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I. Introduction 
 
“The enforcement of international humanitarian law 
cannot depend on international tribunals alone. They 
will never be a substitute for national courts. National 
systems of justice have a vital, indeed, the principal, 
role to play here.”1 
 
 
The number of wars has not decreased in recent history. Contrary to what the international 
community might have hoped after the Second World War, promising “never again”, we 
witnessed catastrophic events in Rwanda, the Balkan-War, Cambodia, Darfur, and the list 
could unfortunately go further along. There may be fewer international armed conflicts, but 
definitely not fewer conflicts in total, which gives rise to worry even more since the legal 
regime governing non-international armed conflicts is, although developing, still weaker than 
that governing international armed conflicts. 
 
According to the development of international law after the Second World War and according 
to statements of states and international organizations, there seems to be a general 
determination of the international community to repress war crimes
2
. Several mechanisms 
have been established in international law after the Second World War to this effect: the 
Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals, obligations related to repression in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the forming of specialized and mixed 
courts and tribunals and the emerging activities of truth commissions. However, no matter 
how well the international mechanisms work, the primary responsibility, according to 
international law, remains with the states to punish these crimes. National procedures are also 
                                                 
1
 Theodor Meron: International criminalization of internal atrocities, in: 89 American Journal of International 
Law (1995), p. 555.  
2
 Later on the study will clarify in Chapter II. 2. (i) the difference between the notions ’grave breaches’ and ’war 
crimes’. At this point it may suffice to say that all grave breaches are also war crimes – and not the other way 
around – but not all violations of international humanitarian law amount to grave breaches or war crimes. 
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the most efficient and practical means to carry out prosecutions, as no international tribunal 
has the capacity to try all those responsible. 
 
Many states have undertaken to respond to this international obligation and to the requirement 
of not letting the perpetrators go unpunished, but faced all kinds of problems, legal and other, 
when applying international law in their national mechanisms. Other states have not even 
endeavored to initiate proceedings, or have done so in a quite unsatisfactory manner.  
 
The Geneva Conventions require the adoption of effective penal provisions for grave breaches 
and the adoption of measures necessary to suppress other breaches of the Conventions.
3
 
Therefore simply ratifying a treaty and adopting sleazy implementing legislation is far from 
being enough. The results of such reckless implementation measures clearly show when 
national courts are trying to apply the law. Therefore questions such as whether an 
international norm can be really directly applicable without the adoption of implementing 
legislation or whether ordinary crimes can sufficiently cover war crimes should have also 
prealably dealt with by the states.  
 
During the decades following the Second World War and the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, many domestic war crime trials were initiated, most of them against Nazi criminals, 
but there were very few against crimes perpetrated in other contexts
4
. In the recent two 
                                                 
3
 Common Article 1, Geneva Conventions: „The High Contracting Parties are under an obligation to respect and 
to ensure respect for the present Convention” and Article 49 Geneva Convention I. According to the 
Commentary, „[t]he use of the words "and to ensure respect" was, however, deliberate: they were intended to 
emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the Contracting Parties. It would not, for example, be enough for 
a State to give orders or directives to a few civilian or military authorities, leaving it to them to arrange as they 
pleased for the details of their execution. (1) It is for the State to supervise their execution. Furthermore, if it is to 
keep its solemn engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in advance, that is to say in peacetime, the 
legal, material or other means of loyal enforcement of the Convention as and when the occasion arises.” See , 
Jean S Pictet, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC (1952), p. 26. 
4
 Worth to mention the special tribunals set up to examine the Novi Sad Raid. The raid took place in 1942, after 
Novi Sad was re-occupied by Hungarian forces. The majority of the local Serb population was reluctant to 
accept Hungarian leadership and organized Partizan forces to oppose the Hungarian Army. As a response, the 
Hungarian Army, on the order of Chief-of-Staff Ferenc Szombathelyi, organized a raid, initially against the 
Partizans, but the raid ended up in the massacre of Serbian and Jewish civilians, resulting in cca. 3000 deaths. 
Due to international pressure, Governor Horthy ordered the setting up of a special tribunal to examine the case. 
The decision of a special tribunal was necessary due to fear that ordinary military tribunals would not be 
impartial, considering that the raid was ordered by high level military leaders. The special tribunal was only 
partially successful, because the main suspects, Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner, the organizer of the raid, and 
József Grassy, the commander responsible for its execution and others involved escaped to Germany. After the 
end of the Second World War they were again tried by the People’s Court in Hungary in 1946 and sentenced to 
death, but the sentence was not executed, they were extradited to Yugoslavia where they were tried and finally 
executed. Politics attempted to intervene in the proceedings in 1943 through initiating an annulment of the 
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decades we have seen an enormous boom in both international and national prosecutions, the 
two having a catalyzing effect on each other: the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, 
national prosecutions in Rwanda, South Africa, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, the procedure 
against Pinochet in Spain followed by indictments in the UK, procedures in Belgium, France 
and Switzerland; the Hissen Habré-case, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Togo, East-Timor are a 
long but not exhaustive list of the national efforts.  
 
Charney perfectly grabs this development by making the following remarks: ”[t]hrough these 
advances governments have become accustomed to the idea that international criminal law 
constitutes a real and operative body of law, which in turn has facilitated domestic 
prosecutions of persons accused of these crimes (…).”5 Furthermore, “[a]s prosecutions of the 
covered crimes increase internationally, before either the ICC or domestic courts, one can 
expect the barriers to domestic pursuit of such cases to continue to fall, as they did after the 
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR”6 (…) “I believe that the real and more effective 
success will reside in the active dockets of many domestic courts around the world, the ICC 
having served first as catalyst, and then as a monitoring and supporting institution.”7 (…) 
“Success will be realized when the aversion to impunity is internalized by the domestic legal 
systems of all states. The test of that success is not a large docket of cases before the ICC, but 
persistent and comprehensive domestic criminal proceedings worldwide (…)”8 
 
Recognizing the importance of domestic prosecutions, it is necessary to examine the reasons 
for the relatively few number of such procedures which may be political, practical or legal. 
One has to note that in some cases national procedures may have a destabilizing effect
9
: they 
                                                                                                                                                        
decisions brought by the tribunal. Evenmore, the tribunal was headed by Chief-of-Staff Szombathelyi, who 
ordered the raid. The tribunal was often seen as fulfilling international expectations on carrying out criminal 
procedure in the Novi Sad Raid case, but not really attempting to bring the main responsible to justice. Sources: 
Cseres Tibor, Vérbosszú Bácskában (Vendetta in Bácska), Magvető (1991), 
http://www.holokausztmagyarorszagon.hu/index.php?section=1&type=content&chapter=2_2_3 (last visited on 
13 November 2012), http://www.hdke.hu/tudastar/enciklopedia/feketehalmy-czeydner-ferenc (last visited on 24 
May 2012),  
http://www.csendor.com/konyvtar/szepirodalom/viszaemlekezesek/magyar/Dr%20K%E9pir%F3%20S%E1ndor
%20nyilatkozata.pdf (last visited on 24 May 2012),  
5
 Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, in: 95/1 American Journal 
of International Law (January 2001), p. 122. 
6
 Ibid, p. 123. 
7
 Ibid, p. 123. 
8
 Ibid, p. 124. 
9
 This was the alleged reason for non-prosecution of the perpetrators of the Adreatine Massacres in Italy during 
World War II. As a retaliation for a partizan attack against German troops by Italian resistance, Hitler himself 
gave the order to kill 10 Italians for each German killed. The Italian victims, largely civilians, were collected 
randomly to make out the expected number, and were executed in the Adreatine caves by drunk soldiers. After 
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may result in incitement of a new or prolonged conflict, especially if there are suspicions as to 
the fairness of the trials.
10
 Political causes may also arise when the crimes were committed as 
a result of state policy
11
, the perpetration of the crimes were overlooked by the system, or if 
the state is reluctant to exercise universal jurisdiction for crimes allegedly committed by a 
friendly or a powerful nation
12
; practical causes could be resulting from the distance in time 
and place between the loci delicti and loci arbitri or the inadequacy of the judiciary system in 
dealing with war crimes cases; legal causes may be the lack of proper national legislation or 
confronting legal principles between international and national law.  
 
The present study mainly concentrates on the legal problems mainly in the field of criminal 
justice guarantees that may account for the relatively small number of domestic trials and that 
may come up once a domestic procedure takes place; then the study examines the possible 
                                                                                                                                                        
the war, neither the German, nor the Italian authorities had any interest in bringing the responsible persons to 
justice. Italian authorities feared that in case they requested extradition of the suspects from Germany, it would 
open a wave of extradition requests towards Italy by other countries, and would undermine their good relations 
with Germany, a NATO ally, as well as with Chancellor Adenauer. Thus, the chief public prosecutor of Italy 
requested the German ambassador to Italy that it confirmed to the Italian public prosecutor’s office that none of 
the suspects are alive or is there whereabouts known, to prevent proceedings in Italy. Evenmore, many of the 
persons sought were holding high position in the German government at the time, in the 1960s and were well 
known. Eventually, three persons were tried in Rome. A trial started against Priebke in 1946, but he managed to 
escape from the prison camp. The renewed proceedings against Priebke, together with Karl Hass, were initiated 
in 1994 after he talked about the event in ABC news. The first instance court relieved them of the charges due to 
elapse of time. The appeals proceedings resulted in life imprisonment for crimes against humanity in 1998 – they 
served the sentence in house arrest due to their age. Previously, Priebke lived in Argentina for 50 years as a free 
man. Argentina extradited Priebke to Italy, where his trial was held. Priebke excused himself by referring to 
Hitler’s direct order. Herbert Kappler, the chief of police in Rome and commander in charge of the massacre, 
was sentenced to life in prison for multiple murder by a military court in Italy in 1948. No other person was held 
accountable for the massacres. Worth to mention that Germany requested the extradition of Priebke during the 
criminal procedure, but the Italian authorities denied the request since a criminal procedure was already in 
process for the same charges. Sources: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/unpunished-massacre-in-
italy-how-postwar-germany-let-war-criminals-go-free-a-809537.html (last visited on 25 May 2012), 
http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=36&level1=15248&level2=&level3=&textid=39887 (last visited on 25 
May 2012), http://www.cicr.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/82529253E69A38C6C1256C8C00553A9A (last visited on 25 May 
2012),http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profils/profile/579/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html (last visited on 25 May 2012). 
10
 See Ruth Wedgewood, National courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in: Substantive and Procedural 
Aspects of International Criminal Law – The Experience of International and National Courts, Volume I, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague (2000), p. 405. 
11
 This was obviously the reason for the immunity of Party officials and those executing state or Party policy 
during the communist era. During the discussion about the legal ways justice can be done after the political 
changes in 1990 in Hungary, one side of the arguments entailed that elapse of time cannot be counted for the 
time the political regime did not execute is prosecutorial powers for acts that were committed on behalf of, or in 
the interest in, of this very same political regime. See Békés-Bihari-Király-Schlett-Varga-Vékás: Szakvélemény 
az 1949 és 1990 között elkövetett, a társadalmi igazságérzetet sértő magatartások, illetve előnyök megítélésének, 
a felelősség megállapításának elveiről és jogi feltételeiről (Opinion on the principles and legal conditions of 
accountability for acts and judgment of benefits violating societal feeling of justice committed between 1949 and 
1990), in: 11 Magyar Jog (1991). 
12
 See the Sharon case in Belgium in Chapter II.2.(ii) or the Rumsfeld case in France in Chapter III.3.(ii). 
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answers to these problems. The study also shortly examines the practical and political hurdles 
that may have an effect.  
 
Generally it must be mentioned that although the legal problems around the domestic 
application of crimes defined in international law may be mostly identical or similar in case of 
the different kinds of core international crimes – i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes –, the study mainly concentrates on war crimes, given the following factors: (i) 
war crimes embody the essence of international crimes in terms of variability of individual 
crimes and the quantity of different kinds of war crimes; (ii) international humanitarian law 
was the first set of rules leading to an adoption of international crimes; (iii) the crime of 
genocide was in most cases word by word implemented into national legislation, therefore 
problems to its implementation and application would not be that representative; (iv) the 
definition of crimes against humanity is still relatively undefined in international law, 
therefore its domestic implementation and application also represents a ‘political’ decision of 
the legislator as to which definition it applies; (v) as opposed to genocide and crimes against 
humanity, there are various and slightly differing obligations in international law as to the 
implementation and effective application of war crimes – for instance the obligations for 
repression and the list of grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions and the list of war crimes 
in the Rome Statute – which require a particular approach.  
 
Following the reasons outlined above, it was considered that for a demonstration of the legal 
problems around the domestic implementation and application of international crimes, the 
examination of war crimes seems to serve the best example. 
 
Due to inherent limits of the study in length and thematic, the study does not seek to identify 
possible drawbacks in domestic implementation of the elements of individual war crimes one-
by-one, mainly because the leading line of the study is the determination of common 
elements, features and hurdles that could arise during the domestic implementation and 
application of war crimes, features that are mainly common in continental legal systems and 
seem to be a common characteristic of post-socialist states’ legislation. However, the one-by-
one analysis of certain war crimes and how they were implemented into domestic penal 
legislation may appear in the study as a representation of one definite common problem.  
 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
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The study concentrates on problems or hurdles of national implementation and application 
mainly from the viewpoint of criminal justice guarantees and thus does not elaborate in depth 
on other kinds of problems, such as general difficulties of enforcement, the complexity of 
international humanitarian law or difficulties of weighing the principles of IHL in domestic 
law. This explains the choice of national legislation and cases that are demonstrated: 
legislation is mainly cited from states that are legging behind, shown as a contrast to instances 
of more advanced pieces of legislation; cases were selected based on the criteria that they 
demonstrate a problem of application arising from conflicting legal principles or possible 
infringement of legality principles during the domestic application of international law. 
 
The overall aim of the study is therefore to examine the problems that usually occur or could 
emerge for national legislators and courts when implementing humanitarian law and trying 
war crimes cases and seeks to determine that effective application of the obligation to repress 
grave breaches goes much further than ratifying international treaties or simply adopting those 
crimes that the international community deems to be pursued.  
 
Such an examination requires a thorough overview of the international obligations, the 
requirements necessary for implementing legislation to be effective and ready for application 
by national courts, and questions must be answered such as (i) how can basic legal principles 
like the principle of legality and foreseeable law become an impediment in a national war 
crime procedure and how implementing legislation can resolve eventual conflicts with these 
basic principles, (ii) to what extent do political considerations play a role in the lust for 
national war crimes procedures and how these considerations may be minimized, and (iii) 
what factors may become practical hurdles, such as lack of the necessary training provided for 
prosecutors and judges or specialized needs required for the investigation of such crimes.  
 
The study also gives an overview of the state of national legislation in certain Central 
European countries and provides examples of how national courts have hitherto dealt with 
war crimes cases. The present author does not wish to provide that national war crimes 
procedures are the best or the only solution to end impunity for war crimes
13
; nevertheless, 
one has to bear in mind that the primary obligation to prosecute – an obligation voluntarily 
accepted by all states – lies with states, and, in an international atmosphere that clearly stands 
                                                 
13
 The role of truth and reconciliation commissions and ad hoc, permanent, mixed or special courts and tribunals 
has to be emphasized, however, these are not the subject of the present examination. 
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for the unconditioned observation of human rights and humanitarian values, national 
procedures seem to be one of the least developed mechanisms in the complex system of 
repressing violations of international humanitarian law. 
 
In the beginning, the study starts by discussing the development of international criminal 
jurisprudence, individual criminal responsibility in international law – including a discussion 
on why the notion of collective responsibility for war crimes is pointless – and the 
development of war crimes, followed by a brief summary of the international obligations to 
repress war crimes, the development of universal jurisdiction, as well as compliance or non-
compliance with law as a strategy in armed conflicts. This chapter ends with the 
demonstration of a parallel example through introducing the main rules of the US Alien Tort 
Statute. 
 
The next chapter deals with examining the legal problems that may arise during the 
application of international law in domestic fora. The chapter is divided into three sub-
chapters according to where these problems are originated: in international law, in national 
law or in national jurisprudence.  
 
The sub-chapter on hurdles inbuilt in international law discusses the effect of international 
penalization obligations on state sovereignty and how states can still influence their 
legislation adopting international crimes; it then goes on to discuss the effect of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and its complementarity principle on domestic 
legislation – with separate discussions on the exact criteria of the complementarity principles, 
the way the ICC considers national laws as sources and the role of state cooperation in ICC 
proceedings – with a special attention on legislation on universal jurisdiction. This is followed 
by an analysis of the general problems of direct application of international law: what are the 
different approaches of monist and dualist states, whether direct applicability really works and 
whether self-executing norms can be automatically directly applied; finally, sub-chapter 1 is 
dealing with specific aspects of the general application of universal jurisdiction. 
 
Sub-chapter 2 examines the hurdles inbuilt in national law from a topical perspective. 
Although a separate examination of continental and common law systems would seem 
obvious, most of the hurdles that are analyzed could arise in both kinds of legal systems. 
Therefore the examination is done first from a general perspective towards more specific 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
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angles: first, potential conflicts of national implementation with the principle of legality will 
be discussed, then the results of the two main approaches of implementation, notably 
reference to international law or the application of ordinary crimes will be analyzed, which is 
followed by other questions such as the domestic criminalization of acts that are not war 
crimes or the importance of the place of the implementing norm in the hierarchy of the 
internal legal system; finally, the sub-chapter is closed by a discussion on the specific aspects 
of implementation of universal jurisdiction and its possible conflict with the legality principle. 
 
The third sub-chapter deals with the potential problems that may arise on the level of internal 
courts: first, the general question is outlined whether domestic courts are indeed prepared and 
ready to deal with war crimes cases and what may be the factors that are missing, then, given 
the sensitive nature of application of universal jurisdiction and the huge effect the judiciary 
has on its exercise, a detailed discussion follows on the different attitudes domestic courts 
have adopted towards universal jurisdiction, listing the main common questions and problems 
that have arisen in past case law. 
 
Chapter IV is seeking to find answers in national legislation and case law to the issues raised 
in the previous chapter. Consequently, this chapter is divided the same way as Chapter III: 
answers or solutions that arose on the level of international jurisprudence, internal legislation 
and internal jurisprudence. 
 
Sub-chapter 1 is discussing examples where international jurisprudence and the work of 
international tribunals presented solutions and had effects on domestic legislation or practice, 
both in substantive and procedural law and on their proceedings. Sub-chapter 2 starts with 
demonstrating general implementation mechanisms with a special attention on the Rome 
Statute, then turns attention on Central European countries, where it first identifies common 
elements of implementing legislation, then shows typical individual solutions through the 
demonstration of four states’ legislation. Sub-chapter 3 finally turns to examples where 
domestic courts themselves served solutions and to techniques which make national 
authorities ready and prepared for war crimes trials. This sub-chapter, similarly to previous 
ones, discusses judicial responses to the challenge of dealing with universal jurisdiction under 
separate headings. 
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II. Evolution of international criminal jurisdiction, individual responsibility and the 
definition of war crimes; international obligations on repression of grave breaches and 
war crimes 
The following pages seek to provide an introduction to the development of international 
jursidiction, the doctrinal evolution concerning individual criminal responsibility in 
international law and the development of the notion of war crimes. This chapter is structured 
to demonstrate the development in these three respective fields, and will guide the reader 
through mainly identical stages – the Hagenbach trial, the Treaty of Versailles, the Nuremberg 
Charter, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC –, analyzing them from the point of view of 
respective development of international criminal jurisdiction, individual responsibility and the 
evolution of war crimes. 
 
The Chapter also provides a brief introduction to the obligations related to the criminal 
repression of grave breaches and war crimes, and a discussion on why compliance with the 
law has become even more crucial in contemporary armed conflicts than it was before. 
 
1. Evolution of international criminal jurisdiction 
 
The first trial in front of an international tribunal concerning war crimes or crimes against 
humanity
14
, and actually the first international tribunal at all, is believed to have been that of 
Peter von Hagenbach. Hagenbach was the governor of Upper Rhein, appointed by the Duke 
of Burgundy. The Duke directed him to keep order on the territories, which von Hagenbach 
fulfilled through terrorizing the population. Following a rebellion in Upper Rhein, he was 
                                                 
14
 It is still subject of debate whether the trial was based on crimes against humanity or war crimes. Those 
arguing for the latter state that there was no armed conflict at the time, therefore the charges could not have been 
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tried by an ad hoc tribunal set up by the Archduke of Austria in 1474
15
. The tribunal involved 
28 judges from different states in the Holy Roman Empire
16
.  
 
The crimes were committed during a rebellion against von Hagenbach and involved murder, 
rape and perjury. He, as many war criminals later, argued that he was only following orders 
from the Duke of Burgundy. However, the tribunal held that he as a knight was deemed to 
have a duty to prevent the very crimes he was charged with, and sentenced him to beheading 
for “violating the laws of God and man”. This trial was the first that involved individual 
criminal responsibility in front of an international tribunal, as well as denying the defence of 
superior order. 
 
It is remarkable that the Hagenbach-trial took place at a time before and 500 years after which 
no similar tribunal existed. As one writer notes, “[i]t is no coincidence that such a unique 
event took place between the erosion of medieval hegemony and the imminent establishment 
of Westphalian sovereignty. Not until the Westphalian veil was pierced by the Nuremberg 
trials nearly five hundred years later, did the subject of the Hagenbach trial take on 
contemporary relevance in the legal literature.”17  
 
The significance of the Hagenbach trial therefore lies in that it was the only attempt at the 
time where acts regarded as violations of fundamental ethical and moral standards were tried 
by a body that had an international face. Since Hagenbach admitted to having perpetrated the 
acts, it would have been perfectly normal at the time to execute him right away. Still, the 
decision, unique at the time, was made that he should face an open court
18
. What was even 
more remarkable, is that he was not tried by a local judge, but by judges representing the 
Alliance. Many writers additionally stress that the trial was fair to the standards at the time: he 
could have been summarily executed but was not, he was given means for his defence and he 
was given the opportunity to confront the witnesses
19
.  
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Therefore, although many historians and lawyers draw attention to the fact that the trial itself 
may well has been an attempt to undermine the territorial demands of the Duke of Burgundy, 
and also underlined that Hagenbach’s testimony that served as a basis for his conviction were 
gained through torture
20
, notwithstanding the political factors which may very well have been 
the main motivation behind the trial itself, the legal significance of it remains uncontested. 
 
The first reference to the Hagenbach case as a justificating factor for twentieth century 
international tribunals was made by Georg Schwarzenberger in an article published after the 
closing of the evidence proceedings in Nuremberg and during the deliberations of the judges. 
In this article
21
, Schwarzenberger compared the Hagenbach trial to that of Nuremberg as 
being the first international criminal tribunal, and was of the opinion that the crimes for which 
Hagenbach was convicted were the forerunners of crimes against humanity. Most probably 
due to this article, a reference to the Hagenbach trial found its way to the judgments of the 
High Command Case and the Ministries Case. From then on, reference to the Hagenbach trial 
became general, as the first international tribunal that ever took place
22
. 
 
The next step in the history of international tribunals was measures foreseen by the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919
23
. Before the Treaty was adopted, the Allied Powers set up a „Commission 
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties at the 
Preliminary Peace Conference” in January 1919 to study international law that can be applied 
to prosecute Germany and to investigate alleged war criminals. The investigations that were 
carried out by the Commission never had any practical consequences, first because the 
international tribunals were never set up, second because anyway there was no institutional 
link between the investigations and the to-be judicial body. However, the Commission did 
find in its report that a belligerent may try enemy persons for violations of laws and customs 
of war, and it may do so in its own courts and tribunals set-up for this purpose, under its own 
procedural law
24
. 
 
                                                 
20
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The Peace Conference, however, did not fully accept the findings of the report, especially 
regarding the setting up of an international tribunal. The opposition mainly came from the 
United States and Japan, who stated that the creation of an international criminal court was 
lacking precedent and was unknown in the practice of nations
25
. Therefore the Treaty adopted 
a milder approach, and opened the possibility that an international ‘special’ tribunal, 
composed of the winning powers, tries William II of Hohenzollern “for a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”26 However, the tribunal was never 
set up
27
 and the trial of Wilhelm never happened
28
 since he fled to the Netherlands who 
refused to extradite him
29
. 
 
The treaty stated that the “German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and 
Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed 
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be 
sentenced to punishments laid down by law.”30 The Treaty gave priority to the jurisdiction of 
such military tribunals over German courts by adding that „[t]his provision will apply 
notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the 
territory of her allies.”31 The text does not say much about the composition of the tribunals, 
only stating that in case the victims are citizens of several states, the tribunals will be 
composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned
32
, thus will have an 
international feature. 
 
When the Allied Powers drew the list of persons they wished to try – a list of 900 persons –, 
serious demonstrations took place in Germany. Considering its obligation to hand over the 
persons to the Allied forces, nevertheless taking into account the strong feelings against the 
surrender of persons expressed by the German nation, Germany proposed, as a compromise, 
to try its own persons in Leipzig, at the Reich’s Supreme Court. To stress how serious they 
                                                 
25
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were about trying their own people, Germany adopted a law on the prosecution of war 
offenders. The Allied Powers eventually agreed, and the trials began in May 1921, with 
substantially fewer numbers of defendants
33
, only twelve, as opposed to the originally 
proposed nine hundred. Therefore, following the Treaty of Versailles, finally neither an 
international tribunal, nor international military tribunals were set up. 
 
A similar attempt was made at the Treaty of Sèvres to try those allegedly responsible for the 
Armenian genocide. The Treaty required Turkey to hand over to the Allied Powers alleged 
criminals who were found within its boarders. Several persons were transferred to Malta and 
waited for the procedures to start, which, however, never started, and the accused were 
transferred back to Turkey. The procedures did not start because the treaty was never ratified, 
and the Treaty of Lausenne, which replaced it, did not include a corresponding provision.
34
 
Eventually, the Allies agreed that Turkey carries out the procedures herself; these were the so-
called Istanbul trials, which were not more successful than the Leipzig trials: the defendants 
were either absent, or the sentences were light, or harsh sentences were announced mainly due 
to internal political reasons. In addition, Turkey has denied that crimes against humanity were 
committed against Armenians
35
. 
 
The International Law Association prepared a draft statute of a permanent international 
criminal tribunal in 1926
36
, however, world politics were not favorable at the time for the 
setting up of such body
37
. Therefore it was not until after the Second World War that the idea 
of an international tribunal could materialize. 
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was set up following years of discussions and negotiations among 
the Allied Powers, and was finally established by the London Agreement. Whereas the 
American delegation opposed the setting up of an international court during the negotiations 
in 1919, it strongly argued in favor during the Second World War. While Churchill and Stalin 
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initially argued for the summary execution of the major war criminals
38
, it was the American 
delegation that was the main supporter of the tribunal and argued that – learning from the 
experiences of the Leipzig trials – it should not be national courts of the perpetrators or the 
national courts of the victorious powers, but an international tribunal that should prosecute 
war criminals. 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal – in its official name the International Military Tribunal for the Far East – 
was created by a charter issued as a military order by General Douglas MacArthur, the 
supreme commander for the Allied powers in Japan. However, it largely based itself on the 
London Charter, giving it some legitimacy
39
. It also followed the London Charter in terms of 
jurisdiction over crimes, the denial of immunity of officials and the defence of superior order.  
 
Despite the criticisms about the Nuremberg Tribunal against it being set up solely by the 
victors of the war, the fact that there was a tribunal following due process and examining the 
individual actions and whether these constituted a violation of international law – instead of 
simply executing those perceived guilty, as many leading politicians and certainly a great part 
of the public opinion would have wished to –, represented a milestone in international 
criminal law and certainly set the basis for future international tribunals. Although discussions 
continued about the setting up of a permanent international criminal court after the Second 
World War, including the request in 1948 by the General Assembly for the International Law 
Commission to explore the possibility of establishing a criminal chamber of the International 
Court of Justice
40
, discussions of the question by the UN Secretariat in 1949, and subsequent 
specific reports on the issue in 1951 and 1953
41
, it could materialize only five decades later.
42
 
 
The setting up of both the ICTY and ICTR were largely a result of a bad conscious from the 
part of the international community, failing to address probably the worst atrocities of the 
post-World War II world. Despite clear evidences of serious human rights violations and 
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grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, states failed in both conflicts to intervene in time. 
This gave, in both cases, green light to even graver violations and finally, when these 
situations could not be ignored, states decided to set up international tribunals within the 
framework of the UN
43
.  
 
In the case of the ICTY, the proposal came initially from the French constitutional judge 
Robert Badinter, the head of the Commission of Experts nominated by the Security Council to 
analyze the situation. The General Assembly endorsed the idea in a Resolution in 1992, and 
the Security Council decided on the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal in another 
Resolution
44
 in 1993
45
. Although the establishment of the ICTY was undoubtedly a landmark 
step for international criminal law and international criminal jurisdiction, it didn’t have the 
deterring effect it wished to have: the Srebrenica massacres, probably the ugliest event of the 
whole war happened after its establishment. In the case of the ICTR, the initiative came from 
Rwanda, and the Security Council decided on the establishment of a second ad hoc tribunal
46
. 
 
Although the analysis of the effects of the jurisprudence of both tribunals goes well beyond 
the limits of the present study, it must be mentioned that the first major judgment by the ICTY 
put down the frameworks in which the tribunal(s) later acted, most significantly for the 
purposes of the present study, by the acceptance of punishability of war crimes in non-
international armed conflicts
47
. Therefore, although many states expressed during the 
establishment of the ICTY that it was an exceptional response for exceptional circumstances 
and therefore it did not establish new norms and precedents, but “simply applies existing 
international humanitarian law”48, its precedent played a crucial role in clarifying existing 
customary law and developing international humanitarian law. 
 
The two ad hoc tribunals doubtlessly had a huge influence on the establishment of the ICC. 
During the discussions on the setting up of the ad hoc tribunals, many states expressed their 
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opinion that although the ad hoc tribunals may pave the way for a permanent international 
criminal court, that should not be established through a Security Council resolution
49
. 
 
The UN General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee in 1994, during which negotiations 
shifted from the idea of a court with primacy over domestic courts towards a court that is 
complementary to national jurisdictions. It had also already been decided relatively early on 
during the negotiations that the crimes would be defined in detail
50
. The result was, as well 
known, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a statute that lists crimes and 
defines their elements in a separate document, representing a great step towards clarity of war 
crimes law. Its specificity is its complementarity to national jurisdictions, which will be 
discussed later in Chapter III.1.(ii). 
 
Summing up the history of international tribunals and courts, the ‘using’ of international 
criminal law for – at least partially – political purposes continued to be a method used by 
states after the Hagenbach trial, establishing a mechanism that became more independent 
from political considerations and growing into one of the most applauded developments in the 
twentieth century in international law through the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court.  
 
For one should not be too naïve as to the partial aim and purpose of such trials, at least in 
earlier times. Remarkable, that both the tribunals foreseen by the Treaty of Versailles and 
Sèvres and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were instigated by the victors in the 
respective wars, and one of the main criticisms against the International Criminal Court today 
is that it only tries African cases, leaving alleged violations committed by strong powers 
untouched. Also remarkable but unsurprising, that, as shown in later pages of the present 
thesis, states only exercised universal jurisdiction effectively in relation to contexts where 
there was no political inconvenience. Therefore we must admit that international tribunals and 
courts are not entirely independent from political considerations, however, this does not 
diminish their huge role in international criminal justice. 
 
At the same time, there are essential differences between the tribunals foreseen in Versailles 
and Sèvres, the Nuremberg and Tokyo systems and the ICC which make „victor’s justice” – 
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understanding as „strong states’ justice” in the case of the ICC – arguments obsolete for the 
ICC. The main difference is notably the legal basis, which in the case of the planned 
Versailles-Sèvres, and the Nuremberg-Tokyo tribunals is highly debatable, is fairly well-
founded in case of the Rome Statute being an international treaty. The two ad hoc bodies of 
the 1990s could be seen as a middle-way in that UN Security Council resolutions under 
Chapter VII are undoubtedly obligatory, an international treaty nevertheless demonstrates a 
firmer, wider consensus
51
. 
 
Nonetheless, international law and especially developments related to criminal responsibility 
on the international level were never free of political considerations, yet they did contribute to 
an evolution of set of rules which even the mighty powers are bound to respect. As sub-
Chapter II.4. of the present thesis demonstrates, respect for the law of armed conflict, or a fear 
of being labeled as disrespectful for it, became a kind of weapon and thus bears much more 
significance than it did before. Therefore, even if the earlier attempts at establishing 
international criminal tribunals were at least partially driven by political motives, they did 
finally establish a mechanism that became more independent and less influenced by world 
politics. 
 
Another interesting observation while comparing post-World War I prosecutions with 
Nuremberg, the ICTR and ICTY, is that the Leipzig trials mainly concentrated on violations 
of conduct of hostilities – Hague law –, while the majority of the Nuremberg cases were 
concerned with violations of protection of certain persons and objects – Geneva law. While 
the ICTY also had some cases related to means and methods of warfare, it was also mainly 
concentrating on protection issues, while in the case law of the ICTR, abuses against civilians 
were far the main issues
52
. 
 
The development of international criminal jurisdiction was parallel to the evolution of 
universal jurisdiction. Although universal jurisdiction was already accepted in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, it was not until the 1990s that it was really applied. The observation 
about the influence of politics on early ideas of international tribunals is also valid for 
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universal jurisdiction, notably because exercising such form of jurisdiction tramps on other 
states’ sovereignty.  
 
The relationship of international tribunals and domestic courts dealing with international 
crimes has always been of a complementary nature – not in terms of jurisdiction of course. 
While prosecution would be the obligation of domestic courts, in certain situations it proved 
impossible, difficult or not effective enough to leave it to domestic courts, hence the ideas of 
international bodies
53
.  
 
History has also proved that even if international tribunals existed, domestic courts still had a 
role to play. There were many war crimes trials on the domestic fora after the Nuremberg 
Tribunals, and both the ICTY and the ICTR handed over trials to domestic systems. The ICC, 
in turn, starts from the point of seeing its own jurisdiction secondary to national jurisdictions. 
This balance, the result of decades of development, seems to be a fair share of work between 
national and international bodies – although it would be too early to talk about experiences 
related to the functioning of the ICC. 
 
Since the essence of the thesis is war crimes as applied by domestic courts, the next sub-
chapter deals with the development of individual criminal responsibility and the development 
of war crimes in international law, as well as the effect these had on domestic legislation. 
 
2. Evolution of individual criminal responsibility and development of war crimes in 
international law 
 
Individual criminal responsibility first appeared during the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
and was further developed in international criminal law. During these procedures the 
individual was holding criminal accountability for certain crimes, even if he carried out the 
acts in the name of the state or government. The essence of individual criminal responsibility 
was to avoid impunity of persons for the most heinous crimes, even those who were trying to 
apply defences like superior orders, official capacity or other similar circumstances.   
                                                 
53
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Although the requirement to punish those violating the laws of war – crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes were understood under this term at that time – was 
raised universally only after the Second World War, references appeared earlier in other 
sources as well. The Lieber Code, for example, does establish individual criminal 
responsibility for certain acts, and although only applicable in the United States, it did have an 
effect on other states as well
54
. The Treaty of Versailles
55
 stated that Germany accepted the 
allied powers to bring to an allied military tribunal those who violated laws and customs of 
war, and Germany would be bound to hand over such persons. Even more, if the victims were 
of several nationality, a possibility for the setting up of an international tribunal was raised
56
. 
 
The Leipzig trials conducted in the 1920s were a consequence of these provisions, and the 
first war crime trials conducted on the basis of international law. The trials involved German 
citizens, convicted for acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. The substantive basis 
for the trials was the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV. Although, as 
Schabas notes, the Hague Regulations were not intended to provide a source for individual 
criminal responsibility, its norms were heavily relied on by the 1919 Commission which 
preceded the Versailles Treaty
57
. 
 
The Leipzig trials had been criticized as being bias by Allied Forces, even before the 
proceedings started
58
. Indeed, the French and the Belgians were very disappointed with the 
outcome of the trials: the maximum penalty imposed was four years. The sentences were 
carried out in house of detention instead of prison, and two of the six persons charged escaped 
soon after, under suspicious circumstances. However, some of the British observers stated that 
the tribunal had done a fairly good job given the circumstances
59
.  
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All in all, although international humanitarian law underwent substantial development from 
the middle of the nineteenth century until after World War I, its enforcement was legging 
behind. The failures in establishing an international tribunal or international military tribunals 
after the Versailles Treaty and the serious shortcomings of holding those accountable during 
the Leibzig trials indicate that “while the contours of war crimes law had been increasingly 
well established by World War II, persons violating that law faced only a hypothetical 
possibility of criminal sanction. In a sense, war crimes law had not yet truly become a form of 
criminal law.”60 
 
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal manifests individual criminal responsibility,
61
 
moreover, it states that official capacity of defendants does not free them from responsibility, 
and the defence of superior order cannot be applied as negating responsibility, only, at most, 
as a mitigating circumstance
62
. It was therefore the Nuremberg and Tokyo procedures that 
initiated the evolution of individual criminal responsibility in international law and produced 
important jurisprudence in this regard. 
 
As a consequence, the International Law Commission (ILC) manifested individual criminal 
responsibility in its 1950 report, even in case the crime in question was not criminalized in 
national law
63
. The ILC understood international crimes as those coming under the 
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and this is how eventually crimes defined in 
international law became “crimes under international law”. 
 
During about this time, the “search for and prosecute” obligation appeared in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions
64
. This was one of the novelties in the 1949 Conventions, as the 1929 
Conventions entailed only a very weak reference to responsibility
65
. The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions expressly oblige states to punish perpetrators of grave violations in national law: 
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the “ensure respect” and the repression obligations, moreover, the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction has now become binding on states
66
. 
 
In addition, the Geneva Conventions list the grave breaches, and the list is more 
comprehensive than the war crimes in the Nuremberg Charter. The 1954 Hague Convention 
on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts and its 1999 Protocol, 
as well as the 1977 Additional Protocol I all contain similar rules, extending the list of 
international crimes. 
 
Based partially on the Geneva Conventions, the Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals 
established to try violations committed in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda
67
 respectively do 
not only refer to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but also to other serious 
violations – including the serious violation of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II –  
and the laws and customs of war, already referred to in the Nuremberg Charter. 
 
The high peak of these developments was the further expansion of the list of international 
crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, probably the main merits of 
which is the enlargening of the list of crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts.  
 
Summing up, international law today undoubtedly accepts individual criminal responsibility. 
The main enforcement body today, with the gradual closing down of the two ad hoc tribunals 
is the International Criminal Court, in case it has jurisdiction. The primary responsibility, 
however, still lies with states.  
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neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 , articles 1 and 4. 
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(i) Development of war crimes in international law 
 
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the term ‘war crime’ means “in international law, 
serious violation of the laws or customs of war as defined by international customary law and 
international treaties.” The definition pretty much covers the notion, and it can probably be 
agreed that it is due to the fast development of customary law that makes identification of the 
list of war crimes today rather difficult.  
 
The first attempt to list war crimes was the Lieber Code of 1863, a set of regulations for the 
American army issued by President Abraham Lincoln. The Lieber Code listed wanton 
violence against persons in the invaded country, including rape and murder, and forcing 
enemy members to serve in the hostile army, as serious breaches of the law of war. 
 
The Versailles and Sèvres Treaties did not list war crimes. The Leipzig Trials, conducted as a 
consequence of the Versailles Treaty, were based on the 1907 Hague Regulations, which, 
however, did not list war crimes either, instead, the Regulations concentrated on the payment 
of compensation by the state as the chief form of punishment – however, this obviously did 
not mean individual responsibility. At the same time, violations of the Hague Regulations had 
long been seen as violations for which members of the armed forces or civilians could be held 
individually responsible
68
, and thus the rules of the Hague Regulations served the basis for the 
determination of war crimes during the Leipzig Trials. 
 
The 1919 Commission, in its report, drew up a list of war crimes
69
, including murder and 
massacre, torture of civilians, rape, and internment of civilians under inhuman conditions
70
. 
The list, however, and the justifications for including certain elements in the list indicate that 
it included both war crimes and what later became crimes against humanity. This last element 
was the main criticism of the United States against the findings of the Commission, indicating 
that violations of the “laws of humanity” were vague and not well established, therefore it 
would violate the principle of legality
71
. Obviously, the American opinion on this changed 
substantially by the time of the Nuremberg Tribunals. 
                                                 
68
 See Meron (2006), p. 554. 
69
 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties: Report 
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (March 29, 1919), reprinted in 14 American Journal of 
International Law 95, 98 (1920). 
70
 See Meron (2006), p. 555. 
71
 See Meron (2006), p. 556. 
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The next instrument where war crimes appeared was the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal – 
lacking a list of war crimes in the 1929 Geneva Conventions. The antecedent event was the 
inauguration of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) on October 20, 1943 
to investigate war crimes; many findings of which were adopted in the Nuremberg Charter. 
The Commission relied on the war crimes listed by the 1919 Commission, mainly to avoid 
criticism that it had invented new war crimes after they had been perpetrated, and also 
because Italy and Japan had also been part of the 1919 Commission, and Germany had not 
objected to its findings. 
 
The text of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal referred to laws and customs of war, laws 
meaning mainly the 1899 and 1907 Hague Treaties and the 1929 Geneva Conventions, none 
of which mentioned war crimes. Therefore it was the Nuremberg Statute that first operated 
with the term “war crime” and provided a definition to it. The Nuremberg Statute also relied 
heavily on customary law to overcome the problem of a lack of proper international 
regulation of prohibition of attacks against civilians in the international treaties in force at the 
time of the Second World War. Hence, the Nuremberg Statute did not only apply the term war 
crimes, but also filled it with precise meaning, basically codifying existing customary law.  
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their provisions on penal repression and grave breaches 
were obvious followers of the Nuremberg Statute. However, the Geneva Conventions used 
the term ‘grave breaches’ instead of ‘war crimes’, and for a reason. According to the ICRC 
Commentary, “[t]he actual expression "grave breaches" was discussed at considerable length. 
The USSR Delegation would have preferred the expression "grave crimes" or "war crimes". 
The reason why the Conference preferred the words "grave breaches" was that it felt that, 
though such acts were described as crimes in the penal laws of almost all countries, it was 
nevertheless true that the word "crimes" had different legal meanings in different countries.”72 
More specifically, the idea was to emphasize the difference between these very serious crimes 
and ordinary crimes or infractions under national law
73
. The Geneva Conventions therefore 
concentrated on grave breaches of the Conventions, whether they were called crimes or not in 
specific domestic laws. 
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 Commentary to GC I, p. 371. 
73
 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald – Olivia Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of 
International Criminal Law, The Experience of International and National Courts, Volume I, Commentary, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2000), p. 70. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 28 
 
The lists of grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions are substantially longer than in the 
Nuremberg Statute. In addition, the 1949 Geneva Conventions made the obligation of the 
1929 Convention I regarding national legislation more imperative. While the 1929 
Convention I merely said that “[t]he Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall also 
propose to their legislatures should their penal laws be inadequate, the necessary measures for 
the repression in time of war of any act contrary to the provisions of the present 
Convention.”74, the obligation of the 1949 Conventions „(…) has (…) been made 
considerably more imperative. The Contracting Parties are more strictly bound to enact the 
necessary legislation than in the past”75. The difference basically lies in the imperativeness: 
while the 1929 Convention I sounds more like a recommendation – ‘shall propose’ –, the 
1949 text is clearly an obligation – ‘Parties undertake to enact’. 
 
The 1977 Additional Protocol I made further developments. Article 11 lists prohibited acts, 
while Article 85 lists further grave breaches, making the list longer
76
. In addition, it makes 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions applicable to grave breaches of Additional 
Protocol I, if these are committed against persons or objects newly protected by Additional 
Protocol I
77
. Therefore Additional Protocol I extended the number of situations in which acts 
would become grave breaches, and added one more grave breach, notably the perfidious use 
of protective signs and signals. 
                                                 
74
 1929 Geneva Convention, Article 29. 
75
 Commentary to GC I, p. 363. 
76
 Additional Protocol I substantially widens the area of protection and extends it to, among others, civilian 
medical personnel, transport and material and certain protected objects. It also includes specific rules on means 
and methods of warfare with providing more detailed provisions on the notion of combatants. According to 
Articles 11 and 85 of Additional Protocol I, acts considered as grave breaches in addition to those described in 
the Geneva Conventions include the following: physical mutilations, medical or scientific experiments, removal 
of tissue or organs for transplantation not justified by the state of health of the person; any willful act or omission 
which seriously endangers the physical or mental health or integrity of any person ;  [when committed willfully, 
in violation of the relevant provisions of the Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health] : 
making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack ; launching an indiscriminate attack 
violating the principle of proportionality ; launching an attack against works or installations containing 
dangerous forces ; making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack ; the perfidious 
use of the protected emblems ; [when committed willfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol] : 
the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the 
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory, in 
violation of Geneva Convention IV; unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; 
practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, 
based on racial discrimination; [upon the existence of certain additional criteria] : making the clearly-recognized 
historic monuments, works of art or places of worship the object of attack, causing as a result extensive 
destruction; depriving a person protected by the Conventions or Protocol I of the rights of fair and regular trial. 
77
 Claude Pillod, Yves Sandoz, Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1987), p. 991, para 3460. 
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Finally, Additional Protocol I adopted a text that was initially highly controversive, notably 
stating that grave breaches constitute war crimes
78
. As outlined below in Chapter II.2.(i), the 
difference between the notions of grave breaches and war crimes lies in where they are 
regulated. ‘Grave breaches’ are terms used by the Geneva Conventions – Geneva law –, 
whereas the term ‘war crimes’ was used in the Nuremberg Charter, originated from Hague 
law. Therefore many regarded grave breaches as referring to violations of Geneva law, and 
war crimes as violations of Hague law.  
 
This differentiation or grouping was made obsolete by the mentioned provision of Additional 
Protocol I
79
, and also by the fact that Additional Protocol I includes both Geneva law and 
Hague law-type regulations. What was clear however at the time was that grave breaches and 
war crimes – therefore international criminal responsibility – were not applicable to violations 
committed in non-international conflicts. This text in Additional Protocol I, finally adopted by 
consensus, merely confirms that there is only one concept, assuring however that “the 
affirmation contained in this paragraph will not affect the application of the Conventions and 
the Protocol”80.  
 
However, this grouping is not entirely reflected in the ICC Rome Statute. Article 8 specifies 
only grave breaches in the understanding of the Geneva Conventions, but not in Additional 
Protocol I. This can be explained by the fact that Additional Protocol I was not ratified by 
many of the states negotiating the Rome Statute, including the United States which knowingly 
played an important role in the preparatory phase. Therefore these states were reluctant to 
incorporate grave breaches of AP I into the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute only works with 
the notion ‘war crimes’ and not grave breaches, however, one set of war crimes are grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Therefore with respect to the war crimes – grave 
breaches relation, we shall state that all grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are war 
crimes, but not all war crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
 
                                                 
78
 „Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these 
instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.” Article 85 para 5, Additional Protocol I. 
79
 See Schabas (2005), p. 53. 
80
 Commentary to Additional Protocol I, p. 1000, para 3523. 
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(ii) Individual responsibility versus collective responsibility? 
 
As described above, one great achievement in international law is the recognition of 
individual criminal responsibility,
81
 as opposed to notions of collective guilt, collective 
responsibility or any forms of collective retribution.
82
 It seems that different fields of 
international law – international humanitarian law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law –, although originating from different times, concepts and attitudes, 
mutually work toward an effective and enforceable international system of individual criminal 
responsibility.  
 
In such a system, international humanitarian law provides the rules, human rights law defining 
the frameworks of international and national accountability, and international criminal law, 
the ‘newest’ element, setting the conditions for international enforcement should national 
efforts fail. Today we are still in a learning process of how to give effect to this principle in 
practice: the establishment and experiences gained from the activity of international tribunals 
and the International Criminal Court, as well as experiences achieved by national courts are 
all indicators of this learning process. Despite these achievements, discussions about 
collective guilt and collective responsibility are often on the agenda, even if only 
theoretically, with no apparent or direct practical results.
83
 The following pages will seek to 
demonstrate why individual responsibility is the only way to determine accountability for 
violations of war crimes. 
                                                 
81
 „We all celebrate the emergence of a human rights regime that recognizes the rights of the individual as 
distinct from, and sometimes even in opposition to, those of the state. We recognize and celebrate the emergence 
of a parallel system of personal legal accountability. And we should, therefore, agree that, in this modern age of 
individual rights and duties, it is untenable to blame an entire polis-the whole citizenry-for the wrongs committed 
either by individual criminals or by a criminal government.” See Thomas Franck, Individual criminal liability 
and collective civil responsibility: do they reinforce or contradict one another?, in: 6 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review (2007) 567-574, p. 569. 
82
 Already after World War II, collective guilt was seen by many as primitive, irrational and bigoted. When the 
entire Dutch cabinet stepped down after failure to prevent or stop the Srebrenica massacres, this did not reflect 
negatively on the entire Dutch population. See Therese O’Donnell, Executioners, bystanders and victims: 
collective guilt, the legacy of denazification and the birth of twentieth-century transitional justice, in: 25 Legal 
Studies (2005), p. 632. 
83 
In many writings collective responsibility means responsibility of a state or responsibility of criminal 
organizations or joint criminal enterprise. See for example Ainley, Kirsten. “Collective Responsibility for War 
Crimes: Politics and Possibilities” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting 
Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, 
LA, Feb 17, 2010 <Not Available>. 2010-11-15. Also available from:  
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p416608_index.html . Franck, however, makes a clear distinction between 
state responsibility and determination of people’s collective guilt. See Franck (2007), pp. 570-571. In the present 
article, however, the notion of collective responsibility is not meant to indicate state responsibility, rather the 
abstract responsibility of a state, nation or a group. This article does not seek to discuss the responsibility of 
(criminal) organizations either, although references to it are made below. 
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Are wars collective in nature? 
 
One great advocate of the notion of collective guilt for the four crimes over which the ICC has 
jurisdiction is George P. Fletcher. His starting point is that aggression, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes are collective in their character. He argues for this view 
by saying that war is a collective enterprise by its nature: as an example, the practice of taking 
and caring for prisoners testifies to the collective character of armed confrontation.  
 
According to his opinion, the nature of war entails that “[t]he person who goes to war ceases 
being a citizen and becomes a soldier in a chain of command.” Additionally, “war suppresses 
the identity of the individual soldier and insulates him or her from criminal liability; on the 
other hand, the international legal order now holds individuals accountable for certain forms 
of immoral and indecent treatment of the enemy. When an individual commits a war crime, he 
or she breaks out, at least in part, from the collective order of war and emerges as an 
individual guilty of violating a prohibition adopted in the international legal community.”84 
Or, in other words, warfare transforms the whole population taking part in it and also its 
representation into one totality, of which the moral quality of individual behaviour is also a 
part. 
 
To demonstrate this with the example of the Rwandan genocide, a great number of persons 
involved were tried for committing genocide, and in the public mind, it was the “Hutus” 
collectively who were massacring the Tutsis, therefore the war seemed to be a collective one 
between the Hutus against the Tutsis. This was a rare event where it was not only a military 
force or a militia carrying out the violations, but included a great part of the population 
themselves as perpetrators.  
 
When we talk about the responsibility of the Hutus in general – which sounds like collective 
responsibility –, looking at the criminal procedures, we realize that responsibility of “the 
Hutus” means responsibility of those Hutus who actually took part in the massacres 
themselves: in the final outcome, individual responsibility. In this case therefore we are not 
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 George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 
Yale Law Journal (May 2002), p. 1518. 
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talking about an abstract collective responsibility, but about a case where a big part of the 
population not only supported the crimes being committed, but also actively took part in it. 
This, in the end, is not collective responsibility, but the individual responsibility of a large 
number of a group: an add-up of individual responsibilities.
85
  
 
A case study: the Polish farmer 
 
Fletcher illustrates the conflict of collective and individual responsibility arising from three 
factors – (i) war being an alternative legal order, (ii) international law as a source of 
individual criminal responsibility and (iii) domestic law as a source of individual criminal 
responsibility – through the following example.86 It is this very example through which I seek 
to demonstrate that thinking in terms of collective responsibility in the case of war crimes is 
ill-founded. 
 
A Polish farmer individually takes up arms against German troops invading his country and 
kills three German soldiers. In Fletcher’s opinion, the farmer is guilty of murder under 
domestic law, because the farmer is acting alone, independently of the army, so the case falls 
outside the collective activity that defines the law of war. Fletcher’s line of reasoning is that 
since an attack against a state is collective, a collective self-defence applies for the state that 
has been attacked, therefore the attacked state, acting through its army, has the right to fight 
back.  
 
As the Polish farmer was not a representative of his army, he cannot invoke the collective 
right of self-defence and would have to rely, instead, on individual self-defence. As, let us 
suppose in the present example, the German troops did not pose a threat to his personal safety, 
there was no individual self-defence situation in the case. Fletcher therefore raises attention 
                                                 
85
 At the same time one has to acknowledge that genocide, per definitionem, often involves a whole group as 
perpetrators. Many writers therefore raise the question whether responsibility of criminal groups, such as the 
Interahamwe, would be the adequate response. “It is important to keep in mind that our claims apply to 
particular kinds of grave injustice, namely, those stemming from hatred of a group”. „[…] notions of criminal 
responsibility rooted in ideas of individual guilt do not provide good models for devising a sound legal and 
moral approach to genocide.” See: Thomas W. Simon, The laws of genocide: prescriptions for a just world, 
Greenwood Publishing Group (2007), p. 222 and p. 220 respectively. The responsibility of criminal 
organizations is, however, not the same notion as collective responsibility. Responsibility of organizations entail 
conditions such as active participation in the groups, the responsibility of its leaders, etc. 
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 Fletcher (2002), p. 1518. 
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on the collective nature of the right to fight in order to lead to an understanding of the 
collective nature of the guilt that may appear once a war crime has been committed.  
 
According to my consideration, however, the basic argument in the above reasoning does not 
correspond to the basic understanding and principles of the law of war. It may be true that war 
is collective by nature, notably an act or a series of acts of a single person representing no one 
but him/herself cannot be considered as war.  
 
However, the underlying consideration behind rules applicable to armed conflicts is not the 
collective nature of the conflict, but protection of those not participating in hostilities, 
therefore the very basic principle is the principle of distinction
87
. Therefore it is strictly 
prohibited for other persons than combatants to participate in the hostilities. Civilians taking 
part in the hostilities in civilian clothes, not being distinctable, would undermine the concept 
of distinction and consequently such acts are usually prohibited under both international and 
domestic law. This prohibition is therefore not founded on the lack of a self-defence situation, 
but because this would be a feigning of protected status.  
 
The point therefore that is missing from the example of the Polish farmer seems to be that  
international humanitarian law’s (IHL) starting point is military necessity versus humanitarian 
considerations and not self-defence. IHL acknowledges that there is military necessity in an 
armed conflict, therefore makes acts permissible which are otherwise, in peacetime, not 
permissible. Military necessity is therefore very different from the notion of self-defence, 
either collective or individual. Accordingly, to judge the legality of the soldier’s act, it is not 
the existence of a self-defence situation that is to be examined, but whether the civilian did 
take a direct part in the hostilities or not.  
 
The rationale of this difference can be demonstrated through weighing the legality of an 
attack under the proportionality principle under IHL. Whereas the self-defence concept 
concentrates on an imminent threat to one’s life and often acknowledges disproportionate 
responses due to the understandable shock one experiences under such threat, the IHL logic 
concentrates on the prohibition of attacking civilians and the requirement of an attack to be 
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proportionate compared to the military advantage anticipated. Therefore not every legal attack 
under IHL would be legal under the self-defence concept. 
 
Given the strict provisions on distinction, the only exception in IHL
88
 where a civilian 
becomes combatant if he/she participates in the hostilities without being member of the army 
(or militant group) is levée en messe89, which entails that the civilian population in 
unoccupied territories, on approach of the enemy, has the right to take up arms spontaneously 
and is not to be punished thereof, if they haven’t had the time to organize themselves, 
provided that they carry their arms openly, hence, are distinctable, as required by international 
humanitarian law
90
.
91
 
 
Concluding from all the above, in the case of the Polish farmer if we regard self-defence and 
the collective nature of the attack/counter-attack, we have to examine whether the farmer was 
actually in a self-defence situation. As long as he was not, he was not entitled to fight back. If 
there was a group of Polish farmers instead of only one farmer, the situation would be the 
same. Under IHL rules, however, we must examine whether the enemy was approaching, 
whether the farmers had time to organize themselves, whether the taking up of arms was 
spontaneous and whether they carried their arms openly. The soldiers threatening them 
personally is not an issue under levée en messe. The criteria are, obviously, very different.92 
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 Géza Herczegh warned that any exception or derivation from the main rule of combatants’ obligation to make 
themselves distinctable from the civilian population would ultimately lead to a weakening of the protection of 
civilians. See Herczegh (1984), pp. 270-274. 
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 Article 4 A (6) Geneva Convention III and Article 50 (1) Additional Protocol I. 
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 See Article 4 A (6) of Geneva Convention III. 
91
 Another interesting example of consideration of levée en messe is the status of Yugoslav partizans who 
opposed Hungary re-gaining control over Novi Sad in 1942, which was followed by the Novi Sad Raid carried 
out by the Hungarian armed forces. The partizan actions did not only take place during the re-occupation of the 
territories and were not spontaneous, therefore they cannot be qualified as levée en messe. This, however, did not 
justify the raid that was carried out in retaliation of the Partizan actions. 
92
 A Hungarian parallel to the case could be that of Bishop Vilmos Apor. During the Second World War, under 
the German occupation of Hungary, the Bishop protected everyone, irrespective of religion or race, who sought 
refuge in his church. The occupation of Győr, the town of his seat, began on 29 March 1945. On 30 March, after 
having denied entry for Soviet soldiers seeking to rob the cellar and rape the women who were staying there, he 
was engaged in a fight by a Soviet soldier, during which he was shot. The wounds caused his death a few days 
later. (Source: http://magazin.ujember.katolikus.hu/Archivum/2002.05/08.html and  
http://www.irodalmijelen.hu/?q=node/1384 (last visited on 8 May 2012). The question could emerge whether he 
was acting in self-defence and whether his action could be regarded under levée en messe, considering the 
occupation of Győr. Since he was acting alone, his action cannot be seen as levée en messe; in addition, he was 
not acting to stop the invading forces but to protect the women in his residence. Nevertheless, the action of the 
Soviet soldiers was clearly illegal, given that the Bishop was not armed. 
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The conclusion therefore is that when deciding whether the Polish farmer acted rightfully, the 
decisive element should not be the existence of the threat to his personal security, i.e. the 
prevalence of an individual self-defence situation, but rather the conditions laid down by IHL. 
In this case, since the farmer was acting alone, levée en messe cannot be applied to him93.  
 
Therefore Fletcher’s examination falls, as a precondition, on the existence of a self-defence 
situation, while the IHL examination falls on the question of direct participation in hostilities. 
As a summary, although the result of the two examinations will be practically the same in 
case of one Polish farmer (self-defence–based: the farmer was not in a self-defence situation 
therefore attacking the soldiers was illegal; IHL–based: levée en messe can be applied only to 
“en messe”: a group of persons, therefore attacking the soldiers was illegal since the farmer 
was acting along), we may come to two different results if we regard a group of Polish 
farmers (self-defence – based: no self-defence situation therefore the act is illegal; IHL–
based: if those criteria which we have specified above are fulfilled, the act is legal).   
 
Therefore reformulating the question, and changing the facts of the case to a group of Polish 
farmers: according to the Fletcher-reasoning, the Polish farmer still cannot raise the 
‘collective’ argument because they were not acting as representatives of their armies; while 
according to the present author’s reasoning, in this case they could justify their acts under 
levée en messe because there was a ‘group’ of them, no matter whether they were 
representing their armies or not.  
 
Furthermore, looking at the consequences of the notion of collectivity with respect to war 
crimes, we have to note that the argument towards collective guilt can be turned to its reverse: 
making war crimes a collective action and therefore attaching collective guilt to it, one may 
come to the conclusion that if the nation cannot be held guilty of a crime than the persons 
acting on its behalf cannot be guilty either.  
 
Lewis notes the danger in relying too heavily on collective responsibility: in his opinion, this 
is a way to the view that responsibility does not really exist, or at least well on the way to 
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 According to the Commentary: „The provision is not applicable to inhabitants of a territory who take to the 
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(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, ICRC (1960), p. 67. 
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finding it easier to ignore.
94
 Albeit such a development is more psychological and sociological 
in substance than logically conclusive, it is remarkable indeed and is certainly not far from 
turns tacitly acknowledged by public opinion and press worldwide. 
 
Another feature of collective responsibility would be that the burden of proof would be the 
reverse of individual responsibility. In case of individual responsibility, the burden of proof is 
on the prosecutor, based on the presumption of innocence; however, when considering the 
individual’s accountability as a member of a group, it would be left to the individual to prove 
that for some reason he/she was not involved in the commission of the crimes.  
 
This was demonstrated in the debate around Kurt Waldheim’s eventual responsibility during 
the Second World War. Kurt Waldheim was the UN Secretary-General between 1972 and 
1981, later Federal President of Austria between 1986 and 1992. At the time he was elected as 
President, a fierce debate unfolded around his participation in Nazi persecutions in Salonici. 
Waldheim was an interpreter and liaison officer in the rank of lieutenant with the Wehrmacht 
and was stationed in Salonici when German forces deported over 40 000 Jews from Salonici, 
thereby basically annihilating the Jewish community in the city.  
 
As the International Commission of Historians later determined, Waldheim, due to his junior 
position within the Wehrmacht, had no influence on the deportations, although he participated 
at meetings where it was discussed
95
. Nevertheless, the discussions made him explain his role 
in the German army and as the debate and similar other debates unfolded, it was presumed 
that every single member of the collective was responsible for what the collective, or leaders 
of the collective, perpetrated
96
. 
97
 
 
The Sharon-case is another cited example to demonstrate the effect of collective 
responsibility. In the Sharon-case, a complaint was filed in 2001 in Belgium against Ariel 
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 H.D. Lewis, The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility, in: Individual and Collective Responsibility, 
Peter A. French (ed.), Schenkman Books (1972), p. 130 ff.  
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 See The Waldheim Report. Submitted 8 February 1988 to Federal Chancellor Dr. Franz Vranitzky. 
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 See Kurt Waldheim, Former U.N. Chief, Is Dead at 88, New York Times, 15 June 2007, available at: 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/world/europe/15waldheim.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2 (last visited on 1 
April 2012). 
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Sharon and others – Sharon Israeli Minister of Defence at the time of commission of the 
crimes and Prime Minister at the time of the proceedings – for alleged crimes (war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide) committed against Palestinian refugees in Lebanese 
refugee camps in 1982. The case was filed by victims of the massacre based on universal 
jurisdiction. Eventually, the Belgian courts refused the case, as a consequence of strong Israeli 
and US pressure. The case brought huge attention because it was raised in a state that had no 
link with the alleged perpetrator, the scene of the crimes or with the victims, therefore was a 
case of ‘pure’ universal jurisdiction.98  
 
Fletcher is of the opinion that „the worst part of this tendency toward universal jurisdiction is 
the belief that if Ariel Sharon had been guilty of a crime against humanity, he could have been 
judged and sentenced in abstraction from the nation in whose name he acted as military 
commander. Belgium was not in a position to judge or even to think about the complicity of 
the entire Israeli nation in any crime Sharon might have committed.”99 Fletcher meant that the 
eventual responsibility of Sharon shall be shared by the responsibility of the Israeli nation for 
creating a culture in which Sharon did not understand the wrongfulness of his deeds. 
 
We can come to two conclusions from such a statement: (i) if we cannot suppose that the 
entire Israeli nation was guilty than the individual responsibility of the agent vanishes, (ii) 
they share responsibility: the agent and the nation. Considering from a given distance, both 
conclusions can be dangerous and go directly opposite one of the greatest developments in 
international law: individual criminal responsibility.  
 
If we were to accept that an agent of a state can only be responsible for an international crime 
if the nation as a whole can be held responsible, than this could be an easy way out for agents 
from responsibility. If we were to accept that responsibility is shared between the agent 
(individual) and the nation, then again we hit non-answerable questions such as how much the 
nation is guilty and what would be the proportion of guilt shared. 
 
                                                 
98
 For an analysis of the case, see Deena R. Hurwitz, Universal Jurisdiction and the Dilemmas of International 
Criminal Justice: The Sabra and Shatila Case in Belgium, in: D. Hurwitz, M. L. Satterthwaite, D. Ford (eds.) 
Human Rights Advocacy Stories, Foundation Press (2009) and Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: 
Belgian Court has Jurisdiction in Sharon Case to Investigate 1982 Sabra and Chatila Killings (2002), available 
online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR53/001/2002/en (last visited on 6 February 2012). 
99 George P Fletcher, Romantics at War, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2002), p.65. 
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Fletcher further argues that whatever responsibility Sharon bore for the massacre in Lebanon, 
his responsibility is shared with that of his nation and therefore mitigated because he was 
acting as an agent of the state. But how can one be sure about this? Talking in general terms, 
what if it is the individual will of the agent to wipe out another group of people? What if this 
is his own personal belief and he only uses the state he is representing to execute his plan and 
it is exclusively through such a channel that eventually the plan allegedly transforms into state 
policy? How can we prove the difference? 
 
And again, what result would such an approach have and where could and would such a 
theory lead? If we stick to individual responsibility in our example, the agent can escape 
responsibility only provided that he steps down from office before the acts are committed, but 
if he doesn’t step down, it makes it his own individual responsibility. 
 
While we may accept that in war a soldier is not acting on his or her own behalf but on behalf 
of the state, the point of the concept of individual criminal responsibility is exactly not to let 
such individuals hide behind the state’s “will” or behind orders given by superiors in the name 
of the state. A state is only an abstract entity which cannot hold criminal liability
100
; therefore 
it is unacceptable that individuals could commit atrocities in the name of the abstract state 
without any consequences
101
.  
 
Fletcher argues that the crimes under the Rome Statute are collective, because the perpetrators 
are prosecuted for crimes committed by and in the name of the groups they represent. “(…) 
The individual offenders are liable because they are members of the hostile groups that 
engage in the commission of these crimes."
102
 If we look at the nature of war crimes, we may 
come to the conclusion that neither part of this statement is correct.  
 
With respect to crimes against humanity or genocide, although this can also be the intent of 
one single person only (even though it is difficult to imagine such a case), the widespread or 
                                                 
100
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27, p. 23. 
101
 See Geoff Gilbert, The Criminal Responsibility of States, in: 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1990), pp. 345-369. 
102
 Fletcher (The Storrs Lecture, 2002), p. 1525. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 39 
systematic nature of the act are constitutive elements of the crimes, therefore these elements 
could make them “collective” in nature.  
 
War crimes, on the other hand, can easily be committed out of a purely individual motive: 
someone wanting to loot an enemy civilian for his own benefit or behaving in an inhumane 
way with detainees out of personal cruelty or an urge for revenge, personal or mediated. 
These acts can well be committed without a state intent being in the background. Naturally, 
state intent may be in the background for example in case of torturing of prisoners to gain 
information, but it would be all too simplicist to say that all war crimes are part of a state 
policy. 
 
McMahan argues that the reason for the formulation in the Rome Statute - namely that the 
ICC is concentrating on the mass violations -
103
 is not the collective nature of the crimes but 
rather the limited resources of the ICC. Would this be otherwise and would the collective 
(state) element be required for war crimes, it would include corresponding elements in the 
elements of war crimes.
104
  
 
If we go through the elements of war crimes, it becomes apparent that none of them include 
any reference to the requirement of collectivity, systematic nature or anything similar. That is 
why it is easy to agree with McMahan, having to add that crimes committed and explained as 
state policy are particularly dangerous because the perpetrators are hiding behind the state 
policy so it is increasingly important to prosecute them individually for that one can be sure 
that everyone will think twice before executing or forming such state policy. 
 
The argument that war crimes are prosecuted because of the collective element, that is 
because they are committed in the name of the group who the perpetrators represent is 
actually a reverse argument of the well-known defence of superior order. In the superior order 
defence, the subordinate is trying to defend himself from criminal liability by claiming that he 
was given orders by his superior. Such a defence has, rightly, not been accepted at and since 
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Criminal Justice Ethics, New Jersey, Winter/Spring 2008, pp. 5-6. 
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the Nuremberg Tribunal.
105
 So, in principle, it is out of the instrumentality of international 
law.  
 
In the case of the “collective” defence, the leader (or superior) is defending himself by saying 
that he only executed the will of the group. As much as the law says in the superior order case 
that the subordinate shall not carry out illegal orders, the superior shall also not carry out an 
illegal “mandate” coming from the collective. In such a case the will of the collective, even if 
illegal, will remain to be a will without action. The justification is also similar: in the superior 
order case the soldier defends himself by saying he did not actually want to carry out that act, 
and in the “collective” defence case the superior may also say it was not his will, but the will 
of the collective. This is why it was so important not to accept the superior order defence and 
this is why, in my opinion, it is equally important not to accept the “collective defence” either.  
 
Similar questions were raised when thinking about the forms of liability during the 
Nuremberg Tribunals. In order to overcome difficulties of proof, evidence and a big number 
of defendants, an attempt was made to determine criminal liability based on membership in 
criminal organization. However, due to the recognition that individual criminal responsibility 
requires personal culpability, it was accepted that membership in an organization was not 
enough in itself, it also requires knowledge of the criminal acts or purpose of the organization 
and that the person voluntarily joined the group or committed the acts himself. Even in this 
form, this solution remained to be strongly contested.
106
  
 
It is worth to note that a further development of the notion of criminal organization was 
assured by the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in the United Kingdom
107
, which stipulated that 
law makes certain organizations illegal and thus making mere membership a criminal offence. 
Here, however, the criminal offence stands not for certain acts committed by the organization 
but for membership alone. In such cases knowledge of criminal purpose of the organization or 
the commission of criminal acts was obviously not a condition for criminal liability of the 
member. These measures against the Irish Republican Army were then further developed by 
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subsequent other counter-terrorism acts throughout the world following the 9/11 attacks, the 
examination of which extends the framework of the present study. 
 
This form of liability can be seen as similar to the collective responsibility of a group, but is 
based on completely different logic and is more a form of indirect responsibility, therefore, 
and on the final analysis, it can not be considered as a form of collective responsibility.
108
 
Namely, this form of responsibility requires that the person is free to decide whether to join a 
group or not, which is not a choice one can usually make with regard to being a citizen or 
national of a given country.
109
  
 
The notion of responsibility of criminal organizations is therefore not to be confused with 
collective responsibility: in the case of responsibility of criminal organizations the member of 
the organization is supposed to have been aware of the criminal objective, joined voluntarily 
and was not simply a member of a group (not an organization) in the name of which persons 
or groups committed the atrocities.
110
  
 
Simon argues for a need for responsibility of organizations by indicating that “participants 
belonged to organizations, whose structures proved critical to carrying out genocide or a 
grave injustice.”111 This, however, requires that such participants were not simply members of 
the group but were active members of it, contributing to the commission of atrocities. This is 
an enormous difference between responsibility of organizations and collective responsibility 
in that in the latter case merely being a member of the group could be enough for the 
                                                 
108
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responsibility of the all the members involved.
112
 To put it bluntly, the difference is between 
the responsibility of the SS and the responsibility of the entire German nation.
113
  
 
In the case of collective responsibility, we therefore again come back to the question of how a 
citizen escapes collective responsibility if it was not his own will to be the part of the “group” 
at all. Obviously, renouncing citizenship is not an answer to this question. Therefore 
accepting the rationale of responsibility of criminal organizations or membership within such 
organizations is not the same as accepting the rationale of collective responsibility. 
 
There is no requirement of a collective element for war crimes 
 
Therefore we may conclude that although wars are indeed collective in nature, it does not 
follow that war crimes are also collective in nature. While it may be easy to imagine some 
war crimes as being an articulation of a collective will, neither the formulation of the grave 
breaches in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, nor war crimes listed in 
the Rome Statute include any required elements of collectivity.
114
 
 
The reason individuals were directly made subject to criminal liability under international law 
was to ensure that international law cannot be neglected through hiding behind the abstract’s 
will by persons responsible for states’ legislation or for government orders given to 
individuals. While Kelsen held that international offences were attributable to the state 
only
115
, and in earlier times obeying government orders resulted in that individuals remained 
immune from criminal prosecutions, the Nuremberg Charter
116
 and subsequent international 
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instruments
117
 expressly established that the official capacity of defendants was not an 
accepted ground to excuse them from criminal responsibility.
118
 While the immunity of a 
person because of his official capacity is not exactly the same question as collective 
responsibility, it shall be realized that criminal responsibility was brought down to the 
individual’s level precisely because acts, in the end, are committed by individuals. 
 
Some experts argue that there is an excess of responsibility for war crimes as opposed to 
individual responsibility, in that not only the person who actually perpetrated the act should 
be held responsible, but also those who created an environment and scheme in the framework 
of which such atrocities had been committed.
119
 One can fully agree with such an opinion in 
the case of certain kinds of war crimes, noting, that this does not establish collective 
responsibility as such, it rather places a responsibility on the individual in a different form or 
means a different mode of liability – be it command responsibility or responsibility based on 
the notion of joint criminal enterprise – to persons other than those who actually, directly 
carried out the acts.
120
 
 
“International criminal law has been regarded as controversial and innovative precisely 
because it makes individuals liable for infractions of international law’s most fundamental 
norms. At Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal, in its final judgment, declared that 
the hideous crimes under investigation were committed ‘not by abstract entities but by 
men’.”121 It was exactly the acknowledgement122 of individual criminal responsibility123 that 
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was such a landmark step at the Nuremberg tribunals.
124
 The International Law Commission 
in 1951 also foresaw individual criminal responsibility for offences against the peace and 
security of mankind, and it did so paradoxically exactly after the events in relation to which 
collective responsibility is most often cited.
125
  
 
The Nuremberg Charter did not only accept individual criminal responsibility, but also 
negated the possibility of defence on the ground of having been acted as Head of State or a 
government official or under the orders of the government or a superior.
126
 Principle IV adds: 
“provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him”. This means that if the person had no 
choice but to commit the acts (e.g. whether he had the possibility to refuse the order or he put 
his own life in imminent risk if he did so) he may escape liability. So then how can we talk 
about collective responsibility if in fact law recognizes that it is possible that certain 
individuals didn’t have another choice? This question can only be answered on the 
individual’s level by judging whether he had a choice or not to not commit the acts. But if we 
start looking at the motives and possibilities of individuals, we cannot talk about collective 
responsibility anymore. 
 
What’s the point? 
 
So what’s the point in recognizing the notion of collective guilt and responsibility for war 
crimes? While individual criminal responsibility has a result in that an individual can be held 
criminally liable and be punished, a collective cannot bear criminal responsibility therefore 
collective responsibility would be a theoretic notion with no practical results or consequences, 
even more, it could divert attention from individual responsibility.
127
 So what purpose would 
the acceptance of the notion of collective guilt or collective responsibility serve?  
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State policy is formed and executed by individuals and since the state is an abstract entity, the 
best solution there is, is to catch the individuals. If in the end there is not one individual 
willing to execute a cruel state policy fearing criminal punishment, we have reached our goal. 
Law and enforcement should work together and law can only be effective if it can be 
enforced. International law generally suffers from a lack of top-down enforceability. The 
measures available in international law to enforce its rules are weak, hazy and not effective. It 
is precisely individual responsibility under international criminal law that makes international 
norms enforceable. This notion is a rare but welcome constraint on national sovereignty.
128
 
 
This question gets particular relevance today as the International Criminal Court starts 
functioning. It is concentrating on punishing individuals and it puts the primary responsibility 
of prosecution on national courts who are also dealing with individuals. This system is hoped 
to result in an increased activity of prosecution of war crimes around the world, both on the 
international and national level. Moreover, to look at a broader picture, collective 
responsibility would not help peace-process either. To stigmatize a whole nation as guilty in 
committing a crime is a seed for further violence and hostilities.
129
 Finally, it seems there is 
anyway too much mitigating factor for crimes committed in war and mostly only a small 
proportion of the real perpetrators are held responsible.
130
  
 
Or is the notion of collective responsibility a term that could be used in its non-criminal 
sense? According to modern international law, criminal responsibility can only be individual, 
and this is, according to the present author’s view, fair so, considering the problems raised 
above, notably the difficulties in proving level of involvement of the members of the 
collective’s or their possibility of withstanding the ‘collective will’. Eventual criminal 
responsibility of a ‘collective’, or a group of persons, should be tackled through different legal 
mechanisms, such as criminal enterprises, criminal organizations or new forms. However, 
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arguments for the sharing of the collective in crimes that can to a certain extent be attributable 
to it could make sense in a non-criminal law, but rather moral, social or political sense, or 
through reparation according to the rules of international law.  
 
This had been done with respect to the responsibility of the German nation for the holocaust 
or through provisions in satellite peace treaties where the state recognizes its responsibility 
and agrees to pay compensation. The Genocide Convention stipulates that “Disputes between 
the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide or for any of 
the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice 
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”131 
 
In modern times, political pressure and opinion of the general public can often constitute 
serious pressure. In everyday talk, Hutus were responsible for the Rwandan genocide, the US 
was responsible for torturing prisoners in Guantanamo or in Abu Ghraib, the US and UK were 
responsible for attacking Iraq on false grounds, the Serbs were responsible for the Srebrenica 
massacres, Afghanistan was responsible for harboring Al-Quaeda and indirectly for the 
terrorist attacks carried out by it, Palestinians are responsible for the suicide bombers and 
other terrorist attacks and Israelis are responsible for killing innocent civilians in Gaza.  
 
But of course these are broad generalities and no one really thinks that every single Hutu, US 
and UK citizen, Afghani, Serb, Palestinian or Israeli is responsible even in the political or 
moral sense, because some, or even many of them may have opposed their government’s 
actions. Of course we can claim that they elected their governments, but this does not seem to 
be a sound argument. Thomas Franck, who acted as counsel for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
1996 ICJ case
132
, argued that state responsibility for genocide as examined by the ICJ and 
individual criminal responsibility as examined by the ICTY are not contradicting, but 
paralelly viable mechanisms
133
.  
 
However, he also argues that “to blame an entire people, the population of the state, for the 
acts of the state would be to assert a discredited notion of ‘collective guilt.’ We all celebrate 
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the emergence of a human rights regime that recognizes the rights of the individual as distinct 
from, and sometimes even in opposition to, those of the state.”134 He adds: „But, just as 
obviously, even in the new era of individual rights and responsibilities, the state has not 
ceased to exist. It is, and it acts, and it must be held accountable. When the state commits a 
great evil, it cannot be allowed to escape responsibility by the punishment of a few 
leaders.”135 However, state responsibility does not represent holding every member of the 
state guilty under ’collective guilt’, but rather sharing in remedying the consequences of 
violations by the state
136
.   
 
Still, raising collective (social, moral or political) responsibility bears the great danger of 
simplifying and generalizing but could also motivate future groups to withstand wrongdoings 
committed in their name. An additional idea could be a way to at least identify the group and 
members of the group who were indeed responsible for violations, or to examine how the 
collective – the citizens, members of the group – could have prevented or stopped the 
violations. This should, however, not lead to diminishing the individual’s criminal 
responsibility but rather identify the group’s additional, non-criminal responsibility.  
 
In sum, it seems neither correct nor helpful to engage in a discussion over collective 
responsibility purely in the criminal term, because “[o]nly individualized justice could ensure 
the relevance and meaningfulness of international law. Abstract entities were out, flesh and 
blood human beings were in”.137 
 
3. Overview of international obligations to repress war crimes 
International humanitarian law and international criminal law include a variety of obligations 
on national repression. A common element of these obligations is that they direct states what 
to do but do not specify how they should do it. International treaties usually define an 
obligation to reach a certain result – the punishment of certain crimes –, which implies that 
states are bound to adopt internal legislation which satisfies this objective in any way they see 
fit
138
. This is obvious given considerations of state sovereignty
139
: such obligations usually 
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mean a self-restriction of sovereignty on the side of states, the way they comply with such 
obligations has to be left to them so that it conforms to their legal culture, legal system and 
principles. An account of these obligations follows, including an early analysis of possible 
difficulties in their application. 
The obligation of states to repress violations of international humanitarian law is very clearly 
detailed in various treaties. The Geneva Conventions / Additional Protocols obligations are 
based on a three-pillar system
140
: obligation to repress or suppress grave breaches and the two 
elements of the aut dedere aut judicare principle: the obligation to search for persons having 
committed grave breaches and an obligation to try them or hand them over to another state.
141
 
Contents of these elements have been further developed by customary law and by 
international treaties, such as the statutes of international tribunals or the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.  
 
Specific aspects of the above mentioned measures have been also developed or overwritten by 
states and international treaties, both due to practical considerations and following an urge to 
make such measures more effective. Such developments have been particularly significant in 
two fields: one field is the increasing acceptance of the grave breaches regime for violations 
committed in non-international armed conflicts
142
, the other is in the field of interpretation 
and application of the aut dedere aut judicare principle
143
.  
 
The three-pillar system of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I bases itself on 
the differentiation between serious violations (grave breaches) and other violations, and on a 
practical necessity to have these violations punished by any state. The treaties themselves list 
grave breaches that states are obliged to punish
144
. For other violations, there is simply an 
obligation to suppress them, leaving the method of such suppression to states, which may, 
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p. 871. 
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obviously, also include penal sanctions. The aut dedere aut judicare principle stems from the 
fear that perpetrators of serious offences would use conflicts between national jurisdictions to 
escape criminal liability and thus seeks to establish a global, universal solution. 
 
In the understanding of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, grave breaches are 
the most serious violations of the rules, committed in international armed conflicts; other 
violations committed in international armed conflicts and violations committed in non-
international armed conflict are simply labeled as “violations”, “breaches” or “acts contrary” 
to the Conventions/Protocols. The difference, as noted above, lies partly in the obligation of 
sanctioning.  
 
In addition, as already noted above, Additional Protocol I introduces the term “war crimes”145 
which mean grave breaches of the Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The relation 
between war crimes and grave breaches has often been confusing; except for the 
differentiation discussed above, the difference is also said to be that war crimes are crimes 
committed in war and criminalized in international law - in other instruments than the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols, such as the Charter of the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal or in customary law-, and grave breaches are terms introduced by the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I
146
.  
 
Another difference between war crimes and grave breaches is that war crimes entailed 
international criminal responsibility, while grave breaches didn’t, for the reason that the 
Geneva Conventions left it to states to punish these
147
 – this is partially why the aut dedere 
aut judicare principle was adopted. Although the war crimes regime seems to be more 
advancing
148
 to the detriment of the grave breaches regime, the undoubted advantage of the 
latter is the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions as opposed to a much smaller 
number of parties to the ICC Rome Statute. However, war crimes and conditions of 
accountability in the Rome Statute are more articulate, elements of crimes are detailed, and 
with a growing number of case law of the ICC, important international jurisprudence will be 
                                                 
145
 Article 85 para 5 Additional Protocol I: „Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this 
Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.”. 
146
 See Marko Divac Öberg, The absorption of grave breaches into war crimes law, in: 873 International Review 
of the Red Cross (March 2009) 163-183, pp. 163-164. 
147
 Ibid, p. 165. 
148
 See James G. Stewart, The Future of the Grave Breaches Regime Segregate, Assimilate or Abandon?, in: 7/4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2009, 855-877. 
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attached to it as an important secondary source: all in all, it is frequently observed that the war 
crimes regime is more effective. 
 
Moreover, the regime separating violations committed in the context of international and non-
international armed conflicts was partially overwritten by the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR 
and the Rome Statute of the ICC, in that many violations committed in non-international 
armed conflicts were also regarded as war crimes. This came parallel with the practice of an 
emerging number of states which, in their penal legislation, penalized violations committed in 
non-international armed conflicts the same way as those committed in international armed 
conflicts. Thus, the difference between crimes committed in international or non-international 
armed conflicts seems to be diminishing and the term “war crimes” includes both kinds of 
violations.  
 
Other humanitarian law treaties, such as Protocol II to the Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict also define grave breaches 
with a similar penalizing obligation and the aut dedere aut judicare principle
149
 as present in 
the Geneva Conventions / Additional Protocol I. Thus, the obligations for penalizing certain 
acts come from a number of treaties which states have to observe. 
 
Due to the underlying understanding of the grave breaches regime that it is the states that are 
responsible to carry out penal procedures, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I 
did not detail the method how such violations shall be included in their penal legislation
150
 nor 
did they give any guidance on the procedures themselves except for the requirement of fair 
trial guarantees
151
. The Commentary is also mainly silent on this issue, with only noting that 
legislation shall provide sanctions and it shall not be left to the judge to deal with these
152
.  
 
Most probably the difficulties in adopting proper legislation and ensuring effective procedures 
were not foreseen by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions. While many states seemingly 
complied with the obligations, it only turned out during procedures in the prosecutorial phase 
                                                 
149
 See Deák Ildikó – Varga Réka, A kulturális javak fegyveres összeütközés esetén való védelméről szóló 1954. 
évi Hágai Egyezmény és jegyzőkönyvei (The 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict and its Protocols), in: 52/3 Műemlékvédelem (2008) 198-209, p. 200. 
150
 See Gellér Balázs, A nemzetközi jog hatása a büntetőjogi felelősségre (Effects of international law on 
criminal responsibility), in: Bárd Károly, Gellér Balázs, Ligeti Katalin, Margitán Éva, Wiener A. Imre: 
Büntetőjog Általános Rész, KJK-KERSZÖV (2003), p. 302 ff. 
151
 See common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions or Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. 
152
 See Commentary to GC I, comments to Article 49, p. 363. 
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or during trials how difficult such a task can be. Hence, the word “effective” received 
particular significance, although not specifically analyzed in the Commentary: legislation 
merely adopted to demonstrate a state’s compliance with international law but not enabling 
effective penal procedures is obviously not enough. Although this statement may seem to be 
just too obvious, it was stunning to see during negotiations with governments on behalf of the 
ICRC how states carelessly satisfied themselves with the knowledge that legislation – any 
legislation - was in place without caring too much about their practical usefulness. 
 
Customary law seemed to largely adopt the obligation to repress grave breaches, at least the 
ICRC Customary Law Study
153
 states so, to which no substantial opposition was formed - to 
this relevant part. The Study affirms that states have an obligation to “ensure respect” for 
international humanitarian law
154
, that serious violations of international humanitarian law 
constitute war crimes
155
 and that states must investigate war crimes and prosecute them
156
. 
The Study also has two specific rules as to the substance of prosecutions: states have a right to 
vest universal jurisdiction over war crimes
157
, and the non-application of statute of 
limitations
158
. Consequently, according to the Study, there is a customary obligation to repress 
war crimes, but not all aspects of the conventional obligations are reflected in customary law. 
 
4. Development of the concept of universal jurisdiction with respect to grave breaches 
 
Although the obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction could be seen as an inherent part of 
the repression obligation, the concept is rooted from different areas than international 
humanitarian law and its application is more controversial than the rest of the repression 
provisions. Since universal jurisdiction is discussed separately in several places below in the 
different chapters, a general introduction to its formation and exact meaning seems to be 
necessary.  
                                                 
153
 The Study does not have any legal binding effect as to what may be considered as customary law or not, it 
represents the outcome of the ICRC’s research on the issue. Therefore the rules adopted in the ICRC Customary 
Law Study are not necessarily of a customary nature. Indeed, many criticism appeared after the publication of 
the study, mainly related to rules concerning weapons and methods of warfare. It seems, however, that no 
substantial criticism was made to the „Implementation” and „War Crimes” part of the Study. 
154
 Rule 139, Louise Doswald-Beck – Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, ICRC – Cambridge (2005). 
155
 Ibid, Rule 156. 
156
 Ibid, Rule 158. 
157
 Ibid, Rule 157. 
158
 Ibid, Rule 160. 
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Although to date there is no precise manifested definition accepted for universal jurisdiction 
in international law, it can best be described as jurisdiction over offences committed abroad 
by non-resident aliens, where such offences are not posing a threat to the interests of the state 
or give rise to effects within its territory. Although this definition probably stands its place, 
universal jurisdiction is more often defined in the negative: a ground of jurisdiction which 
does not require any link or nexus whatsoever with the forum state
159
, and the state is 
nevertheless permitted to exercise jurisdiction.
160
 Another common element to grasp universal 
jurisdiction may be that it is linked to the nature of the crime
161
. In other words, universal 
jurisdiction is often also described as jurisdiction that ‘any’ or ‘every’ state can exercise162. 
 
According to O’Keefe, universal jurisdiction is a form of jurisdiction to prescribe – or, in 
other terminology, legislative jurisdiction. Differentiating from the jurisdiction to enforce, 
namely the authority to arrest, detain, prosecute, try, sentence and punish, legislative 
jurisdiction means the states’ authority to criminalize a given conduct163. While jurisdiction to 
enforce is strictly territorial, ie. a state can only exercise its enforcement powers within its 
territory
164
, jurisdiction to prescribe can be extraterritorial. Jurisdiction based on nationality, 
passive personality or protective jurisdiction are all extraterritorial forms of jurisdiction, as is 
universal jurisdiction.  
 
Certain authors separate a third category, jurisdiction to adjudicate, but acknowledge that 
“[s]ince the jurisdiction to adjudicate hinges on the legislator entrusting the judiciary with the 
power to prosecute crimes short of any link with the national public order, it could be said that 
universal jurisdiction simultaneously [to jurisdiction to adjudicate] involves a question of 
jurisdiction to prescribe.”165 
 
                                                 
159
 See Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction, Clarifying the Basic Concept, in: 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2004) 735-760, p. 745. 
160
 See Meron (1995), p. 568. See also Jean d’Aspremont, Multilateral versus Unilateral Exercises of Universal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, in: 43 Israel Law Review (2010) 301-329, p. 303. 
161
 See Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International 
Relations? In: 43 George Washington International Law Review (2011) 419-466, p. 425. 
162
 O’Keefe (2004), p. 746. O’Keefe mentions that obviously ’any’ or ’every’ state would mean any or every 
state that had become party to the given treaty. In case universal jurisdiction is based on customary law, this 
would really mean any or every state as bound by customary law. 
163
 Ibid, p. 736. 
164
 Naturally, a state may exercise its enforcement powers on other state’s territory with its consent. International 
law accepts rare exceptions to this rule, but these are limited to armed conflicts. Ibid, p. 740. 
165
  See d’Aspremont (2011), p. 304. 
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Hence, in the case of universal jurisdiction, the state prescribes certain conducts as being 
under the criminal enforcement jurisdiction of the state – but, naturally, strictly on its 
territory. Still, as O’Keefe mentions, “while jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to 
enforce are mutually distinct, the act of prescription and the act of enforcement are, in 
practice, intertwined. A state’s assertion of the applicability of its criminal law to given 
conduct is actualized, as it were, when it is sought to be enforced in a given case.”166 
 
The traditional example of universal jurisdiction is piracy. Irrespective of the crimes in 
question, be it piracy or war crimes, universal jurisdiction serves the interest of the 
community of states, although for different reasons. The rationale that any state can exercise 
jurisdiction over piracy primarily stems from the fact partly that pirates were enemies of 
humankind, and partially on that that the crimes were committed on the high seas against 
nationals of various states, making the exercise of jurisdiction based on the traditional 
jurisdictional principles often difficult, even if the concerned states were willing to exercise 
jurisdiction
167
.  
 
Hence, universal jurisdiction was founded based on procedural necessity and it was rather a 
right then an obligation. Indeed, Grotius - whose formula ‘aut dedere aut punire’ was the 
forerunner of the aut dedere aut judicare principle - thought that this principle should apply to 
piracy or crimes that later became war crimes on the basis of considerations of a civitas 
maxima.
168
 As Grotius stated, “[t]he fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who 
possess rights equal to those kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on 
account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of 
injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law (…) of nations in 
regard to any persons whatsoever.”169 Similar reasons led to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in the case of slave trading.
170
  
 
                                                 
166
 O’Keefe (2004), p. 741. 
167
 See Coombes (2011), p. 427. 
168
 For an analysis of the evolution of the aut dedere aut judicare principle, see M. Nyitrai Péter, Az „Aut dedere 
aut Judicare” elvének fejlődése a nemzetközi büntetőjogban (Evolution of the „Aut dedere aut Judicare” 
principle in international criminal law), in: V/1Collega (March 2001) 24-27 
169
 Referred to and cited by Coombes (2011), see pp. 426-427. Origional quote from Hugo Grotius, De Jure 
Belli Ac Pacis, Libri Tres 504, Carnegie, trans. 1925 (1612). 
170
 See Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, in: 35/2 New England Law Review 
(2001) 383-397, pp. 391-392, and Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, in: 1 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2003) 596-602, p. 560. 
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However, with war crimes, the motives were somewhat different: the concerned states were 
either not willing to exercise jurisdiction (when for example the perpetrator was an acting 
functionaire of the standing government or the crimes were perpetrated as a result of 
government policy), or the state’s judicial system simply collapsed. It was more the 
consciousness of the international community that led to the adoption of universal jurisdiction 
for war crimes, to ensure that perpetrators don’t escape punishment; consequently, the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction became an obligation.
171
 Hence, in the case of war crimes, it 
was not that much the procedural necessity, but rather the morale of the world community that 
led to this concept.  
 
This was also underlined by three judges in the Finta case in their dissenting opinion, when 
they said that “(…) following the cessation of hostilities or other conditions that fostered (…) 
commission [of war crimes or crimes against humanity], there also is a tendency for the 
individuals who perpetrated them to scatter to the four corners of the earth. Thus, war 
criminals would be able to elude punishment simply by fleeing the jurisdiction where the 
crime was committed. The international community has rightly rejected this prospect.”172  
 
Universal jurisdiction was often seen as being recognized by post-World War II trials, 
including the Nuremberg trials, although the Nuremberg Charter did not refer to universal 
jurisdiction
173
. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were the first international instruments to 
accept universal jurisdiction and were followed by the 1984 Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
174
. The Genocide Convention is 
                                                 
171
 See Brown (2001), p. 394. Brown also discusses whether universal jurisdiction can be erga omnes, 
considering that a treaty can only be binding on states-parties. The present author considers that due to the 
universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions, universal jurisdiction related to grave breaches can definitely 
be considered as an erga omnes obligation. However, it has to be noted, that the ICRC Customary Law Study, in 
its Rule 157 refers to universal jurisdiction as a right and not as an obligation: „States have the right to vest 
universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes.” (emphasis by the author). This is reflecting, 
among others, the military manuals of states, which generally refer to universal jurisdiction as a possibility rather 
than an obligation, through the use of terms like „may”, „have the competence”, etc. See: 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule157 (last visited on 21 September 2010). Regarding the 
relationship between ius cogens, erga omnes and universal jurisdiction, see Cherif M. Bassiouni, Accountability 
for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Crimes: Jus Cogens 
and Obligations Erga Omnes, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996), p. 63 and 65. 
172
 Supreme Court of Canada, the Finta case (R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701), Judgment of 24 March 1994, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge La Forest, Judge L’Hereux-Dubé and Judge MacLachlim. 
173
 See Coombes (2011), p. 428. 
174
 Article 5: „1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases: (a) When the offences are committed in any territory 
under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) When the alleged offender is a 
national of that State; (c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate. 2. Each 
State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences 
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also often cited as providing basis for universal jurisdiction
175
, although it does not expressly 
say it. 
 
However, the main source of universal jurisdiction remains customary international law
176
, 
although it is still debated, precisely which crimes fall under the notion. A general 
understanding seems to be that the following crimes fall under universal jurisdiction: piracy, 
slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, apartheid and torture
177
. 
 
Controversies around the notion, exact meaning and application of universal jurisdiction have 
prompted many organizations to deal with the issue. The numerous resolutions, guidelines, 
statements and other documents dealing with this question include the 1999 Amnesty 
International document „Universal jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the effective exercise of 
universal jurisdiction”178, the 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction179, the 2005 
Resolution of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) on universal jurisdiction
180
, 
REDRESS/FIDH Reports on universal jurisdiction
181
, the Cairo-Arusha Principles
182
, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him 
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article. 3. This Convention does not 
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.” 
175
 Article 6: „Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a 
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction.” 
176
 Coombes, p. 432. 
177
 See Coombes, p. 433. 
178
 Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR53/001/1999 (last visited on 31 October 2012). 
179
 The Princeton Principles assert, among others, that national judges may rely on universal jurisdiction even in 
the absence of relevant national law (Principle 3), that the official position of a person may not relieve him/her of 
criminal accountability (Principle 5). The Princeton Principles provided ground for many subsequent documents 
or guidelines regarding universal jurisdiction. 
180 
The Resolution states that states may exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes under international law. It 
subjects such exercise to a set of limitations including, in particular, the principle of subsidiarity and the  
observance of human rights. Regarding application of universal jurisdiction in absentia, the Resolution adopted a 
a middle course by allowing investigative measures while excluding trials in absentia. For an analysis, see Claus 
Kreß, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international, in: 4/3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2006) 561-585. 
181
 See „Universal Jurisdiction in Europe”, REDRESS-FIDH, 1999; Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 27 
Member States of the EU, REDRESS-FIDH December 2010. 
182
 The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: an 
African Perspective, available at:  
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=116&Itemid=27 (last 
visited on 31 October 2012). The document is an outcome of two experts meeting held under the auspices of the 
Africa Legal Aid in Cairo (2001) and in Arusha (2002). For an analysis of the Principles, see Evelyn A. 
Ankumah, The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: 
an African Perspective, in: ASIL Proceedings of the 101st Annual Meeting (March 31-April 3, 2004), Vol. 98 
ASIL, pp. 238-240. 
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Report of the UN Secretary General
183
 after deliberations by the General Assembly’s Sixth 
Committee with the working title „The scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction”.  
 
As it will become clear from the sections below dealing with universal jurisdiction, by today, 
this form of jurisdiction became often, but perhaps not enough used. However, it still raises 
important questions as to its exact contents and bears serious difficulties around its application 
both in the legal, practical and political sense
184
. 
 
Although the list of documents dealing with universal jurisdiction mentioned above is not 
exhaustive, it demonstrates the value and level in which different aspects of universal 
jurisdiction were tackled. Eventhough these documents include important observations around 
the meaning and application of universal jurisdiction, a detailed discussion of the documents 
referred above would exceed the limits of the present thesis. However, certain points will be 
referred to in case they bear a direct significance with the topics discussed in the thesis. 
Specific questions of universal jurisdiction, such as its relation with the principle of legality, 
the restrictions applied to it or practical problems around its application will be discussed 
under the relevant chapters. 
 
5. Law as a weapon 
 
Enforcement of international law has always been difficult, although it has gone through a fast 
development in the past sixty years. Reference to violation of the law of war has probably 
never been as crucial and influential on warfare as today. Even superpowers were inclined to 
change their actions as a consequence of world pressure urging to respect international law. It 
may be observed that, even more now than before, considerations of avoidance of IHL 
violations are taken into account already during the strategic set-up of military operations, due 
to, in part, of the close and immediate media attention.  
 
                                                 
183
 Report of the Secretary-General on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
(A/65/181) 
184
 See Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008, in: 30/927 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2009) 927-980, p. 931. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 57 
Considering the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility, the review of detention 
conditions, interrogations and procedures and the release of numerous prisoners by President 
Obama was doubtless largely the result of loud protests against interrogation techniques, the 
circumstances in which detainees were held and the fact that they had been held without any 
due legal procedures having been initiated against them. The need to respect the rules of 
armed conflicts has tied the hands of many financially and, as to the war machinery and 
equipment they had developed in organization and technology, technically strong states in the 
way they waged war and was therefore used as a ‘shield’ by their much weaker opponents.  
 
Playing with legal arguments therefore became a basic instrument – mainly in asymmetric 
conflicts - and has consequently a huge effect on how wars are waged in our days. This 
phenomenon, linked together with the recognition of individual criminal responsibility for 
violations under international law, may be decisive in influencing leaders of conflicting states 
and non-state actors in how to act.  
 
Since the core subject of the present thesis is domestic war crime trials, the significance and 
power of respect for the law must be underlined; the present sub-chapter shortly deals with the 
phenomenon often labeled as “lawfare”.  
 
„That this strategic military disaster [the detainee abuses in Abu Ghraib] did not involve force 
of arms, but rather centered on illegalities, indicates how law has evolved to become a 
decisive element – and sometimes the decisive element – of contemporary conflicts.”185 This 
quote illustrates how much modern military forces realize that compliance with the law can be 
a tactical advantage – or disadvantage – to them. The consequence of which is that the 
possibility of sanctioning a wrongful act must be real: if the general feeling is that even if 
someone does something wrong he gets away with it, the theoretical presence of criminal 
sanctions does not have a deterring effect.  
 
This was perfectly reflected in a change of approach of many states worldwide since the 
Second World War to the necessity to train soldiers on international humanitarian law. In 
Hungary for instance and in many other countries, a few years ago humanitarian law was seen 
as one of the “nice to have” issues, but by today, the teaching of international humanitarian 
                                                 
185
 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare – A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts? In: 54/3 Joint Force 
Quarterly (2009), p. 34. 
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law has become a priority in both general and pre-deployment trainings, and the number one 
goal of the military commander – apart from fulfilling the mission – is to carry out the 
mission adopting all precautions possible in a way that there will be no legal hick-ups.  
 
At times, the effort to make sure that no violations take place turned to extremes. In 
Afghanistan, for instance, a serious and very unfortunate incident resulting in the death of a 
number of soldiers occurred when militant groups attacked a camp of UN multinational 
forces. Although the soldier on watch saw the attackers coming, he did not dare to shoot, 
because the ‘advice’ he allegedly received from his commander earlier was not to shoot under 
any circumstances because he didn’t want to be engaged in any legal controversies. 
 
The term ‘lawfare’ is relatively new and primarily means that in today’s conflicts, law is used 
as a weapon. This phrase was first popularized in this meaning by the US Air-Force Colonel – 
now General – Charles J. Dunlap in a paper in 2001186. The questions Dunlap examined were 
situations in which relatively weak enemies of the United States used American values 
“dishonestly” to undermine US military efforts. Dunlap notes that “[w]e must remind 
ourselves that our opponents are more than ready to exploit our values to defeat us, and they 
will do so without any concern about LOAC. Consider this disquieting statement from 
Chinese military leaders: ‘War has rules, but those rules are set by the West...if you use those 
rules, then weak countries have no chance...We are a weak country, so do we need to fight 
according to your rules? No.’ ”187.  
 
Later Dunlap extended the meaning of the expression to strategies of using the law as a 
substitute to traditional military means to achieve an operational objective
188
. The term today 
is understood both as a negative phrase and as a value-neutral term, in that the negative 
understanding would only incline that lawfare is solely a distort of legal principles to gain 
military advantage
189
; whereas the value-neutral understanding, more acceptable to the 
present author, would simply mean that contents and interpretations of the law of war are 
                                                 
186
 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. USAF, Law and military interventions: preserving humanitarian values in 21st 
century conflicts, available online at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf (last 
visited on 14 March 2012). 
187
 Dunlap (2009), p. 36. 
188
 For a summary of different issues of ’lawfare’, see http://www.lawfareblog.com/about/ (last visited on 14 
March 2012). 
189
 See for instance The Lawfare Project, available on http://www.thelawfareproject.org/ (last visited on 14 
March 2012). 
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being questioned, discussed and analyzed by various players, including governments, 
international and non-governmental organizations, defence lawyers, courts and prosecutors – 
with all of them believing that they represent the true understanding of international law. Such 
discussions include the real meaning of “direct participation in hostilities”, the qualification of 
a conflict against terrorist groups or the legal frameworks of detaining and proceeding against 
so-called terrorists.  
 
Since there is nothing new in the existence of legal discussions and different interpretations, 
this value-neutral understanding of lawfare simply inclines that – probably due to an 
enormous change of the features of today’s armed conflicts and consequently a difficulty in 
applying traditional legal frameworks to it – international law is widely debated among 
various players and the outcomes of such debates have a decisive effect on warfare – probably 
much more so than before.  
 
According to all predictions and the common phenomena of today’s wars, 21st century wars 
are different from traditional conflicts
190
. Public opinion and the opinion of the international 
community have a huge weight and can make a party to the conflict substantially weaker or 
stronger, both at home and at the international fora. Even super-powers cannot get away with 
serious breaches; the mistreatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib or in other detention facilities 
in Iraq
191
 or the already mentioned questionable physical and legal treatment of detainees in 
Guantanamo had and still have a huge undermining effect on the US military, and this 
ultimately has a direct consequence on how to plan and execute their operations on the field.  
 
Public opinion has a strong political influence which in turn may, and most probably will, 
result in military advantage or disadvantage: the enemy will not hesitate for a moment to use 
public hesitation or discontent either at home or at the international level to further its military 
goal.  If a soldier is blamed for any act that could qualify as a war crime, the only way his/her 
state can escape or at least diminish the political and military consequences is bringing the 
perpetrator to justice. This seems to be the most effective way for the state to demonstrate that 
                                                 
190
 Questions such as whether international humanitarian law applies to terrorist acts are also on the legal agenda. 
Although it has been generally accepted that those forms of terrorism that constitute armed conflict are 
consequently covered by international humanitarian law, an exact definition of terrorism has not been adopted 
yet. See Elisabeth Kardos Kaponyi, Fight Against Terrorism and Protecting Human Rights: Utopia or 
Challenge? (Ad Librum Ltd, Budapest, 2012), p. 13 ff. 
191
 Abu Ghraib was probably the most known but definitely not the only case of mistreatment of prisoners. 
Another well-covered case was the Baha Mussa case in the United Kingdom, see 
http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/ (last visited on 27 March 2012). 
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these persons were not executing illegal state policy, but the wrongful acts were one-off 
actions. Obviously, this was also used for its reverse: when soldiers were believed to be 
carrying out an illegal state policy through their illegal actions, prosecution of low-ranking 
soldiers was basically to shield the state policy and the responsibility of high level 
commanders. 
 
The fact that law has become so paramountly important in today’s warfare, more decisive in 
exerting genuine influence on warfare than it was before, calls for a special attention to 
respect for the law and makes it the ultimate interest of warring parties to demonstrate their 
willingness to abide by the rules in the form of enforcement. This is why punishment of 
violations of the law of war is so important and is, or should be, in the best interest of states 
themselves. 
 
6. A parallel example of extraterritorial jurisdiction: the US Alian Tort Statute 
 
The Alien Tort Statute, or Alien Tort Claims Act, is a section of the Unites States Code, 
adopted in the United States in 1789, originally in the Judiciary Act. Para 1350 of the USC 
says: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”192 
 
At that time the rationale was to make remedies available for foreign citizens in the United 
States for violations of customary international law.
193
 However, until the 1980s only very 
few cases were carried out based on this provision. Beginning with the Filartiga-case, 
increasing international concerns over human rights violations brought litigants to seek 
redress from the Alien Tort Statute.
194
  
 
The first case that paved the way for a more extensive application of the Statute was the 
Filartiga v Pena-Irala, in 1980. Pena was the Inspector General of Police in Asunción, 
Paraguay, and was allegedly responsible for torturing and murdering Filartiga’s son in 
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retaliation for his father’s political activism and views. The Filartiga family had been living in 
the US and was informed of the presence of Pena in the territory of the United States and 
brought a case against him under the Alien Tort Statute. 
 
The District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, arguing mainly that the law of 
nations does not entail a states’ treatment of its own citizens. However, the US Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision by saying that the law of nations does contain state-sanctioned 
torture, and being free from torture developed into a norm of customary international law.
195
 
Filartiga won the case and was awarded 10,4 million USD for damages. 
 
The Statute has provided ground for cases that resemble universal jurisdiction cases and are 
obviously linked to international crimes, but on the level of civil law claims. A civil claim for 
instance was filed against Taylor Jr., son of Charles Taylor after he was apprehended on US 
territory, tried for torture and sentenced for 97 years of imprisonment in 2009. After his 
conviction, civil organizations in the US brought a claim against him based on the Statute and 
won, courts awarding over 22 million USD for damages.
196
  
 
In the case against Karadzic
197, the court held that “the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act] 
reaches the conduct of private parties provided that their conduct is undertaken under the 
color of state authority or violates a norm of international law that is recognized as extending 
to the conduct of private parties.”198 
 
As is stated in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the acknowledged aim of the Statute is to 
enable victims of torture to sue their tormentors, recognizing the difficulty in bringing claims. 
As it is noted, „[o]ne of the difficulties that confront victims of torture under color of a 
nation's law is the enormous difficulty of bringing suits to vindicate such abuses. Most likely, 
the victims cannot sue in the place where the torture occurred. Indeed, in many instances, the 
victim would be endangered merely by returning to that place. It is not easy to bring such 
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suits in the courts of another nation. Courts are often inhospitable. Such suits are generally 
time consuming, burdensome, and difficult to administer. In addition, because they assert 
outrageous conduct on the part of another nation, such suits may embarrass the government of 
the nation in whose courts they are brought. Finally, because characteristically neither the 
plaintiffs nor the defendants are ostensibly either protected or governed by the domestic law 
of the forum nation, courts often regard such suits as "not our business." „199. 
 
This intention was further strengthened through the Torture Victim Protection Act, passed in 
1991. Notably, the Act „ convey[s] the message that torture committed under color of law of a 
foreign nation in violation of international law is "our business," as such conduct not only 
violates the standards of international law but also as a consequence violates our domestic 
law. In the legislative history of the TVPA, Congress noted that universal condemnation of 
human rights abuses "provide[s] scant comfort" to the numerous victims of gross violations if 
they are without a forum to remedy the wrong. [ ] This passage supports plaintiffs' contention 
that in passing the Torture Victim Prevention Act, Congress has expressed a policy of U.S. 
law favoring the adjudication of such suits in U.S. courts. If in cases of torture in violation of 
international law our courts exercise their jurisdiction conferred by the 1789 Act only for as 
long as it takes to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens, we will have done little to 
enforce the standards of the law of nations.”200 
 
Another interesting aspect of the Alien Tort Statute is the acceptance of corporate liability, 
although there is a split of opinion as to the scope of it. Important cases had been based on the 
notion of corporate liability, such as the Bauman, et al. v. DaimlerChrysler, et al., in which 
twenty-two plaintiffs claimed the automaker cooperated with the Argentinean junta during the 
1970s “Dirty War”, the above mentioned case against Shell Oil, or cases against national 
railway services for their alleged role in deportations, such as the case against the Hungarian 
Railway Services on behalf of victims of the Hungarian Holocaust for participating in the 
deportation of Jews during the Second World War and confiscation of their goods.
201
 This 
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latter case was largely criticized for its serious historical and legal mistakes.
202
 The case is 
still ongoing and is presently in the appeals phase.
203
 
 
Cases based on the Alien Tort Statute can thus be considered as the civil-law mirrors of 
universal jurisdiction cases. The rationale for the establishment of such jurisdiction in the US 
is very similar to the rationale of universal jurisdiction. Both establish jurisdiction for a 
domestic court to try cases that are not triggering ordinary jurisdictions: neither the victim, 
nor the offender or the place of the commission of the acts are linked to the forum state, 
however, the reasons are the same: to prevent offenders escape liability.  
 
Interestingly, criticism against both basis of jurisdictions are also similar: there is an 
increasing number of legal literature in the US raising attention on the international 
implications of the Alien Tort Statute and to the fact that it harms US external relations.
204
 
Obviously, in both cases, the judgment can only be enforced in case the offender is on US 
territory, which is another similarity with universal jurisdiction cases. 
 
The US Alien Tort Statute is thus another expression of the intention to provide jurisdictional 
possibility to initiate cases concerning serious violations of international law. Although this 
form of jurisdiction is presently only available in the United States and does not concern 
criminal liability, its message is clear and, even together with its noticeable downsides, 
obviously plausible.  
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III. Legal problems around the application of international criminal law 
The present chapter examines the common problems that may arise during domestic 
application of international law. These problems will be discussed from different 
perspectives: first, from the perspective of inherent dilemmas and issues of international law-
making, then examining common denominators and features of national legislation that may 
be of relevance for the often problematic application of international law, and finally 
analyzing the inherent hurdles of domestic jurisprudence through examining approaches and 
attitudes of domestic courts towards international law during its application, as well as the 
interaction between jurisprudence of international and national judicial bodies. 
 
1. Problems inbuilt in international law 
 
As is well known, international law by definition bears certain shortcomings in terms of 
precisity, common understanding of terms, discrepancies in legal definitions, non-concise 
solutions or compromises. These are mainly due to the very features of international law and 
the specific circumstances in which international rules are adopted. 
 
As is also commonplace, international law is based on fundamentally different notions than 
domestic law. Sovereignty of states, the dynamics of international politics, the weaknesses in 
enforcement mechanisms all contribute to certain discrepancies in international norms. When 
it comes to rules related to armed conflicts, such inconsistencies or results of compromises 
among states are to be found at several instances. When we think of the rules related to non-
international armed conflicts, the difficulties in adopting a definition for aggression, or, closer 
to our topic, of the issues of direct application of international law and all the problems arising 
from it, we witness the consequences of these political and other features of international law 
in general and international lawmaking and jurisprudence in particular. 
 
The following sub-chapter deals with such hurdles that are inbuilt in international law. It starts 
with effects of the sovereignty principle on domestic implementation and penalization of 
certain acts, continues with problems that are consequences of international lawmaking, with 
a separate discussion on the issues of international law-national law relationship and questions 
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of direct application of international law. The discussion follows with analyzing the effects of 
uncertainties around the legal definitions of crimes on domestic application, and conditions of 
their punishment in the Rome Statute with special attention to the complementarity principle, 
and lastly by examining the role the existence of the ICC and international jurisprudence have 
on domestic legislation. 
 
(i) Sovereignty and penalization 
 
One of the main expressions of state sovereignty is the power to decide which acts should be 
criminalized. Usually it is the state’s discretion to define such acts, and it is put in form in 
national penal laws. Exception from this usually exclusive state power is the case when an 
international treaty obliges states to penalize certain acts. “In fact, it is a central feature of 
core crimes law that it bypasses the national legislature in order to directly regulate the 
behaviour of individuals.”205 Consequently, in certain cases it is not left anymore to the 
discretion of the state to decide on the penalization of certain acts, but the state is bound by 
international law to do so
206
. 
 
This is the case with certain human rights treaties as well. In the case law of the past decades 
of the European Court of Human Rights, it has been manifested that the state is not only 
responsible for the acts of its organs, but also for acts of its individuals. This is the so-called 
“Drittwirkung”: although the ECHR is applicable between the individual-government vertical 
relationship, the state will eventually be responsible for an individual-individual horizontal 
relationship as well, since in case it does not ensure the enforcement of certain rules in 
penalizing these acts and so cannot guarantee adequate remedy for a violation
207
, it in the end 
could raise the responsibility of the state for violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights
208
. Obviously, what is examined by the Court in such cases is whether the state is 
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responsible for not providing adequate protection to its citizen through legislation, and it does 
not examine the responsibility of the individual for the specific act committed.
 209
  
 
This tendency is somewhat similar to the direct effect of certain international treaties to 
individuals, making individuals the subject of international law. Consequently, certain treaties 
not only oblige states to behave in a certain way, but they also oblige individuals through 
obligations to criminalize acts in order to protect persons from the actions of other persons.  
 
The obligation of international humanitarian law treaties is an example. States are not always 
keen about such obligations, as they usually like to keep their influence and control over 
criminal legislation as an expression of their sovereignty, either for political or for legal 
reasons or both. The obligation to penalize certain acts does not only mean that the 
penalization of certain acts as criminal is decided on the platform of international law, but 
additional questions are also decided on the international level, such as their elements, the 
grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, the possibilities of amnesty, immunities or 
time-barring.  
 
In the case of internationally formulated crimes, these questions are not left to the discretion 
of state authorities and so cannot be influenced by them. For this reason it is not uncommon 
that a state deliberately implements international crimes in a way that it still tries to exert 
certain influence over it, even if this is not in compliance with international law. Or else, the 
state chooses not to ratify the treaty, or to ratify it with reservations.
210
 Eventhough, if the 
state fails to implement internationally defined crimes in its penal legislation manifested in 
treaties ratified by it, the international provisions may, and shall be directly applied by 
domestic courts to avoid non-compliance with international law. 
 
The direct application of an international treaty may raise questions of state sovereignty, 
especially in the criminal law field. However, through the ratification and promulgation of the 
treaty, and by the common reference in certain constitutions on recognizing the ratified 
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international treaties as part of national law, the question may be solved. Still, for the benefit 
of certainty and clarity of the domestic legal system, and to ease the work of the prosecutors 
and judges, states, especially in continental legal systems, may choose to implement all 
international obligations thoroughly and then apply these national norms when actually 
complying with the international treaty. This question comes up not only in relation to direct 
application of international treaties, but also in relation to the self-executing rules: although 
such rules may be indeed self-executing, the question is how much the application of self-
executing international rules serve the certainty and clarity of the domestic legal system.  
 
To base legal procedures on national laws also safeguards the feeling of sovereignty of the 
state in forming its own criminal justice system. Therefore, apart from the binding 
international obligation, it is in the state’s own interest to implement as best as it can the 
obligations arising from humanitarian law treaties. Ferdinandusse adds, that “(…) States’ 
powers to shape their criminal laws are restricted primarily by the very fact that international 
law contains obligations for both States and individuals regarding the core crimes, rather than 
by the direct application of that body of law. After all, implementing legislation may give the 
States some opportunity to adapt core crimes law, but the substantial choices have already 
been made at the international level. Therefore, the extent to which State sovereignty can be 
protected by rejecting direct application and requiring implementing legislation is rather 
limited.”211 
 
The certainty and clarity of national law is also an important factor for judges and 
prosecutors. National law is more familiar, more defined, the judges know the background of 
the rules, are familiar with the legal system in which the rules have crystallized, hence the 
effects of the rule and the possible challenges are also more familiar and predictable. In 
addition, there are well-known national precedents to rely on. For these reasons it is no 
wonder that judges and prosecutors are more comfortable working with national law rather 
than international law. Even in the case of self-executing norms, the legislator has to bear this 
in mind and has to find a solution for national implementation that is not only legally correct, 
but also workable.  
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Therefore the easiest solution may not be the most effective. Although it is true that in a 
monist state international law becomes part of national law without transformation and in 
dualist states this transformation is done by promulgation, and while it is correct that 
international treaties may have a large number of self-executing rules, however, this does not 
mean that judges and prosecutors will be willing to apply the norms, even if they legally 
could.  
 
This argument, in the end, calls for an effective implementing legislation, taking into account 
not only the legal correctness, but also practical considerations, the preparedness of judges 
and prosecutors to resort directly to international norms, the avoidance of potential collisions 
with national law safeguards such as principle of legality, and a number of other factors. This, 
however, requires ample work by the government to prepare all the necessary implementing 
norms and by the legislator to adopt them, still, such a broad thinking over what is needed to 
ensure effective implementation of the treaties is inevitable.  
 
At the same time, experience shows that states are usually quite fast in ratifying a treaty to 
look good in the eyes of the international community – this is especially true for small states 
such as most of the Central European ones -, but can be rather lazy in properly implementing 
them and in thinking about the consequences of ratification on national law. In many cases 
implementation comes years after ratification and even when implementation is done, it is 
often legging far behind from what would be really necessary. 
 
Also, it may be the state’s own interest to express its legislative sovereignty to properly 
implement the international treaty instead of leaving it to direct application by judges and 
prosecutors. If the legislator implements the treaty provisions in national law, it still has a 
minimal possibility to influence it, whereas if the judges directly apply the international 
provisions, the legislator has absolutely no influence to regulate penal matters.  
 
This could be seen as contradictory to the separation of powers, according to which it is the 
legislator’s task to regulate criminal matters through the adoption of laws.212 “(…) while the 
direct application of core crimes law does not provide national courts with unchecked powers 
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to create new crimes, it can give them considerable leeway to shape the legal framework for 
the prosecution of existing ones.”213 
 
Having stated this, it has to be noted that the argument of sovereignty cannot be used for non-
compliance with an international treaty
214
. Therefore if the state does not implement its 
international obligations, direct application of the treaty is still possible and should be pursued 
for the sake of compliance with the treaty. 
 
Finally, it must be mentioned that a trend towards the recognition of the rule of law principle 
to international law itself seems to be forming, which will ultimately also lead to a restriction 
of state sovereignty. Several pieces of literature suggest that numerous international treaties, 
among others, the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, testify to the 
acceptance of the principle of rule of law to international lawmaking and observance of 
international law by states
215
.  
 
The effect of this on state sovereignty would be that international lawmaking would in itself 
be subject to rule of law principles, therefore international norms bind states accordingly. 
Moreover, the recognition of the rule of law in international law does not only concern the 
norms themselves, but also mean that the subjects of international law abide by them and act 
accordingly
216
.  
 
As it had been mentioned by numerous authors, the treatment of the Guantanamo detainees by 
the United States does not only violate and discredit US legislation, but also infringes the rule 
of law concept through accepting the disregard of human rights in the name of security
217
. 
Therefore, as the concept would incline, states are not only obliged to respect international 
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treaties and custom, but more generally and more broadly, the rule of law concept with 
respect to international law as well.
218
 
 
(ii) Effects of international law on national lawmaking and national jurisprudence: the 
ICC complementarity principle 
 
The Rome Statute of the ICC and the complementarity provision provide an excellent 
example to the issues that may arise as a consequence of the difference in international and 
national lawmaking. 
 
The obligation of states to adopt proper legislation in order to allow their courts to punish 
perpetrators of war crimes is important not only from the viewpoint of obligations on 
repression and effective application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. 
The Rome Statute complementarity provision
219
 also focuses on national courts’ actual 
investigations or prosecutions and the eventual ability/willingness
220
 to prosecute war 
crimes
221
.  
 
Whereas in the repression provisions of the Geneva Conventions there is no clear “standard” 
as to the forms of such implementation, the provision only stating that legislation has to be in 
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place, furthermore, there is no direct “consequence” built in the Convention if the state fails to 
comply with this obligation, the Rome Statute complementarity provision bears a more 
tangible effect if the state omits to prosecute: the ICC could take the case from the state.  
 
The dialectics therefore is interesting between the Geneva Convention obligation and the 
Rome Statute complementarity provision: the Geneva Convention expresses an obligation on 
the states, but accords no direct consequence for failure to comply with the obligation
222
, 
whereas the Rome Statute does not as such oblige states to put implementing legislation in 
place but attaches a direct consequence: the ICC gaining jurisdiction if the state does not 
proceed.
223
 In this way the two instruments complement each other and the Rome Statute 
gives weight to the Geneva Conventions’ obligation. 
 
It will be interesting to see in the practice of the ICC what kinds of procedures will be 
considered as demonstrating an inability or unwillingness of the state in the given proceeding 
to punish war criminals, as it seems that so far the ICC has avoided the question. Here two 
remarks must be made. First, the standard of inability and unwillingness is probably high,
224
 
and was most likely not meant to lead to a total standardization of states’ war crimes 
procedures and a standard understanding of all the legal elements of such procedures in all the 
states. This can not be the case, if for nothing else, because there are no such international 
standards in international law.  
 
Although there are procedural standards in human rights instruments, in the fair trial 
guarantees of Additional Protocol I, there are also binding procedural rules in the convention 
on the non-application of statutes of limitation, substantial elements are to be found  in the list 
of grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and the list of war 
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crimes and elements of war crimes of the Rome Statute, these do not, however, cover all the 
procedural and substantive aspects of a war crime prosecution that could serve the state with 
an overall international standard on the prosecution of war crimes
225
. However, it is obvious 
and just logical that in case an international treaty obliges states to punish certain crimes, the 
realization of this obligation should be in compliance with basic human rights as accepted in 
international law
226
. 
 
Second, the ICC should not be seen as an appellate court
227
 where it can take cases from 
national courts on its free consideration
228
. Although the inability and unwillingness criteria 
clearly will make good sense in many cases, these should not be used and considered as a 
joker in the hands of the ICC to freely grab cases.
229
 How much certain “western” procedural 
rights can be transferred to different legal systems has been the subject of debate concerning 
transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwandese authorities and the scope of the ICTR requiring 
Rwandese authorities to adopt such rights and guarantees. Critics of ‘legal imperialism’ claim 
that certain due process rights are Western legal constructs and are thus foreign to certain 
countries, such as Rwanda. Evenmore, as is argued, specific procedures required by the ICTR 
are foreign to common law systems as well. Counter-arguments say that a non-adherence to 
certain fundamental due process rights may lead to ‘victor’s justice’ and serious violations of 
basic non-derogable rights
230
. Whether similar arguments will be raised with respect to the 
ICC’s practice is still a question. There are fundamental differences between the ICC’s and 
the Tribunals’ approaches to jurisdiction – complementarity versus primacy – and most of the 
literature and statements made on behalf of the ICC make it clear that the ICC seeks to abstain 
from engaging in detailed ‘revision’ of domestic proceedings and will restrict itself to the 
most basic questions. 
 
                                                 
225
 For a detailed discussion on international standards, see Harmen van der Wilt, Equal Standards? On the 
Dialectics between National Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court, 8 International Criminal Law 
Review (2008) 229-272, pp. 252-254. 
226
 See Fichet-Boyle – Mossé (2000), p. 881. 
227
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228
 „(…) the ICC was not envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts.” See Holmes 
(2002), p. 673 
229
 See Abi-Saab (2003), pp. 598-599 (a reply to George P. Fletcher’s opinion). 
230
 See Jesse Melman, The Possibility of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis To Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic Courts, 79/3 (15) Fordham Law 
Review (2011) 1273-1332, p. 1321 and 1327. 
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Worth to note therefore, that the ad hoc Tribunals are stricter than the ICC in regard to 
weighing national procedures. Both the ICTY and the ICTR statute provide that they may re-
try a case even if the same case was tried in front of a national court, if the act was considered 
an ordinary crime and not an international crime
231
, eventhough the elements of the crime in 
domestic law need not be exactly identical, but “similar in substance”232. This solution in fact 
means that the ICTY and ICTR can, to a certain extent, „criticize” the national procedures233 
and, indirectly, the implementing legislation.  
 
In addition, the Tribunals, through Rule 11bis of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence, have 
also established a kind of „ability” test if they wanted to refer a case to national authorities. 
Rule 11bis states that the President of the Tribunal may appoint a bench of three judges (or 
Trial Chamber in the case of ICTR) to determine whether the case should be referred to the 
authorities of a State
234
. Such a State could be the one on whose territory the crime was 
committed, the one in which the accused was arrested or one having jurisdiction and being 
willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case
235
. The standard applied by the 
Tribunals when judging on the appropriateness of national procedures for the purposes of 
11bis referrals may provide interesting examples but not necessarily a ground for similar 
examination of national mechanisms by the ICC. 
 
In a summary, the ICTY and ICTR, during such assessments, had to consider under Rule 
11bis whether the requirements set forth in Article 20/21 of the Statutes listing defendant’s 
                                                 
231
 See Article 10 para 2 (a) and Article 9 para 2 (a) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively. For 
corresponding case law, see Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the  
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Law (2011) 397-417. 
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rights were met
236
, especially regulations on the presumption of innocence, to be tried without 
undue delay, to be tried in one’s own presence, the right to an attorney, the right to examine 
and cross examine witnesses for the prosecution and defense under the same conditions. In 
practice, this meant examining among others whether right to a fair and public hearing, 
adequate time to prepare a defense, right to counsel and equal access to witnesses were 
guaranteed
237
, or, in the case of ICTR, a factual examination of the availability of witness 
protection
238
.  
 
A comparative analysis showed that the ICTY was more lenient in applying Rule 11bis than 
ICTR (in referring cases to Rwanda), in that the ICTY merely conducted a purely legal 
analysis to see whether these comply with 11bis requirements, while the ICTR conducted 
both a legal analysis and a factual review of many factors
239
. This may be due to the increased 
concerns over the Rwandese authorities’ ability to keep up the due process guarantees, and 
due to the involvement of the ICTY and international experts with the courts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina through training programs and other measures. 
 
The situation was therefore a bit different concerning transfer of cases to Rwandan 
authorities. Since the fairness of trials and the readiness and capability of Rwandese courts to 
carry out fair and independent procedures were repeatedly questioned – so much so that a 
number of 11bis requests had been turned down –, Rwanda adopted a law in 2007 concerning 
transfer of cases
240
, guaranteeing the elements of fair trials and adequate procedural rights. 
Still, serious considerations were raised about the quality of the procedures, despite the law
241
. 
It must also be noted that corresponding literature criticized the different approach of the 
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Tribunals when examining Rwandese national legislation and procedures as opposed to 
examining European systems, judging the Rwandese system more harshly
242
.  
 
Today, due to the completion strategy of the ICTY, primacy in the case of ICTY cannot be 
invoked anymore and the Rule 11bis procedures have also been finished in front of the 
national authorities. Cases however are still transferred from the ICTR to national 
jurisdictions
243
. 
 
Coming back to the ICC, different approaches to the Court’s consideration of national 
systems was nicely demonstrated in a discussion between Georges Abi-Saab and George 
Fletcher. Fletcher argues that such a provision provides the ICC with the possibility to „decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether the judgments of other courts are worthy of its respect”, 
while Abi-Saab argues that should a national procedure be inadequate and reflect the 
unwillingness of the state, „this is not (…) a legitimate interest of the state, but an abuse of 
prosecutorial and judicial power for purposes of political protection from international 
criminal responsibility”.244  
 
Complementarity: contents of unwillingness and inability 
 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute, “the difficult aspect of the negotiations was to 
develop criteria setting out the circumstances when the Court should assume jurisdiction even 
where national investigations or prosecutions had occurred.”245 Within these criteria, 
obviously the unwillingness criteria was more contested, being a more subjective element. 
The term “genuinely” was chosen to attempt to counterbalance the subjectivity246, in order to 
give guidance for the ICC to serve as a basis against which the national procedure has to be 
tested.  
 
According to the Triffterer commentary, the criteria for unwillingness as described in the 
Rome Statute – shielding the person, unjustifiable delay and lack of impartiality – are 
                                                 
242
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243
 See ICTR official website: http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/Default.aspx?id=7&mnid=7 (last visited 26 
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exhaustive
247
. The unavailability of national legislation is not mentioned under any of the 
criteria as such. Under ‘shielding’ and ‘unjustifiable delay’, the prosecutor is bound to 
examine whether the state carried out proceedings in good faith, ie. whether there is an intent 
by the state to bring the persons concerned to justice.  
 
Under ‘lack of impartiality’, the prosecutor examines whether the proceedings are in fact 
being conducted in a manner, which in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person to justice
248
. Generally, the “critical factor (…) was whether there was a 
defect in the approach taken by the State which inevitably, if left to its conclusion, would 
result in travesty for justice.”249 
 
The ICC should, and probably will, take into consideration states’ legislative traditions, 
framework and legal context, and should examine the unwillingness criteria against this 
background. Being sure the arbitrary criticism by the ICC of national procedures was not the 
intention of the Rome Statute, this point has to be made when discussing the unwillingness 
criteria.
250
  
 
Indeed, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC stated that “(…) the policy of the Office in the 
initial phase of its operations will be to take action only where there is a clear case of failure 
to take national action. (…) In any assessment of these efforts, the Office will take into 
consideration the need to respect the diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures.” 251   
 
This being said, states should always bear in mind when forming national legislation whether 
in the end they are able to carry out prosecutions of war crimes in a way that corresponds to 
the international legal obligations. Even states that have not ratified the Rome Statute and 
expressed clear and strong opposition to it are inevitably somewhat influenced by these rules.  
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When it comes to inability, Schabas reminds that “inability will arise when a State cannot 
obtain the accused or necessary evidence and testimony or is otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings. The Statute makes this conditional on ‘a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system’ (…). Thus, a developed and functional justice 
system that is unable to obtain custody of an offender because of lack of extradition treaties, 
for example, would still be able to resist prosecution by the Court on the ground of 
complementarity.”252 However, if in such a case the lack of extradition treaties results in non-
action by the state, this would still be a ground of admissibility for the ICC, since in the end 
no national procedure was initiated.
253
 At the same time, the lack of reference to international 
crimes in the national penal code does not raise inability
254
, since the Rome Statute does not 
oblige states to exactly implement the crimes formulated therein.
255
  
 
Initially, on the request of the start-up team of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), a group of 
experts examined the question of how the ICC should approach the complementarity question 
and were invited “to prepare a reflection paper on the potential legal, policy and management 
challenges which are likely to confront the OTP as a consequence of the complementarity 
regime of the Statute.”256 In this paper, the experts identified certain elements that should be 
viewed, among others, when assessing unwillingness and inability.  
 
The group stated that generally, the examination “may relate to the legislative framework, the 
powers attributed to institutions of the criminal justice system, degrees of independence, 
jurisdictional territorial divisions”257. Regarding unwillingness, the group raised attention on 
the following factors: (i) different authorities within a country may demonstrate different 
determination regarding genuine procedures; (ii) the examination shall be based on an 
assessment of the procedure, not the outcome, because an indication that a person ‘should 
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have been found guilty based on those evidences’ would violate the presumption of innocence 
while tried in front of the ICC; (iii) the assessment should search for an indicia of the purpose 
of shielding the person from justice, such as proofs of political interference, general 
institutional deficiencies (such as lack of independence of judiciary) or procedural 
irregularities demonstrating unwillingness.
258
 The report raises attention that examining 
unwillingness may be more complex and politically more sensitive. 
 
Regarding inability, the paper generally notes that “ICC is not a human rights monitoring 
body, and its role is not to ensure perfect procedures and compliance with all international 
standards.  The focus of the complementarity regime is on the more basic question of whether 
the State is unable to genuinely carry out a proceeding”259.  In concreto, it notes the following 
factors regarding collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system: (i) unavailability of 
necessary expert personnel; (ii) unavailability of infrastructure; (iii) lack of substantive or 
procedural criminal legislation or access rendering the system unavailable; (iv) obstruction of 
uncontrolled elements or presence of immunities or amnesties rendering the system 
unavailable.
260
 
 
Whether or not the ICC’s actual assessments correspond to the elements listed in the Expert 
Paper is yet to be seen. In fact it seems that in the judgments adopted so far, the ICC has 
avoided the question of the exact contents of inability and unwillingness by determining lack 
of actual investigations or prosecutions, therefore making examination of 
inability/unwillingness unnecessary.  
 
The difference between inability and unwillingness and elements of the two terms was at first 
a part of the issue in the Katanga-case, however, the Court did not take a stand on their 
elements. The appellant argued that the non-objection of the DRC to the ICC’s assertion of 
the admissibility of the case cannot be seen as unwillingness, therefore this should have been 
examined under inability by the ICC. Inability, in turn, can be invoked only in very 
exceptional circumstances, evenmore, argues the appellant, it is for the ICC to determine the 
inability of the state, and not for the state
261
. The Appeals Chamber did not examine the 
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question in merits. It argued that since the DRC authorities did not initiate investigations, the 
examination of inability or unwillingness is irrelevant (for subsequent arguments see below). 
 
Complementarity was the issue in the admissibility challenge filed by Kenya in the Muthaura, 
Kenyatta and Ali case
262
 as well, however, the Court did not elaborate in this decision either 
on the exact contents of unwillingness and inability. The debate was rather around the ability 
of Kenya to prove that it had conducted investigations over the same persons for the same 
conducts
263
, which it did not succeed to do so. 
 
Similarly, in the Ahmad Harun-Ali Kushayb case the ICC determined that since no 
investigations or prosecutions took place in Sudan related to the conducts which the Court is 
dealing with, the case is ab ovo admissible, therefore inability or unwillingness were not 
examined.
264
 
 
While we had been discussing above the substantial elements of the criminal proceedings and 
their effects on a state to prosecute from the point of view of the ICC complementarity 
principle, the procedural elements should also be considered. Could the non-existence of 
certain procedural elements or guarantees in national legislation or in the actual case lead to 
the non-action of the state in investigating or prosecuting a person for ICC crimes?  
 
As is the case with the substantial elements, the Rome Statute does not prescribe procedural 
elements that are to be observed by the national courts. Other instruments of international law, 
however, contain such rules: first and foremost international human rights treaties, but also 
humanitarian law treaties which have transferred the basic fair trial elements and made them 
binding on states, even in the case of war crime trials.  
 
Worth to note that although states often adapt their substantive legislation, they tend to forget 
about adopting elements in procedural law that are unique to extraterritorial investigations and 
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prosecutions of extraterritorial crimes. Such considerations include ensuring adequate rights 
for defence in the absence of the suspect, difficulties for the defence to carry out own 
investigations abroad, or hearing witnesses abroad.
265
 Other aspects of criminal procedural 
law will be discussed in Chapter IV.1. 
 
In certain cases inadequacy of procedural elements could also lead to admissibility of the case 
to the ICC. For instance, if functional immunity hinders national prosecution, this may also 
give way to ICC jurisdiction. This has been confirmed in the Jean-Pierre Bemba case in front 
of the ICC, where the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that since “the CAR judicial authorities 
abandoned any attempt to prosecute Mr Jean‐Pierre Bemba for the crimes referred to in the 
Prosecutor’s Application, on the ground that he enjoyed immunity by virtue of his status as 
Vice‐President of the DRC”,266 the case is considered admissible in front of the ICC. 
However, while it is acknowledged that functional immunity is not a defence in front of 
international tribunals, this has not been acknowledged for national courts. The Arrest 
Warrant case in front of the International Court of Justice, as well as the Rumsfeld-case in 
France have also stated this
267
.  
 
While states that ratified the Rome Statute amended national legislation to allow acting heads 
of states to be surrendered to the ICC, they have in most cases not amended national 
legislation to terminate the defence of immunity in national proceedings
268
. Should such a 
case not be tried in front of domestic courts due to the immunity, it could fall under ICC 
jurisdiction due to inability of the state to prosecute. The comparative table in the Annex 
shows that several states omitted to adopt the necessary changes in their national legislation. 
 
Complementarity: the ‘inaction’ criteria 
 
Talking about the relation between the state of national legislation and its relation to the 
admissibility of a case in front of the ICC, an interesting debate has unfolded around the exact 
meaning of Article 17 forming the rule of complementarity. While many writers concentrated 
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on the one-step inability/unwillingness test – examining simply whether the state is unable or 
unwilling to prosecute -, Darryl Robinson, one of the authors of the text that became Article 
17, clearly indicates that the inability/unwillingness of the state is only an exception to the 
rule – the text says “unless” – according to which the case is inadmissible before the ICC if 
the jurisdictional state is investigating or prosecuting the case.
269
  
 
This means that if the state is investigating or prosecuting (which would lead to 
inadmissibility), it has to be examined whether the state is unable or unwilling to proceed - if 
yes, this would lead to admissibility of the case. Therefore, according to Robinson, this is a 
two-step process, whereby it is first examined whether the state is actually investigating or 
prosecuting, and then it is examined whether it is unable/unwilling to genuinely carry out the 
investigation.
270
  
 
Correspondingly, the ICC Appeals Chamber said in the Katanga-case that “[u]nder article 17 
(1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the question of unwillingness or inability has to be considered 
only (1) when there are, at the time of the proceedings in respect of an admissibility 
challenge, domestic investigations or prosecutions that could render the case inadmissible 
before the Court, or (2) when there have been such investigations and the State having 
jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned. Inaction on the part of a State 
having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not 
done so) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to article 17 (1) (d) of the 
Statute.”271 Thus, in case the state having jurisdiction initiates investigations or prosecutions 
during the admissibility procedure, the case will become inadmissible, since new facts have 
arisen
272
.  
 
The same was declared earlier on by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga-case: ”[t]he first 
part of the [admissibility] test relates to national investigations, prosecutions and trials 
concerning the case at hand insofar as such case would be admissible only if those States with 
jurisdiction over it have remained inactive in relation to that case or are unwilling or unable 
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(…).”273; and identical statements were made in the Ahmad-Harun case274, in the Al Bashir 
case
275
, in the Jean-Pierre Bemba case
276
 and in the Kony-case
277
. 
 
It is probably worth to note that the admissibility test has to encompass both the person and 
the conduct which is the subject of the case before the ICC
278
; within this question it was this 
momentum that made the Lubanga-case admissible, as certain national steps had been taken 
against the same accused, but related to different conducts. 
 
It is worth to note that the above quoted judgment in the Katanga-case arose from exactly the 
same considerations as was discussed above. The question was whether the self-referral of the 
case by the DRC demonstrated an unwillingness in the interpretation of the complementarity 
principles. The Trial Chamber argued that although self-referral was not mentioned under 
’unwillingness’ in the Rome Statute, it could be understood as a second form of 
unwillingness. While the Appellant argued that Article 17 (2) contains an exhaustive list and 
therefore the Trial Chamber erred in inventing a new form of unwillingness, the Prosecutor 
noted, later backed up by the Appeals Chamber, that unwillingness did not need to be 
examined at all, since the first sentence of Article 17 makes inadmissibility dependent on 
investigations or prosecutions. Since no investigations or prosecutions took place in the DRC, 
the case, in the Prosecutor’s view, is admissible279.  
 
At the same time, El Zeidy notes that it seems the Chamber did not consider the mere self-
referral as a ground for admissibility, but sees a need to examine self-referral on a case-by-
case basis. Admissibility can thus only be manifested if other reasons are also present, notably 
the clear inability of the state to proceed
280
, or, as stated by the Appeals Chamber, the non-
                                                 
273
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, 
Article 58, PTC-I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 February 2006, para 29. 
274
 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Decision on the Prosecution 
Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, PTC-I, ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007, paras 19-25. 
275
 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Amhad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, PTC-I, ICC02/05-0/09, 4 March 2009 para 49. 
276
 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, PTC-III, ICC-01/05-01/08, 10 June 2008, para 21. 
277
 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony  ¸Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2003, as amended on 27 
September 2005, PTC-II, ICC-02/04-53, para 37. 
278
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, para 38. 
279
 ICC, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, paras 62, 65 and 75 respectively. 
280
 Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, Origin, 
Development and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague (2008), p. 229.  
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 83 
existence of domestic procedures. At the same time it is difficult to imagine a state referring a 
case to the ICC while simultaneously investigating or prosecuting it. 
 
Here another question also appears. Notably, if we would not consider the first sentence of 
Article 17 (1), we would be inclined to think that unwillingness or inability would not be 
linked to actual proceedings, but would be a mere demonstration of general unwillingness or 
inability from the state. However, if we consider the first part of the sentence and regard the 
second part as an exception to it, this means that unwillingness or inability are linked to actual 
investigations or prosecutions that are already taking place.  
 
In other words, the state did initiate proceedings but those proceedings demonstrate the 
unwillingness or inability of the state. This view is strengthened by para (2) of the Article, 
which refers to investigations that ’were’ or ’are’ taking place. This is confirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber’s argument in the Katanga-case281 and the Pre-Trial Chambers’ findings in 
the Lubanga case: „The Chamber (…) notes that when a State with jurisdiction over a case is 
investigating, prosecuting or trying it, or has done so, it is not sufficient to declare such a case 
inadmissible. The Chamber observes on the contrary that a declaration of inadmissibility is 
subject to a finding that the relevant State is not unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct its 
national proceedings in relation to that case within the meaning of article 17 (1) (a) to (c), (2) 
and (3) of the Statute.” 282The ICC thus made clear that the examination of unwillingness and 
inability are linked to actual investigations or prosecutions. 
 
The Appeals Chamber sums this up in saying the following: „(…) in considering whether a 
case is inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to ask 
are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have 
been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute 
the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions are in the affirmative that 
one has to look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and to examine the question 
of unwillingness and inability. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse.”283 
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Although it is easy to imagine a case where the state initiated investigations in order to shield 
the person from ICC jurisdiction, it is more difficult to imagine a case where the state initiated 
investigations but is not able to carry out the proceedings – why would the state initiate the 
proceedings in such a case at all? The state may want to demonstrate its capability of dealing 
with its own matters, especially in cases of newly formed states or states where the regime or 
government had changed.  
 
Finally, the Office of the Prosecutor also confirmed the ‘inability’ requirement in saying that 
„(…) in deciding whether to investigate or prosecute, the Prosecutor must first assess whether 
there is or could be an exercise of jurisdiction by national systems with respect to particular 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor can proceed only where States fail 
to act, or are not ‘genuinely’ investigating or prosecuting, as described in article 17 of the 
Rome Statute.”284 To look at it from a different point of view: if there is no investigation or 
prosecution (step 1), no matter whether the state is able and willing or not (step 2), the case is 
admissible. If we would only look at the inability/unwillingness requirement in one step, it 
would be enough to determine whether the state is theoretically willing or able to carry out the 
prosecutions to bar the ICC jurisdiction.  
 
To sum up, three cases are possible:  
 
(i) the state is investigating or prosecuting AND is also (willing)/able to genuinely 
carry out the prosecution: the case is inadmissible,  
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(ii) the state would be investigating or prosecuting BUT is not (willing)/able to 
genuinely carry out the prosecution: the case is admissible (OR: the state is 
investigating BUT is not able to prosecute: the case is admissible
285
),  
 
(iii) the state is not investigating or prosecuting NO MATTER if it would be 
willing/able to genuinely carry out the prosecution: the case is admissible.
286
  
 
This differentiation becomes practically important when a state is not investigating or 
prosecuting for reasons other than those listed under unwillingness or inability. If we accept 
that these lists are exhaustive, a different interpretation of the Statute would mean that in case 
a state is not investigating or prosecuting for other reasons, the case would still be 
inadmissible. In other words, mere theoretical ability and willingness to investigate would be 
enough to bar ICC jurisdiction. As the Appeals Chamber noted, “The Court would be unable 
to exercise its jurisdiction over a case as long as the State is theoretically willing and able to 
investigate and to prosecute the case, even though that State has no intention of doing so.”287  
 
This was exactly the question in the Katanga-case, where the reason for inaction was a simple 
lack of intention (other than any of the reasons listed under unwillingness) from the side of 
the DRC, which ultimately lead to non-investigation/prosecution. Had the ICC considered this 
only under the unwillingness criteria, it would had judged for inadmissibility because lack of 
intention is not listed under unwillingness. However, since the first sentence of Article 17 (1) 
makes it clear that non-investigation already makes the case admissible, the Court found that 
it had jurisdiction over the case.  
 
It must be mentioned that what the present author finds a more arguable reasoning in the 
Katanga appeals judgment is the reasoning with respect to Article 17 (1) (b), where the 
Chamber notes that although the Auditeur Général decided to terminate proceedings, he did 
so precisely to initiate ICC proceedings. The other line of reasoning by the Chamber referring 
to the overall purpose of the Statute being to end impunity seems more convincing
288
. 
However, this part of Article 17 is not relevant for our discussion. It also has to be noted that 
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286
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the entire issue raises questions about the relationship of self-referrals to the complementarity 
principle, the discussion of which would go beyond the frameworks of the present thesis. 
 
The consequence of the analysis above on the appropriateness of national legislation is 
therefore also in points (ii) and (iii): even if the state would want to and even if it starts to 
investigate and prosecute but cannot carry out proper proceedings due to inappropriate 
domestic legislation or application of the law – reasons not listed under unwillingness or 
inability –, the case would still be admissible before the ICC due to the first sentence of 
Article 17 (1) (a). 
 
Reading this conclusion together with William Schabas’ explanation on what unwillingness 
and inability exactly mean, we may conclude that even if the state is willing and able to 
proceed - for example a state with developed judicial system but inadequate domestic 
legislation -, but the investigation or prosecution could not even be launched due to the lack of 
relevant domestic provisions, the case would be admissible before the ICC.  
 
The great difference therefore between examining existing procedure first and 
inability/unwillingness second, as opposed to only examining unability/unwillingnes is that if 
we would consider only willingness/ability, the manifestation that a state is willing/able to 
proceed would in itself be enough to bar ICC jurisdiction, even if it actually does not proceed. 
Whereas if we read the text of the Statute closely, actual investigation or prosecution is 
necessary to render the case inadmissible before the ICC: therefore it is not enough if the state 
wants and – theoretically - can proceed, it also actually has to proceed; ability and willingness 
apply not generally to the procedural capabilities of the state but to the actual proceedings. If 
amnesty laws inconsistent with the Rome Statute or lack of relevant crimes in the criminal 
code or any other legislative or non-legislative reasons finally lead to a non-investigation, the 
case is admissible because finally no proceedings take place.  
 
If we think of the practical consequences of the above described interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, one could point to the case of self-referral of the Ugandan situation to the ICC. El 
Zeidy in his article analyzing the effects of self-referral on the interpretation of the 
complementarity principle asserts the following: “(…) an effective practical interpretation 
should apply to article 17(1)(a)-(c), where paragraph 1(a) states that the Court "shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where ...[t ]he case is being investigated ... by a State." 
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Thus, if a State did not initiate an investigation, or if it acknowledged that it is not going to 
initiate proceedings, the case should be de facto admissible, since none of the criteria set out 
in paragraph 1 (a)-(c) are satisfied. It follows that there is no need to delve into the question 
whether the state is unwilling or unable within the meaning of article 17(2), (3).”289  
 
The situation El Zeidy examines is similar to a case when a state cannot proceed lacking 
adequate national legislation in that in both cases the reason for non-prosecution falls outside 
the exhaustive reasons for inability/unwillingness listed in Article 17 (2) and (3), however, in 
both cases this results in non-prosecution by the state. Consequently, following the Robinson-
interpretation, both cases would be admissible since the case is not investigated or prosecuted 
by a State (Article 17 (1) a) first sentence); however, following the other interpretation, these 
cases could be seen as inadmissible, because the reason for non-investigation or non-
prosecution are different from Article 17 (2) and (3).  
 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that in the Ugandan case one could easily argue 
that the fact of the referral itself indicates to unwillingness – this is the conclusion to which El 
Zeidy also arrives at
290
 –, this argument would not stand in the case of non-action due to 
inadequate national legislation. Notably, the state can demonstrate ability (adequate judicial 
system) and willingness (no attempt at shielding the person from justice, unjustified delay, 
etc.) and still not proceed. Such a situation could end up in two different decisions on 
admissibility resulting from the two different interpretations of the Rome Statute. 
 
Interestingly, some states examined the complementarity provision from the side of state 
sovereignty. The French Constitutional Council examined whether the complementarity 
provision infringes France’s sovereignty. The Court ruled that complementarity, where it 
results from a state evading its responsibility and not carrying out proper procedures comes 
from the pacta sunt servanda principle and thus does not violate state sovereignty.
291
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290
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Although it falls outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, it is theoretically interesting that 
the recent Biszku-case in Hungary - which brought a huge media attention and strong protest 
from the part of international lawyers - could eventually fall under unwillingness: it could 
either be stated that the state failed to adopt proper implementing legislation or that the 
prosecutors were not applying international law, thereby ignoring Hungary’s international 
legal obligations.  
 
In the Biszku-case, the Prosecutor General’s Office rejected a criminal complaint against 
former Minister of Interior Béla Biszku for alleged crimes against humanity committed after 
the 1956 revolution. The Prosecutor General’s Office handled the acts as ordinary crimes and 
referred in its rejection to time-barring as prescribed for ordinary crimes, and basically 
refused to genuinely examine whether the acts in question could qualify as crimes against 
humanity, to which no time barring applies
292
. 
 
These considerations lead us to believe that the threshold of national procedures for the 
purposes of complementarity is to be found somewhere between the express prohibitions of 
the Rome Statute as a minimum requirement and the states’ legal features as the maximum 
aspect, the Rome Statute providing no clear guidance, but offering some clues. The practical 
consequence is that the domestic judge, when dealing with a war crime case, should better 
take the Rome Statute minimum requirements into account if it wants to avoid the ICC 
gaining jurisdiction over the case, to the extent, of course, of the possibilities provided by 
national law.  
 
Hence, although the Rome Statute entails no obligation to implement its provisions, these 
should be taken into account in national law and practice.
293
 Some national courts have gone 
so far as referring directly to international law or even international customary law in their 
decisions, others were not reaching back to international law but rather applied their domestic 
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law exclusively. In the Mugesera-case
294, the case of deportation of Hutu political leader Léon 
Mugesera from Canada on grounds of incitement to commit genocide, the Canadian courts 
reached back to international law when interpreting elements of crimes against humanity. 
However, the Dutch courts in the Van Anraat-case
295
 had differing opinions: while the 
District Court took the ICTY case law as a reference for the assessment of mens rea, the 
Court of Appeal took the opinion that although there should be a preference for the 
application of international law, if the case law of international tribunals is not clear, Dutch 
national law should be applied exclusively
296
. A discussion on the application of international 
law by domestic courts will follow in more detail in Chapter III. 1. (iii). 
 
National laws as sources for the ICC 
 
It is noteworthy that the Rome Statute acknowledges the relevance of national legal systems 
in some other aspects as well. Notably, according to Articles 21 (1) c) and 31 (3) of the Rome 
Statute, the Court may consider - in general or as a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility other than those specifically referred to in previous paragraphs - deriving from 
the general principles of law, national laws of legal systems of the world, including the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that 
such principles are not inconsistent with the Statute, with international law and with 
internationally recognized norms and standards.
297
  
 
While drawing from national laws is only a supplementary means of construction to fill any 
lacuna in the first two sources mentioned by the Statute – the Statute itself and treaties and 
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principles of international law
298
 -, this link is an important aspect when analyzing the Court’s 
willingness to consider national law elements. Although this particular article is relevant for 
the Court’s own proceedings, it demonstrates that the Court is not deaf to what national law 
has to say. 
 
If we look at the question of national procedures and whether these reach the threshold for the 
purpose of the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC, the mentioned article of the Rome 
Statute may indicate that in case the national court, based on national law, applies defences 
that are not expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute but are consistent with international law 
and internationally recognized norms and standards, the application of such defence would 
not, in itself, lead to a consideration of “inability” by the International Criminal Court, as long 
as such defence does not contradict express rules of the Rome Statute.  
 
As a conclusion it can be stated that creating a tension within domestic jurisdictions is not the 
aim of the Court, acknowledging that “whereas the international crimes owe their very 
existence to the efforts and determination of the international community, concepts of 
international criminal responsibility have to fit in the legal texture of domestic systems where 
they face the competition of tried and tested equals. It is by no means self-evident that time-
honoured general parts of criminal law should yield to their international equivalents, as this 
would probably cause unwarranted difference in the administration of criminal justice within 
one legal system.”299 At the same time, the Statute expressly closes out certain defences, such 
as defence of official capacity, lack of knowledge in the case of command responsibility, or 
superior orders.
300
 The application of such defences in national criminal proceedings may lead  
to non-investigation by the state and ultimately to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
The question of comparability of national legislation with the Statute is not only relevant to 
see whether a defence in national legislation is acceptable or not, but also to examine the 
different features of ordinary crimes and international crimes. Another interesting example is 
the question of self-defence. While self-defence in national law is a well-known and 
crystallized concept, it is more difficult if not impossible to apply it with respect to 
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international crimes. The self-defence concept does not appear in international humanitarian 
law and therefore is not present in the ICC Rome Statute. 
 
The question is then, would the defence of self-defence be applicable in a domestic procedure, 
and if yes, would the threat be justified if it endangered the person or a group? And if self-
defence would be applied for a war crime, what would be the acceptable, proportionate 
reaction under the terms of self-defence? Clearly, a combatant has the right to kill a 
combatant, irrespective of the self-defence concept as it is understood in ordinary criminal 
law. But would an act constituting a violation of IHL be justified under self-defence if the 
threat was proportionately big? And should a national court acknowledge a situation of self-
defence in such a case as ground for excluding responsibility, would that mean the state was 
inactive in trying the person for the purposes of complementarity?  
 
A similar case was dealt with by the ICTY, where the defence stated that the accused acted in 
self-defence to repeal the attack of enemy forces. The Trial Chamber, however, underlined 
that being in a military operation in a self-defence situation does not justify serious violations 
of IHL.
301
 But how is this compatible with the acknowledged excess in the act as a response 
to the threat? Many states acknowledge that the threat can cause such a psychological shock 
that the person exceeds the limits of acceptable response to the threatening act and reacts with 
a comparably more serious act. Would this explanation be acceptable in the case of war 
crimes?  
 
As there is no sufficient ICC jurisprudence as yet on the way how the ICC will assess general 
principles of law derived from the practice of national courts to its own proceedings, we may 
try to draw some examples from the practice of international tribunals. Raimondo points out 
that although general principles of law should be derived from national laws in force, one has 
to bear in mind that because of the prohibition of the application of retroactive laws in mala 
partem, the law to be looked at is the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. 
However, one cannot be sure what law the tribunals looked at, because they nearly never 
indicated it, and the danger exists that the data they obtained and thus the law they were 
referring to was the law in force at the time of the proceedings, and not at the time of the 
commission of the act.
302
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Tribunals have observed both substantial and procedural elements in general principles of 
law. Substantial elements, such as individual criminal responsibility or duress as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing have been observed in the ICTR’s and ICTY’s Akayesu303 and 
Erdemović304 cases, while procedural elements, such as the burden of proof being on the 
Prosecutor have been mentioned in the Delalić305 judgment.  
 
A further question is how the international tribunals ascertain whether a rule is a general 
principle recognized in national law. To verify this, tribunals had obviously a tendency to 
reach to national laws and other sources of certain “leading” countries such as Germany, 
France, Australia, UK, USA and Canada or to reach to the national legal system of the 
country where normally the procedure would have taken place. This approach is plausible 
because it gives full satisfaction to the principle of foreseeability of the law by the accused 
and the nullum crimen nulla poena principles.
306
 Moreover, as Raimondo points out, 
“recourse to comparative law as a method for ascertaining general principles of law would be 
a safeguard against legal imperialism”.307 
 
Accordingly, the ICTY stated in the Furundžija case that “[in order to arrive at an accurate 
definition of rape], (…) it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems of the world. These principles may be derived, with all due caution, from 
national laws.”308 The modes of “all due caution” were elaborated mainly in the Kupreškić-
case, where the Tribunal examined what degree of caution was required by national courts to 
sentence a person based on eyewitness identification made under difficult circumstances. 
During this examination of domestic practice, the Tribunal cited examples from several 
common law and continental law states and concluded that it will turn down conviction if it 
was based on evidence that could not have been accepted by any reasonable tribunal or where 
the evaluation of the evidence was wholly erroneous
309
. It then generally stated in the Tadič-
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case that the threshold of identification of general principles of law is high, in the sense that it 
needs to be shown that the principle is part of most, if not all, national legal systems
310
.
311
 
 
As stressed in the Furundžija and Kupreškić cases, when applying or resorting to general 
principles of law as applied by national courts, the correctness of such analogy and 
transforming national law concepts in the international tribunal has to be justified. Judge 
Cassese also warned about the risks of such transposition: 
 
“To my mind notions, legal constructs and terms of art upheld in national law should not be 
automatically applied at the international level. They cannot be mechanically imported into 
international criminal proceedings. (…) Reliance on legal notions or concepts as laid down in 
a national legal system can only be justified if international rules make explicit reference to 
national law or if such reference is necessarily implied by the very content and nature of the 
concept. (…) However, this historical spilling over from one set of legal systems into the law 
of nations does not detract from these legal systems (those of States on the one side, and 
international law, on the other) being radically different: their structure is different, their 
subjects are different, as are their sources and enforcement mechanisms. It follows that 
normally it would prove incongruous and inappropriate to apply in an inter-State legal setting 
a national law concept as such, that is, with its original scope and purport. The body of law 
into which one may be inclined to transplant the national law notion cannot but reject the 
transplant, for the notion is felt as extraneous to the whole set of legal ideas, constructs and 
mechanisms prevailing in the international context. Consequently, the normal attitude of 
international courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to adjust it 
to the exigencies and basic principles of international law.”312 
 
Coming to the conclusions, one can state that general principles of law in national systems 
have played a significant role in international criminal law by filling the gaps. However, the 
transposition of such rules was effectuated without any adjustment, or the rules have been 
adjusted so they are compatible with international law and applicable to the given case.
313
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Should the ICC continue such a practice, this would ensure a broad observance and respect 
for general rules established on the national level. 
 
Role of state cooperation in ICC proceedings 
 
We have to briefly mention that national courts may play an additional role while the ICC is 
proceeding in a case. Since the ICC does not have its own police force, it is largely dependent 
on national authorities regarding arrest and surrender of persons, taking and collecting 
evidence, questioning, searches and seizures, examining places, etcetera.
314
  
 
Although not the same concepts, most states treat surrender requests from the ICC similar to 
extradition requests coming from another state, therefore national courts will hold a 
preliminary hearing or examination before the surrender, according to their own national law, 
to examine whether the standard of proof reaches the standard necessary for surrender. 
Eventually, some judges may come up with a negative answer. Furthermore, when collecting 
evidence, freezing assets, giving authorization for searches and seizures, the national 
investigating authority will need to have an authorization from a court and the judge will have 
its own discretion in the decision within the framework of national law.  
 
Although the requirement of double incrimination should not – and cannot – be an obstacle to 
fulfilling surrender requests, partly due to the fact that with the ratification of the Rome 
Statute the state already accepted the penalization of the crimes included, difficulties may still 
arise during the specification of the crime and difference in elements of crimes especially if 
the state did not implement the Rome Statute crimes in its penal legislation
315
. Consequently, 
even if a state itself does not conduct prosecutions, its authorities may have a word in 
international procedures.
316
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 93. 
315
 For an examination of the specificities of surrender, see Péter M. Nyitrai, A kiadatási jog sajátszerűsége a 
nemzetközi büntetőbíróságokkal folytatott együttműködés rendszerében, in: Ünnepi Tanulmányok Wiener A. 
Imre tiszteletére, Budapest, KJK-Kerszöv (2005). 
316
 For example, in the US a magistrate freed a suspect requested by the ICTR, because, in his view, the proof 
did not measure up to the federal standard for a surrender. See Wedgewood (2000), p. 409. 
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Complementarity versus universal jurisdiction? 
 
Some authors have argued that the ICC can be seen as “the final substitute for universal 
jurisdiction”.317 In fact, the ICC’s jurisdiction is not based on a concept similar to universal 
jurisdiction, but it is closer to traditional jurisdictions.
318
 The ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute 
crimes committed in the territory of a State Party or by a national of a state party – two 
traditional basis of jurisdiction. Therefore the coverage of universal jurisdiction is wider than 
that of the ICC’s jurisdiction: while according to universal jurisdiction every state has the 
right and is in fact obliged to search for and prosecute offenders, the ICC is basically tied to 
the nationals and territories of States Parties.
319
  
 
Therefore it is no way desirable and would go counter the international efforts of ending 
impunity for war crimes if states would see the ICC as a substitute for universal jurisdiction, 
even considering that states are often applying certain restrictions to universal jurisdiction 
(see Chapter III. 3. (ii) ). In fact, as many see it, the “adoption of the Rome Statute may thus 
prove a catalyst for universal jurisdiction”.320 Moreover, the Court may even assist states in 
exercising universal jurisdiction, because the Rome Statute provides that “[t]he Court may, 
upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party conducting an 
investigation into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the 
requesting State.”321  
 
Even in cases where the ICC could in fact exercise jurisdiction, national procedures may be 
more welcome. Considering that the ICC can only deal with a limited number of cases, 
national courts still have a huge role to play. Evenmore, the ultimate success of the ICC could 
                                                 
317
 See reference in Cedric Ryngaert, Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC era – A Role to Play for EU Members 
States with the Support of the European Union, in: 14/I European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice (2006), p. 46. 
318
 Ibid, p. 48. 
319
 Although the Rome Statute foresees prosecution based on the referral of the Security Council, this could be 
regarded as an extraordinary basis of jurisdiction in the case of the ICC. 
320
 Ryngaert (2006), p. 51. 
321
 ICC Rome Statute, Article 93 (10) a). 
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be measured by the small number of cases in which it has to proceed.
322
 However, the ICC 
may be used as a substitute for national procedures when prosecution of a certain high-
ranking individual would pose problems for the state or because of the links of the custodial 
state with the state of nationality or the territorial state.
323
 
 
Universal jurisdiction is therefore seen as an exceptional form of jurisdiction. Many also see it 
as a form of jurisdiction that operates only in the absence of other grounds, including the 
international jurisdiction of international courts. According to such opinion, and due to the 
fact that these crimes are regarded as crimes against the whole international community, 
universal jurisdiction is a tool for the benefit of the international community to help out in 
case states with ordinary jurisdiction are not conducting proceedings.  
 
Hence, the state is exercising universal jurisdiction not in its own name, but in the name of the 
international community, lacking other mechanisms. However, if another mechanism exists 
on the international level, such as an international tribunal or court, the rationale of universal 
jurisdiction could vanish.
324
 According to this view, therefore, universal jurisdiction is not 
accorded priority over other forms of jurisdiction.
325
  
 
Therefore the question arises, which prevails in case of conflict: the jurisdiction of the ICC or 
universal jurisdiction. If a case is not tried by the state having ordinary jurisdiction but if 
another state is willing to exercise jurisdiction, does it curtail the jurisdiction of the ICC based 
on the complementarity principle? According to the Rome Statute,  
 
“the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution;”326  
 
The Rome Statute does not expressly identify or exclude a specific ground of jurisdiction, 
therefore one may conclude that it could include universal jurisdiction. Therefore if any state 
                                                 
322
 Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, September 2003, p.4. 
323
 See Ryngaert, p. 53. 
324
 See for example Abi-Saab (2003), pp. 601-602. 
325
 See Statement of Orrega Vicuña, Institute de droit international, Annuaire, Volume 71, Tome II, Session de 
Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième partie, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, pp. 212-213. 
326
 ICC Rome Statute, Article 17 para 1. 
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would be willing and able to exercise universal jurisdiction over a case, this would deprive the 
ICC of its jurisdiction. In the Lubanga-case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber noted that “such case 
would be admissible only if those States with jurisdiction over it have remained inactive in 
relation to that case”327. Further case law of the ICC is yet to confirm this. In any event, 
certain states already tackled this question by closing out the exercise of jurisdiction if an 
international tribunal/court is proceeding in the case
328
. 
 
Moreover, some States argued during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Rome 
Statute that the existence of universal jurisdiction obviates the need that any state consents to 
prosecution by the ICC. Germany, for example, specifically argued that since based on 
universal jurisdiction any state has the right to prosecute without consent of the concerned 
state, the ICC should have the same right. This argument actually bases the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court on the existing concept of universal jurisdiction.  
 
This would, in their view, mean, that should the ICC want to prosecute a case, it could do so, 
regardless whether the concerned state (custodial, territorial or national) accepts jurisdiction 
of the ICC.
329
 Although this concept obviously had many strong opponents and a 
corresponding provision did not eventually find its way to the Rome Statute, it is interesting 
to see that certain states interpret universal jurisdiction as a very broad general authorization 
for any state or international body to exercise jurisdiction. 
 
It also has to be mentioned that as recognized in international law, the primary responsibility 
to punish perpetrators of the most serious international crimes lies with states. Which states, is 
the question of the share of jurisdiction among them: obviously sovereignty requires the 
primacy of the territorial/nationality states. Still, international tribunals and courts were and 
are established because states were not able or willing to carry out this task.  
 
This is also demonstrated in the chronology of adopted treaty obligations: after the 
Nuremberg Tribunal states agreed on the establishment of universal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convention, expressing their opinion that it is the task of states to deal 
with such perpetrators. Since this mechanism did not work sufficiently, ad hoc tribunals, and 
                                                 
327
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, para 29. 
328
 See for example Spain, Law of 1985 as amended by Law of 2009. According to the amendment, Spain cannot 
exercise jurisdiction if another competent court or international tribunal has begun proceedings. 
329
 See Brown (2001), pp. 385-386. 
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then the ICC were established. The Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, being ad hoc bodies, did 
not deal with this issue, simply taking over all such cases, but the ICC is based on the 
principle of complementarity, in other words, on the obligation of states to proceed. 
 
A further argument against the subsidization of universal jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals in general and the ICC in particular would be the very practical 
consideration of the (un)availability of the ICC to handle a large number of cases. It is 
perfectly clear from the experience of the ICTY and ICTR that such tribunals are not able to 
deal with many cases and are only taking cases of high value and gravity. Since the ICC also 
connects its jurisdiction to sufficient gravity of the crimes, it is obviously not expected from 
the ICC to take up all international criminal cases – this task should be fulfilled by domestic 
courts, be it on the basis of ordinary or universal jurisdiction. 
 
The Geneva Conventions are also silent on the issue of eventual conflict of universal 
jurisdiction with jurisdiction of international tribunals, not only because the International 
Criminal Court had not existed at the time the Geneva Conventions were adopted, but it was 
also deliberately silent not to hamper any future developments of the law. The Commentary 
indicates that „there is nothing in the paragraph to exclude the handing over of the accused to 
an international penal tribunal, the competence of which is recognized by the Contracting 
Parties.”330  
 
To sum up, in the present author’s view, an order of jurisdictions can be established based on 
the corresponding international treaties and the above mentioned arguments, according to the 
following:
331
 
 
(i) ordinary jurisdiction – because the national/territorial state is in the best place to 
carry out the proceedings; 
 
(ii) universal jurisdiction – should the national/territorial state not proceed for this or 
that reason
332
; 
                                                 
330
 Commentary to GC I, Article 49 para 2, para 4. 
331
 It is important to underline that this order is in no way based on international obligations. According to 
international law, there is no mandatory order of jurisdictions when it comes to bases of jurisdiction of states. On 
the other hand, jurisdiction of a State versus jurisdiction of the ICC is guided by the complementarity principle. 
The order described by the present author rather refers to a rationale order. 
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(iii) ICC – should none of the domestic courts proceed333.  
 
(iii) Problems of direct applicability of international law 
 
The transformation of legal solutions from one state to another and the inherent dangers, 
problems and difficulties are not only a subject for implementation of international law to 
domestic criminal legislation but are also discussed in other fields, such as transformation of 
constitutional or civil law solutions from one state to another. The limits of the present study 
do not allow for an extensive discussion on legal transformation in general, therefore the 
following chapter will concentrate on the problematics of the transformation of obligations on 
repression into national legislation. 
 
International law – national law relationship generally 
 
The relationship between international law and national law has an extensive literature written 
by both international and Hungarian scholars. Therefore only those aspects will be briefly 
mentioned below that have a direct effect on the domestic procedures concerning war crimes. 
 
Primacy of international law over national law is a concept that had been contested for a long 
time, however, by today, it has been generally accepted that a state cannot excuse its actions 
by pointing to inadequate national implementing legislation to justify non-compliance with 
international obligations
334
. Therefore, if international law and national law contradict each 
other, international law prevails
335
, even if it contradicts the constitution
336
 of a state.
337
  
                                                                                                                                                        
332
 See for example: Douglass Cassel, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, in: 31/1 Human Rights: Journal of the 
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities (Winter 2004). 
333
 Universal jurisdiction is often seen as a transitional system between national – ordinary – jurisdiction and 
international jurisdiction: this sustains the theory of order of jurisdictions as described above. See de la Pradelle, 
in: Ascensio-Decaux-Pellet (eds.), p. 917. Note that this order of jurisdictions of states vis-à-vis the ICC presents 
a profound difference from the same relation vis-à-vis the ICTY and ICTR. Namely, according to their Statutes, 
the ICTY and ICTR originally had primary jurisdiction over national jurisdictions and they did exercise this 
primacy on numerous occasions mainly at the beginning of their functioning – for instance in the Tadić, Mrkšic, 
Musema and Bagosora cases. See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, From Primacy to Complementarity and Backwards: 
(Re)-Visiting Rule 11bis of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in: 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008) 
403-415, p. 407. 
334
 The state of international law within national law or concepts related thereto are also largely influenced by a 
state’s political system. See Péter Kovács, The effect of the change of political regime on the Hungarian doctrine 
of international law, in: András Jakab - Péter Takács - Allan F. Tatham (eds.), The Transformation of the 
Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005- Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union, Kluwer 
Law International, Alpheen aan den Rijn (2007), pp. 453-463. As Kardos points out, the Hungarian attitude 
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However, when it comes to obligations of individuals under international law, what effect 
does this primacy have on the individual’s obligation? If international law has not been 
incorporated into national law, is the individual directly obliged to comply with international 
law? Can obedience to national law be a defence for perpetrating acts that constitute war 
crimes?  
 
The defence of inadequate national legislation may seem similar to that of superior orders in 
referring to a higher command or authorization – through a lack of national prohibition of that 
act – to excuse the act. However, in case of superior orders the defendant has committed an 
illegal act, while in the case of reference to national law, the defendant did not commit an 
illegal act according to national law, but the act was criminal based on international law. Such 
a situation could result from two circumstances: either the state simply did not implement 
international law, or national law contradicts international law.  
 
Whether obedience to national law could serve as a defence for violation of international 
obligations was one of the key issues during the Nuremberg trials, considering that many of 
the offences with which Nazi criminals were charged with were not illegal under German 
                                                                                                                                                        
towards international law during the socialist era was characterized by the „sacred cow” concept. This approach, 
however, changed after the changes. See Kardos Gábor, The Changing face of international law in Hungary, in: 
András Jakab - Péter Takács - Allan F. Tatham (eds.), The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985-
2005- Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union, Kluwer Law International, Alpheen 
aan den Rijn (2007), pp. 464-467. 
335
 See Fichet-Boyle – Mossé (2000), p. 872. 
336
 The Hungarian Constitutional Court stated that it had to interpret the Constitution in compliance with 
obligations under international law. For an analysis of the role of international law in constitutional 
interpretation, see László Blutman, A nemzetközi jog használata az Alkotmány értelmezésénél (The Use of 
International Law in Constitutional Interpretation), in: Jogtudományi Közlöny (Július-Augusztus 2009) 301-315. 
Blutman refers to a differentiation made by the Constitutional Court between 3 categories of international law 
binding on Hungary: (i) international ius cogens norms: these prevail over the Constitution, (ii) generally 
accepted rules of international law: these do not prevail over the Constitution but may complement it, (iii) 
international treaty rules: these do not prevail over the Constitution. The Constitutional Court eventually formed 
the doctrine that interpretation of the Constitution shall be done in compliance with binding international rules, 
including obligations arising from international treaties. See Blutman (2009), pp. 304-305. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court also ruled that it had jurisdiction to examine the amendment of the Hungarian constitution 
from a procedural perspective, but not from a substantive perspective. This means that from a substantive point 
of view, both the constitution and the amendment of the constitution are the basis for examination of the 
constitutionality of other legislation. The Constitution has to be in compliance with ius cogens and obligations of 
international treaties to which Hungary is a party. See 61/2011 (VII.13) AB hat., para V.2.2. 
337
 The Belgian Council of State, for instance, opined that if Belgium ratified the Rome Statute while its 
Constitution contravened its norms, the Rome Statute’s provisions would prevail. See Rapport fait au nom de la 
Commission des relations extérieures et de la défense, Exposé introductif du Vice-premier Ministre et Ministre 
des Affaires étrangères, Doc. Parl. 2-329/2 (1999/2000), p. 1-5. Available at www.icrc.org (last visited on 12 
September 2012). 
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law.
338
 Apart from the philosophical question this and other issues raised
339
, it is also a 
question of relationship between international and national law, and the obligations of 
individuals under international law.
340
 Principle II of the Nuremberg Principles deals with this 
question in saying that “[t]he fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act 
from responsibility under international law.”341 
 
However, the consequence of national law contradicting international law (as opposed to 
simply not having been implemented) tends to be more complicated. The answer depends on 
the constitutional framework of the state and whether there is a hierarchy between 
international and national law according to national law. While generally it is clear that the 
state has to bear responsibility for not bringing its national legislation in line with 
international law
342
, the individual is bound in the first place by national law. However, if 
international law incurs direct rights and obligations on the individual, international law 
overrules national law.
343
  
 
This viewpoint was supported by the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the Justice trial: 
“It is, therefore, clear that the intent of the statute (…) is to punish for persecutions and the 
like, whether in accord with or in violation of the domestic laws of the country where 
perpetrated, to wit: Germany. The intent was to provide that compliance with German law 
should be no defense.”344 In other words, when national law, contrary to international law, 
                                                 
338
 Before and during the Nazi regime, if a law was enacted legally, the judiciary had basically no power to 
challenge them. German judges were obliged to apply German law only, even if it collided with international 
law. See reference in the Justice trials:  
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm#Commentary (last visited on 29 
March 2010). 
339
 N.b. the Radbruch-formula about unbearably injust laws, see Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und 
übergesetzliches Recht, 1 Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung (1946) 105-108, p. 107. 
340
 The individual being direct subject of international law is a relatively new achievement of international law, 
originating primarily from the notion of international crimes – the passive side – and human rights law – the 
active side of the individual being a subject of international law. See Kovács Péter, Nemzetközi jog, Osiris 
Kiadó (2006), pp. 298-299. 
341
 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal, 1950, Principle II, Report of the International Law Commission covering its Second Session, 5 
June - 29 July 1950, Document A/1316. 
342
 Yoram Dienstein, Defences, in: Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and 
procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law – The Experience of International and National Courts, 
Volume I, Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2000), p. 382. 
343
 Ibid, p. 382. 
344
 U.S.A. v. Alstoetter et al (The Justice Cases), 3 CCL No. 10 Cases 954 (1947), available on 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm#Commentary (last visited on 29 
March 2010) 
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obliges the individual to commit acts, the very enactment of that law is complicity with the 
crime.
345
 
 
If the legislator failed to implement a treaty, can a judge make do and directly apply it, even if 
it is in contradiction with national law but in compliance with international law? The state 
cannot refer to national law to excuse itself from not complying with international law, as it is 
established in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a state ratified 
an international treaty, it is applicable even lacking national implementation, although in this 
case application is more difficult. Therefore to apply an international norm directly in the 
absence of implementing legislation would not violate national law, as the treaty had been 
promulgated in the state, therefore it is in force. Therefore it seems that the state is free to 
decide on the implementation of an international treaty only as far as this freedom of 
implementation is compatible with pacta sunt servanda.
346
  
 
This limitation on the freedom in national implementation becomes more relevant as 
international law increasingly confers rights and obligations directly vis-à-vis individuals. 
Therefore state control over the implementation of international treaties goes only so far that 
it has to make the rights and obligations in relation to the individuals workable within national 
law. Whether this is done through the direct application of international law by the national 
courts or through comprehensive implementing legislation is up to the State to decide, as long 
as it works.  
 
Therefore the specific state organs that are responsible for making international law work – 
the legislature in the first hand, but also the judiciary and the executive powers – are bound by 
international law to this effect.
347
 This obligation also means that national courts are also 
bound to observe the rules of international law, even lacking adequate national legislation. It 
is incorrect for national courts to look at only and exclusively national law. The inadequacy of 
national law compared to the rules of international law does not give any exemption for the 
national courts from observing international law. This also follows from the internal hierarchy 
                                                 
345 
The Justice Case 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), also see Dienstein (2000), p. 383. 
346
 See Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 170. 
347
 „Should one accept the view that international law confers rights and obligations on individuals, it seems 
reasonable to hold that international law may also impose obligations on specific State organs.”, quoted by 
Ferdinandusse (2006), footnote 935. 
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of norms, constitutions giving way to international rules if they are in collision with national 
law, and this also follows, again, from pacta sunt servanda.
348
  
 
In addition, rules of a humanitarian character are in a special position here: because of a 
constant reference to the “basic dictates of humanity” or “the civilized nations”, humanitarian 
rules seem to be put on a higher ground than other international rules. The fact that many 
humanitarian rules are ius cogens and erga omnes and that many have become customary 
rules backs up this argument. The question is, whether this particular position also stands for 
the national implementation of humanitarian rules. Fact is, many international and national 
courts have called for effective domestic implementation and application of the humanitarian 
rules.
349
 Truly, it is difficult to imagine how a State could comply with the “ensure respect” 
obligation of the Geneva Conventions if it does not make it possible for its national courts to 
enforce these rules.  
 
Ferdinandusse notes that “[i]f some international norms are so fundamental that they bind 
States per se regardless of their consent, while proceedings on the national level provide the 
most, or even only, effective means of enforcement it is difficult to accept that the 
applicability of those norms in national courts is subject to the discretion of the State” 350.  It 
is, furthermore, even more difficult to imagine how a State could comply with pacta sunt 
servanda without ensuring the domestic enforcement of the said international norms.  
 
However, there are examples to the contrary. The Vermeire case in Belgium
351
, although not 
related to war crimes, discussed whether choice of implementation of a norm was to be done 
by the legislative or judiciary power. The case concerned the rights of an illegitimate child to 
her heritage. Vermeire was a recognized illegitimate child who was denied her heritage based 
on the Belgian Civil Code which closes out illegitimate children from heritage. Vermeire 
argued, however, that the Belgian Civil Code manifested discrimination between legitimate 
and illegitimate children which was in violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Brussels Court of First Instance recognized this controversy between the 
Convention and the Belgian Civil Code and directly applied the norm of the European 
                                                 
348
 See Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 170. 
349
 See Hungarian Constitutional Court decision 93/1993; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Nepal, Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.41, 10 November 1994, para 12.  
350
 Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 163. 
351
 Judgment of the Brussels Court of First Instance of 3 June 1983. 
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Convention on Human Rights, lacking implementing legislation. However, the Brussels Court 
of Appeal quashed the decision
352
, and this was upheld by the Court of Cassation, saying that 
the choice of means of implementing the rule is the choice of the legislature and not the 
judiciary.
353
  
 
Vermeire brought the case to Strasbourg. In its decision, the European Court of Human Rights 
said that “[t]he freedom of choice allowed to a State as to the means of fulfilling its 
obligations under Article 53 of the Convention could not allow it to suspend the application of 
the Convention while waiting for such reform to be completed”. 354 
 
Monism - dualism
355
 
 
Implementation of international law means that the state includes the norms of international 
law into its own laws. Transformation of international rules means the way a state makes 
international law in force in its national law. While transformation is absolutely necessary for 
the international treaty being in force in a state, implementation is a tool to make domestic 
application easier. Transformation mechanisms of certain states depend on the legal system of 
the states and the relationship between international and national law. Basically two kinds of 
relationships exist: monist and dualist; in practice, mostly a mixture
356
 of the two appears
357
. 
From the viewpoint of the international treaties it doesn’t matter which solution is chosen, 
important is that the state is able to enforce the rules of international law within its national 
law.   
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 Judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal of 23 May 1985. 
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 Judgment of the Court of Cassation, para 11, of 12 February 1987. 
354
 Case of Vermeire v Belgium (Article 50), Application no. 12849/87, Judgment of 29 November 1991, para 26. 
355
 The question of monism-dualism will not be discussed in detail in the present thesis due to its rich literature. 
See for instance Bodnár László, Nemzetközi szerződések és az állam, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest (1987), Karl Josef Partsch, International law and municipal law, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume 10: States, Responsibility of States, International Law and 
Municipal Law, North-Holland – Collier Macmillan, New York-London (1987)  
356
 Gábor Sulyok, Comments on ’The relationship of international law and the Hungarian legal system 1985-
2005’ by Tamás Molnár, in: András Jakab- Péter Takács – Allan F. Tatham (eds.), The Transformation of the 
Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005- Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union, Kluwer 
Law International, Alpheen aan den Rijn (2007), pp. 485-486. 
357
 For an analysis of international law – national law relationship, see Bodnár (1987), and Bodnár László, A 
nemzetközi szerződések államon belüli alkalmazásának fő kérdései (Main questions of domestic application of 
international treaties), in: 15-16 Acta Humana (1994) 6-19. 
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If a state violates the rules of international law, it cannot refer to its internal laws
358
. The 
difference between a monist and a dualist approach has not been very important until 
individuals also became subjects of international law. With individuals as subjects, it became 
crucial that rights and obligations stipulated directly on them by international treaties can be 
really enforced
359
. In the constitutions of Central European states one can usually find 
reference to acceptance of general rules or principles of international law and that 
international law prevails over national law. Certain constitutions even declare that 
international treaties accepted by the state become part of national law.  
 
In a monist state international law becomes part of national law without transformation. This, 
however, does not mean that there is no need for any legal measure – implementation – to 
enforce the rules.  
 
This is where we must make a difference between directly applicable and non-directly 
applicable rules. In theory, a directly applicable rule is for instance the prohibition of torturing 
prisoners-of-war, because there is no need for any legal measure to comply with this rule. It 
must not be forgotten, however, that the state has further obligations, such as dissemination of 
the rules, incorporation into military manuals, enforcement, etcetera. In order to comply with 
such obligations it is necessary to adopt certain measures, such as determining which 
authority is responsible for dissemination, incorporation into the manual, providing 
punishment and so forth.  
 
Non-directly applicable rules are, for instance, rules related to the use of the protected 
emblems; these rules cannot be enforced without internal legal regulations determining for 
instance which authority is responsible for painting the red cross on vehicles, who is 
responsible for giving identity cards for medical personnel, and so on. 
 
A dualist state transforms international treaties into its internal law
360
. Transformation is 
usually done by promulgation
361
. Promulgation
362
 needs to be done in a way compatible with 
                                                 
358
 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Fifth Edition, Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 124 or 
Kardos Gábor-Lattmann Tamás (eds.), Nemzetközi Jog, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest (2010), pp. 59-60. 
359
 See Bodnár (1994), p. 9.  
360
 Difference shall be made between general transformation and special transformation, in that general 
transformation means the transforming of international law generally into the national legal order (most often 
understood as the transformation of customary law into the national legal order); special means that a specific 
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national regulations relating to enactment of laws, consequently an international treaty will 
only be in force in internal law if its promulgation was done in compliance with national law. 
The question of directly and not directly applicable norms
363
 is present here as well: directly 
applicable norms are enforceable after the transformation without any further legislation, 
while non-directly applicable norms are in need of further implementing legislation
364
. The 
adoption of such further legislation is best done at the same time as the promulgation (or 
publication in monist states) of the treaty.  
 
Whether criminalization of grave breaches is done through adoption into the domestic 
criminal code or directly through the published/promulgated international treaty is really 
dependent on the legal system of the state. Even if the state decides to adopt the crimes in the 
criminal code, it is a further question whether it would be enough to describe the act and refer 
to international law for the elements of the crime or whether all elements of the crime need to 
be listed in the criminal code. In the practice of states with continental legal systems it seemed 
to be a more secure solution – and many states chose to – if national law contained 
everything: elements of the crime, sanctions, defences and other issues, although even in such 
a case the prosecutor or judge would have to apply international law. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter III. 2. 
 
Deducting from what had been said above, it becomes clear that during enforcement of 
humanitarian law it is not the monism-dualism issue that is problematic but rather the 
question of directly and not directly applicable norms: although there are numerous directly 
applicable humanitarian law rules, in the end it comes clear that even most of these are not 
really directly applicable because their effective enforcement may depend on internal legal 
measures.  
                                                                                                                                                        
treaty is transformed in national law. Bodnár argues that this differentiation is artificial because customary norms 
can typically not be transformed. See Bodnár (1994), p. 10. 
361
 Bodnár argues that promulgation as such is not necessary in case of ratified treaties: in this case promulgation 
is a duplication of the ratification, because ratification in itself invokes the rights and obligations on the state 
institutions, hence, publication of the treaty would be enough. See Bodnár (1994), p. 13. 
362
 As for a confusion between the concepts of transformation and promulgation, see Blutman László, A 
nemzetközi szerződések törvénybe iktatása: homokszemek a gépezetben, in: 1 Közjogi Szemle (2010) 7-14, pp. 
8-9. 
363
 In the present thesis, the question of directly or non-directly applicable norms indicates the question whether 
norms stipulated in international treaties can indeed be effectively enforced without further national legislation. 
This issue is not to be confused with the question whether international law as such is directly applicable within 
a state. 
364
 This action, however, cannot be labeled as transformation: it only means that the enforcement of the norms of 
the treaty is effectuated by an internal law. See Bodnár (1994), p. 12. 
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Can international law be really directly applicable?  
 
The easiest excuse to escape full implementation of international humanitarian law treaties is 
to argue that according to many states’ constitutions and internal legislation, international law 
becomes part of domestic law as soon as it is duly promulgated (dualist systems) or published 
(monist systems). Although this may be theoretically correct,
365
 this provision does not solve 
all the problems a state may face when it applies humanitarian law treaties. In fact, it seems in 
most cases it does not solve any of the problems. 
 
The question of direct application of international law by national judges could seem to be a 
non-issue at first blink.
366
 However, if a state becomes party to a treaty and does not bother 
with adopting implementing legislation, as we will see from following examples, the 
promulgation of the treaty would not necessarily be enough for a judge to try someone for war 
crimes “directly” based on these treaties.  
 
This is what the present study understands under direct applicability of international norms: 
the judge would formally have to apply national law – that is, the promulgated treaty, because 
due to the ratification the international treaty became part of national law – , but if the rules 
were not implemented into the already existing internal norms (for example in the Criminal 
Code), the judge, in fact, would have to directly apply the Geneva Conventions / Additional 
Protocols or other treaties, which are creatures and part of international law. The reason for 
                                                 
365
 Constitutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia and Hungary recognize general principles of international law. 
The Constitutions of Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia say that self-executing treaties are directly 
applicable. The Croatian, Lithuania, Estonian and Slovak systems (although the Slovak Constitution mentions 
promulgation of international treaties, many Slovak authors argue that the Slovak system is monist) seem to be 
monist or have monist elements in their Constitutions. The Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish 
Constitutions are dualists or have dualist elements: the Bulgarian Constitution says that ratified, promulgated and 
in-force treaties are part of national law, the Czech Constitution refers to promulgated treaties, the Hungarian 
and Polish Constitutions mention publication of international treaties. It has to be noted that in many cases there 
are no clear monist-dualist solutions but a mixture of the two. 
366
 By ’direct application of international law by domestic courts’, the present study means application by 
domestic courts of rules of international treaties that were ratified by the given state but its provisions had not 
been implemented into national law. For instance, applying a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions in a 
criminal procedure in a state that had ratified the Geneva Conventions but did not implement that specific grave 
breach into its penal code. Similarly, direct application could also mean an application of a customary rule 
without it having been implemented into national legislation. 
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the complexity of the question is the difference between the features, systems and rules of 
international law and national law
367
.  
 
In addition, in many cases international law does not regulate issues as detailed as it would be 
necessary for a judge for its effective application.
368
 Questions arise such as what could be a 
reference for the elements of such crimes, what sanctions would the judge impose if the 
concerned act was not in the domestic criminal code, how could international case law be 
taken into account, what about relevant customary law, etc. Depending on the state’s legal 
system and culture, the judge could either solve these issues through direct application, or, 
lacking properly clear domestic legislation, he/she may not be in a position to properly apply 
the law and thus would be bound to drop charges due to problems inbuilt in national 
legislation. 
 
This, however, would mean that the state is not able to effectively enforce the international 
treaty. As Wiener puts it: “In case we accept criminal responsibility based on international 
law, from the view point of legal guarantees of criminal law, the adoption of domestic laws is 
not necessary for holding the individual accountable, however, a sovereign state decision 
must be made in order that the internal jurisdiction works, because criminal prosecution is an 
expression of state sovereignty. It is then an internal constitutional question, what kind of 
measure is adopted to express this sovereign decision.”369  
 
Can a state refer to a lack of national implementation measures when it comes to the 
application of an international obligation? As is well known, and as Shaw also points out, 
although in case a state does not act in accordance with its obligations as laid down in 
international law, the domestic position is unaffected (and is not overruled by the contrary 
                                                 
367
 One of the reasons for the adoption of the German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch was it being a link between 
international law and national criminal legislation which is required for German courts to adjudicate in a concise 
manner acts violating international law, and to consolidate international criminal law into the German legal 
order, in order to ease the work of adjudicators. See Kis Norbert – Gellér Balázs: A nemzetközi 
bűncselekmények hazai kodifikációja de lege ferenda, in: Wiener A. Imre Ünnepi Kötet, KJK-Kerszöv, 
Budapest (2005), p. 364 and the ministerial explanation to the German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch. 
368
 As for collision of direct application of the Rome Statute with the principle of legality, see Michael Cottier, 
Die „Umsetzung” des Römer Statuts hinsichtlich der Kriegsverbrechen, in: Jusletter, 14 Maerz 2005, p. 4. 
available at: http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/jusletter_michael_cottier.pdf (last visited 
on 11 October 2010). In this article, Cottier asks whether it is compatible with the principle of legality that the 
Swiss military penal code refers to crimes defined in international treaties and it does not define the elements of 
crimes in the national penal code. 
369
 Wiener A. Imre, Büntető joghatóság és nemzetközi jog (Criminal jurisdiction and international law), in: 35 
Állam-és Jogtudomány (1993) 175-211, p. 203. 
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rule of international law), the state as it operates internationally has broken a rule of 
international law and the remedy will lie in the international field
370
. "A state which has 
broken a stipulation of international law cannot justify itself by referring to its domestic legal 
situation. It is no defence to a breach of an international obligation to argue that the state acted 
in such a manner because it was following the dictates of its own municipal laws."
371
 
Therefore, a state cannot argue effectively that it can not or not properly try the perpetrators of 
war crimes because it is lacking adequate implementing legislation. Moreover, should the 
state consider that the implementing legislation is sufficient, but at the same time should a 
judge not find the domestic legislation sufficient to try the accused, the question arises 
whether this would amount to a breach of the international obligations of the state.  
 
Degan states that “unlike international judges and arbitrators who gave direct effect to 
international obligations, a national judge could not do that unless authorized by national 
law.”372 But what does authorization by national law mean? Does it suffice if the state simply 
ratifies the relevant treaty or does it require further authorization in national law? This 
depends on both national legislation and the willingness and self-confidence of judges to 
apply a foreign field of law.  
 
In theory, if international law had become part of the national legal order, it becomes a part of 
national law therefore directly applicable: in fact, the judge applies national law. If some 
elements of crimes are not to be found in the treaty which the judge is dealing with but in 
other treaties, the issue is similar. However, if some elements necessary for adjudicating the 
case are to be drawn from other sources, such as texts or documents not adopted in treaties, 
then it could be really problematic whether the judge could and would refer to these 
“international” cases and documents, and if so, on what basis.   
 
For example, the elements of war crimes are listed in a separate document to the ICC Rome 
Statute. Although the Elements of Crimes are not binding on ICC judges, they are to be used 
as an interpretative aid during ICC proceedings
373
 and thus could be guiding for national 
courts as well. If national criminal codes include crimes based on the ICC Rome Statute and 
                                                 
370
 Shaw (2003), p. 123. 
371
 Ibid, p. 124. 
372
 Statement of Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Institut de droit international, Annuaire, Volume 71, Tome II, Session de 
Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième partie, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, p. 212. 
373
 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICRC-
Cambridge University Press (2003), p.8. 
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when a national judge is applying these crimes, could he also directly apply the elements of 
war crimes? On what legal basis? 
 
In Hungary, an ‘Information’ had been issued in 2004 by the Minister of Justice374, referring 
to the acceptance of the force of foreign court decisions, including decisions of international 
tribunals established based on an international treaty or the decision of the Security Council of 
the United Nations. Since the new law on the adoption of laws annulled all Informations 
based on a decision of the Constitutional Court
375
, the Information is not valid anymore, it 
provided an interesting example of how national legislation is trying to deal with the effect of 
foreign court decisions.  
 
The Information generally stated that with the widening of international relations, 
development of the law was pointing towards the acceptance of the force of foreign court 
decisions in criminal cases. The Information then noted that the Hungarian courts considered 
the force of foreign court decisions and international court decisions equal to Hungarian court 
decisions if the act was punishable under both the foreign and Hungarian law and the 
punishment was in compliance with the Hungarian legal order. This rule meant that (i) the 
case was considered res judicata in Hungary and (ii) the foreign or international court/tribunal 
decision could be referred to with the same force as a Hungarian court decision. It is worth to 
mention that although the Information itself was annulled, it may still provide as a guidance 
for judges and prosecutors. 
 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court held in 1993, examining a law that was the partial basis 
for the Korbély-case (see next paragraph), that “[a] typical feature of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity is that they are punishable irrespective of whether they were committed in 
breach of domestic law. (...) It is therefore immaterial whether the Geneva Conventions were 
properly promulgated or whether the Hungarian State fulfilled its obligation to implement 
them (…). Independently [of these issues], the responsibility of the perpetrators existed under 
international law, and potential subsequent domestic legislation may give effect to this 
responsibility in its original scope”376. 
                                                 
374
 Information of the Minister of Justice nr 8001/2004 . (IK.4.) on the administration of criminal cases with of 
an international concern (8001/2004. (IK. 4.) IM tájékoztató a nemzetközi vonatkozású büntető ügyek 
intézéséről). 
375
 Constitutional Court decision 121/2009. (XII. 17.). 
376
 Hungarian Constitutional Court, case nr. 53/1993, para 4.d. 
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The “direct” application of ratified international treaties got therefore particular importance at 
Korbely v. Hungary in front of the European Court of Human Rights.
377
 Korbély was a 
Hungarian captain who was found guilty in Hungary for attack against protected persons 
during the 1956 revolution. The debate of the case was particularly around one victim, Tamás 
Kaszás, a member of the insurgents, who, among others, intruded into the compound where 
Korbély was serving. The incident in question involved Korbély negotiating with Kaszás and 
his company about their surrender to which they eventually agreed. Kaszás drew a handgun 
from his pocket – a movement which was interpreted differently and became the essence of 
the case: according to Korbély, under the circumstances it could be believed that he was 
reaching for his handgun to attack, and Korbély ordered his men to open fire, simultaneously 
shot at Kaszás himself who died immediately. According to the other party, however, Kaszás 
drew his handgun to hand it over to surrender, in which they previously agreed. The 
Hungarian Supreme Court found Korbély guilty for intentional murder constituting a crime 
against humanity based on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
 
Korbély brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing, inter alia, that the 
Hungarian courts have violated the principle of legality, because the Hungarian translation of 
the Geneva Conventions, ratified in 1953 by Hungary, was not promulgated in the official 
state gazette, but in a separate annex to it. According to Hungarian law, a precondition for 
entry into force of any legal act is the publication in the official state gazette. Although the 
ECHR did not accept this argument in the given case – arguing that these rules were well 
known to the claimant which proved in that the rules were incorporated in the military 
manuals at the time for the training of which the claimant was responsible –, this defence 
could have eventually brought about difficulties for the state in terms of fulfilling of 
international obligations. 
 
The question of direct application of international law gets even more complicated when it 
comes to customary law. This problem usually comes up with regard to universal jurisdiction 
where it is not accepted in treaty but in customary international law. According to Degan, 
“[u]nless otherwise authorised by national law, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege would 
prevent the national judge from giving effect to the aut dedere aut judicare principle in a 
                                                 
377
 European Court of Human Rights, Korbely v Hungary [GC], no. 9174/02 – (19.9.08). 
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treaty or universal jurisdiction based on customary international law.” The only solution can 
be a general transformation of accepted customary law into the national legal order. Such a 
solution can be found in the Hungarian constitution: “Hungary shall accept the generally 
recognised rules of international law”.378 While it is a topic of debate whether this refers to ius 
cogens or customary international law or both, such a general transformation may ease the 
way for judges to apply non-written binding rules of international law.  
 
Certain states find customary law too elusive and vague to be able to be directly referred to. 
The Dutch Supreme Court in the Bouterse-case
379
 (a more in-depth analysis follows in 
Chapter III. 2. (i)) did not accept reliance on customary law if it collided with national law. 
Van der Wilt mentions that “[r]ules of international customary law may by their very nature 
lack sufficient precision. Moreover, it may be rather difficult for a court to assess whether a 
certain standard has matured into international customary law. However, these considerations 
can be countered by other arguments. (…) If [the prohibition of torture as ius cogens] entailed 
that States are under an obligation to prosecute perpetrators, it might be questioned whether 
they would be permitted to invoke any domestic legal impediments as an excuse to neglect 
such obligation.”380  
 
The elusiveness of customary law shall not be an obstacle to its application. In the end, 
customary norms are equally binding as treaty law. Whether it is the task of the legislator or 
the judge to decide whether a norm is customary or not, shall be the decision of the state. It 
should, however, be considered that it would be unrealistic to expect the legislature to 
implement customary law into its national legislation in a systematic way. Therefore it will 
remain to be the task of the judge to decide on the customary nature of a given norm. The 
only consequence its elusiveness could then have would be an upmost caution on the side of 
the judges in such determination and consequently a restrictive rather than a broad approach. 
 
Regarding the direct application of universal jurisdiction, some argue that a judge can apply 
universal jurisdiction only based on an express authorization in domestic law, others argue 
that the treaty provision to extradite or prosecute is enough.
381
 While the treaty provision 
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 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 25 April 2011, Article Q para 3. 
379
 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, nr. HR 00749/01 CW 2323 LJN: AB1471, NJ 2002, 559 
380
 Comment of Harmen van der Wilt, Bouterse-case, ILDC 80 (NL 2001), C5. 
381
 Statement of Orrega Vicuña, Institute de droit international, Annuaire, Volume 71, Tome II, Session de 
Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième partie, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, p. 213. 
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clearly establishes an obligation, judges are reluctant especially in the field of criminal law to 
act without an express provision in their own domestic criminal legislation. 
 
Ferdinandusse poses the question whether „general rules of reference to international law or a 
part thereof (…) also incorporate international offences (…) in the national legal order (…). 
In other words, is ICL subject to the same constitutional rules on incorporation and 
transformation as international law in general, or does it take up a special position?”382 
Ferdinandusse further suggests that the explicit mentioning of international law does not in 
itself fulfill the requirements of the principle of legality, and to decide whether international 
law can be directly applied. It all depends on the national provisions relating to the adoption 
of legislation: if such provisions foresee that punishment has to be based on national law, it is 
still an open question whether national law in this sense includes international law - because 
of its inclusion in national law through a general reference.
383
  
 
Therefore considerations of the principle of legality do not fix the question alone: other issues 
have to be looked at, such as the status of international law in national law and the question of 
direct applicability of international law provisions. Many constitutions say that international 
law shall be directly applied. However, there may be difficulties as to the direct application of 
international customary law, as most of the constitutions define international treaties as being 
part of the national legal order, and only some constitutions name “generally accepted 
principles of international law” 384. 
 
In practice, after ratification of a treaty, two solutions are possible:  
(i) it is a monist state therefore no need to promulgate the international treaty, it 
becomes part of national law without any transforming legislation;  
(ii) it is a dualist state, therefore the state promulgates the treaty in its national law.  
 
In both cases direct application should be theoretically no problem, because the treaty became 
part of the legal order, either as effect of the treaty’s ratification and it being published 
(monist state), or as effect of the promulgation (dualist state).  
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 Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 36. 
383
 Ibid, p. 36. 
384
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Can then this treaty be directly applied by the judge? The elements of the crimes are more or 
less specified in the Geneva Conventions and other treaties containing serious violations, but 
a number of other questions are not: the penalty, the defences, forms of participation and so 
forth. Consequently, it is not enough for the judge that direct application is theoretically 
possible and constitutional, the judge needs further elements for his judgment. These further 
elements can be provided in national law in two typical ways:  
 
(i) for instance a Geneva Convention Implementation Act: the implementation act 
should solve these issues, either by referring to the applicability of the ordinary 
criminal code in these aspects, or by containing the answers in the implementation act 
itself (e.g. United Kingdom);  
 
(ii) implementing the crimes in the criminal code (e.g. Hungary) or in a separate 
legislation (e.g. international crimes code as in Germany).  
 
In addition, an official translation of the treaty should be provided in such acts/legislation. 
These kinds of national laws will finally give all the elements for the judge to be able to 
adjudicate the case. However, lacking any of these elements - the translation, the penalty or a 
reference to the applicable penalty, the forms of participation or other general criminal law 
issues - would result in that the judge would either not be able to apply the law, or he would 
have to make an inventive application, and it depends on the states’ legal system, how far a 
judge can go. 
 
Relationship between self-executing norms and direct applicability 
 
Direct applicability is often confused with self-executing rules. Self-executing rules are rules 
which don’t require specific national legislation to be applied. Whether a rule is self-
executing or not, depends on the nature of the rule. Prohibition of a certain act as such is, for 
example, self-executing, because for a person not to commit an act there is no need to have 
national legislation. If, however, the application of a rule requires the action of a state 
authority, there is need for national legislation to appoint which authority is responsible to 
make that action. The fact that a rule itself is self-executing does not necessarily mean that 
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there is no need for national legislation to effectively enforce that rule in national law; 
enforcement obligations are therefore usually not self-executing.  
 
The prohibition of acts considered as war crimes could be said to be self-executing, i.e. 
soldiers who are holding prisoners in custody shall not treat the prisoners inhumanely – there 
is no need for specific legislation so that soldiers can follow this rule. However, in order to 
effectively enforce this rule, the state may have to criminalize the act in the penal code, unless 
international law can be directly applied by the courts. Therefore if a state would like to 
effectively apply international rules it must examine whether despite the self-executing nature 
it needs national legislation. The question of self-executiveness does not only concern the 
question whether the rule can be enforced directly by national courts, but also whether the 
rule can be applied without the adoption of national laws.
385
 There is no authority or treaty 
rule to say which rules are self-executing. It is up to the state to consider whether a rule is 
considered self-executing or not. However, states have to be careful not to rely too heavily on 
the self-executing nature of certain rules in the field of criminal repression, because it may go 
contrary to the legality principle
386
. 
 
As the US District Court said in the Baptist Churches case, “Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions is not a self-executing treaty provision. The language used does not impose any 
specific obligations on the signatory nations, nor does it provide any intelligible guidelines for 
judicial enforcement (…). The treaty provision is “phrased in broad generalities” (…) and 
contains no ’rules by which private rights may be determined’.”387 
 
Usually the problem that arises around self-executing norms is not that much their denial, but 
rather an excessive reliance on them. States, not wanting to engage in often lengthy process of 
adopting implementing legislation tend to rely on norms as being self-executing even when 
they are actually not, or when the rule itself may be self-executing, but its national 
enforcement would require national legislation. 
                                                 
385
 According to Bodnár, self-executing treaties are treaties where (i) national law does not exclude the 
possibility of self-executiveness of the treaty, (ii) the addressee of the treaty can be concretely defined, (iii) the 
contents of the treaty are well determined rights and obligations. See Bodnár (1994), p. 17. 
386
 See Fichet-Boyle – Mossé (2000), p 872. 
387
 United States, District Court for the Northern District of California, Baptist Churches case, Judgment of 24 
March 1989, para 12. Source: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule144#_VNaCa (last visited 
on 30 March 2012). The case involved consideration over deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan nationals 
to their home country where Article 3 violations are occurring, and whether their deportation would violate the 
„ensure respect” obligation of the Geneva Conventions.  
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The difference between direct applicability and the question of self-executiveness therefore 
lies in their features: direct applicability is the question of the position or “availability” of 
international law generally during application of the law, while self-executiveness is a feature 
of a specific norm. Variations are possible in all directions: a norm may be self-executive but 
the treaty may not be directly applicable by a judge in a given legal system; or even if a treaty 
is directly applicable, many norms may not be self-executive.  
 
To demonstrate with examples, in the first case prohibition to attack medical staff is a self-
executive norm, but if no such crime is to be found in the domestic criminal code, the judge 
may have difficulties punishing it in certain legal systems. On the other hand, one may also 
say that prohibition to attack medical staff is not fully a self-executing norm, especially 
because its enforcement needs special legislation, but the judge could and should directly 
apply the treaty if the domestic criminal code does not provide such crime. As for the second 
example, some states may very well accept direct applicability of international treaties, 
however, obligations to mark protected cultural property with the blue shield is obviously not 
self-executing in that national law needs to specify which authority decides on the list of 
cultural property to be marked. It is thus clear that direct applicability and self-executiveness 
concern different legal questions, eventhough in a given case they may mean the same thing. 
 
(iv) Specific problems related to universal jurisdiction 
 
Whether States have the power to establish universal jurisdiction for crimes committed in a 
non-international armed conflict has been the subject of a long debate and is a perfect 
demonstration of problems inbuilt in international law and the role of jurisprudence on how 
international law evolves.
388
 This is even more so, because the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is an obligation that is surrounded by political considerations, however, as is 
shown below, judicial practice has, at least partially, overcome the political concerns and 
stepped largely over the treaty law frameworks.
 
 
                                                 
388
 For arguments for applicability of universal jurisdiction to non-international armed conflicts, see Wedgewood 
(2000), p. 398; Meron (1995), p. 569; Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in: Michael 
N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green (eds.), The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millenium, Newport. RI: 
Naval War College (1998), p. 17 and 21. 
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The Geneva Conventions have clearly developed an obligation to search for and prosecute 
persons having committed grave breaches in international armed conflicts.
389 
As far as 
violations committed in a non-international armed conflict are concerned, the Geneva 
Conventions merely establish an obligation to “suppress” such violations390, without 
specifying the method, be it criminal or other means. The text itself does not exclude the 
possibility of a State deciding to establish its own universal jurisdiction for crimes committed 
in non-international armed conflicts.  
 
However, to exercise universal jurisdiction without authorization from treaty or customary 
international law would be exceeding the jurisdiction of the state and would infringe the 
sovereignty of other states.
391
 If a crime has no link with the state and there is no international 
authorization for exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction, the state has no ground to exercise its 
judicial powers.
392
 This may also be the case if the court bases universal jurisdiction applying 
an ordinary crime from the criminal code to an international crime: for example if the court 
applies ordinary murder for an unlawful attack against a civilian, without any legislative link 
to international law, the state steps over its limits of exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
 
The question of sovereignty with relation to universal jurisdiction appeared in the 
Guatemalan Generals-case in Spain. The Supreme Court held that the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, as acknowledged by Spanish laws, must be understood in a way that it doesn’t 
infringe the sovereignty of other states: if a state would prosecute a crime that was perpetrated 
on the territory of another state on the basis of domestic law, without any limitations, this 
would infringe sovereignty of the other state. Therefore, the Court required the existence of 
national interest for Spain in order to have jurisdiction. Later, this decision was annulled by 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, which stated that imposing additional restrictions on the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction is a contra legem reduction of the conditions laid down in 
the Spanish law and is inconsistent with the concept of universal jurisdiction as laid down in 
international law.
393
 
 
                                                 
389
 Articles 49/50/129/146 Geneva Conventions. 
390
 Articles 50/51/130/147, Geneva Conventions. 
391
 The same conclusion was drawn by the American Bar Association, see its Recommendation 103A on 
universal criminal jurisdiction. 
392
 See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66/785 Texas Law Review (1988), 
pp. 785-786 
393
 Rigoberta Menchu and Others v Guatemalan Government Officials, Judgment of the Constitutional Court, 26 
September 2005, para 8 (translation by the author). 
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Many writers point out that although at the time of the drafting of the Geneva Conventions 
universal jurisdiction was meant to apply for crimes committed in international armed 
conflicts, development of the reality and law has resulted in broad acceptance of universal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts as well. Customary law 
seems to support this
394
, strengthened by the fact that certain international tribunals (Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Cambodia) also have jurisdiction over crimes committed in such conflicts.  
 
The ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law also indicates a similar 
tendency.395 Indeed, the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law in 2005 
states that “universal jurisdiction may be exercised over (…) other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in international or non-international armed 
conflict.”396 
 
Other authors argue, however, that this concept only applies to international armed conflicts. 
Wedgewood has a remarkable explanation: she argues that prosecutions in such cases based 
on universal jurisdiction are “escaping on the technical ground that the victim was not 
‘protected by’ the Treaties. The Geneva Conventions’ class of ‘protected persons’ has 
generally been limited to include only the non-national of the belligerent, and, by definition, 
civil wars are fatricidal.”397 While one may agree with the outcome of the argument, it is 
difficult to see why in this analysis the application of the grave breaches/universal jurisdiction 
provisions is restricted only for protected persons in the understanding of Geneva Convention 
IV and not the other Conventions.  
 
The Hague Supreme Court reached the conclusion in Prosecutor v Darko that the obligation 
of universal jurisdiction is applicable to war crimes committed in a non-international armed 
conflict.
398
 Later, the Hague District Court in H v Netherlands also ruled that it had universal 
jurisdiction over violations of common Article 3, directly based on the Geneva Conventions. 
                                                 
394
 See: Institute de droit international , Annuaire, Volume 71, Tome II, Session de Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième 
partieEditions A. Pedone, Paris, p. 210. 
395
 See Rule 157 of the ICRC Customary Law Study: „States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their 
national courts over war crimes. [IAC/NIAC]”. 
396
 Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Respect to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes (seventeenth commission: rapporteur, Mr. Christina Tomuschat), Resolution. Available at: 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf (last visited on 27 May 2010) 
397
 Wedgewood (2000), pp. 397-398. 
398
 See Dutch Supreme Court, Prosecutor v Darko, 11 November 1997, NJ 1998, No. 463, 30 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (1999), 315. 
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The court said that although universal jurisdiction is expressly mentioned only in relation to 
grave breaches of the Convention, it does not mean that it is closed out for other breaches, 
given that states are given a free hand how to ‘suppress’ other breaches, and this could include 
universal jurisdiction.
399
 The Appeals Court then softened this position by saying that Dutch 
courts had jurisdiction in this case based on Dutch national laws, and so the Court largely 
circumvented the essence of the question.
400
 
 
In Belgium, the first cases based on universal jurisdiction were in connection with crimes 
committed in a non-international armed conflict, such as the case concerning Rwanda, Public 
Prosecutor v Higaniro et al.
401
 for genocide crimes. The first case based on universal 
jurisdiction for grave breaches was Public Prosecutor v Saric, in Denmark.
402
  
 
The heart of the question really is, whether universal jurisdiction can be exercised only if 
there is express authorization or rather, obligation, in international law (such as the case with 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) or whether states are authorized to apply 
universal jurisdiction in other cases as well.
403
 
 
While the Dutch court in H v Netherlands may has been right in saying that states are free to 
decide how they suppress violations, be it with criminal or other means, it does not give carte 
blanche for the application of universal jurisdiction: this is another matter.
404 
Since exercising 
such jurisdiction touches on other states’ sovereignty, it requires international authorization. 
While states are free to criminalize any act they wish within the boarders of international law 
as this represents the margin of appreciation deriving from their sovereignty, states are not 
free to establish jurisdiction outside their sovereignty, except especially authorized by 
                                                 
399
 The Hague District Court, 14 October 2005, LJN AU 4373. For an analysis of the decision, see Guénaël 
Mettraux, Dutch Courts’ Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes, in: 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006) 362-371. 
400
 H. v. Public Prosecutor, Decision of the Court of Appeal of The Hague, LJN: AZ7143 , 29 January 2007, 
ILDC 636 (NL 2007), F3 and H4-H5. 
401
 Assize Court of Brussels 8 June 2001. For a detailed discussion on Belgium’s law on universal jurisdiction 
and the case, see Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction, International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, Oxford 
Monographs in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 102-118. 
402
 Østre Landsret, 25 November 1994 (Trial judgment); Højesteret, 15 August 1995 (Appeals judgment), 
reprinted in Ugeskrift for Retsvœsen 1995, 838 H. See Reydams, pp. 128-129. As for a summary of the Trial 
judgment, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/39a82e2ca42b52974125673e00508144/9d9d5f3c500edb73c1256b51003bbf44!OpenDocument (last 
visited on 4 November 2011). 
403
 See Harmen Van der Wilt (2008), pp. 240-241 and 254.  
404
 See Guénaël Mettraux, Dutch Courts’ Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War 
Crimes, in: 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006) 362-371, p. 367. 
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international law or by other states.
 
Even if an act is seen as a crime under international law, it 
does not automatically follow that every state has jurisdiction over it. The criminal nature of 
an act and jurisdiction are, therefore, two different issues and have to be regarded separately.  
 
What follows is that domestic courts, lacking national legislation, have to review whether a 
certain act was criminal in international law at the time of the commission, and, if the case 
does not fall under ordinary jurisdiction, they additionally have to examine whether 
authorization exists, either in treaty or in customary law, for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. Only in case of the presence of both criteria can a state exercise universal 
jurisdiction over an act that was not criminalized in its national law (in case it was, the first 
criteria has to be viewed differently: it has to be examined whether the criminalization existed 
in national law at the time of the commission). 
 
There is also a wide interpretation of the ICC Rome Statute’s complementarity principle, 
where authors argue that all crimes subject to ICC jurisdiction may also be subject to 
universal jurisdiction.
405
 An argument supporting this view says that war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide – ius cogens - are subject to universal jurisdiction.406 
 
Some authors, however, argue that universal jurisdiction for non-international conflicts is not 
customary law. Van der Wilt for instance says that „[a]lthough the ICJ did not pronounce on 
the scope of universal jurisdiction the judges in their separate and dissenting opinions 
displayed a wide array of diverging views on the issue. Some of them adhered to the well–
known Lotus–judgment, allowing states a wide margin of discretion to define the range of 
their jurisdiction, while others took a stricter stance, requiring indeed an explicit basis in 
international law. In view of this disparity, it is unlikely that a hard and fast rule of 
international customary law has solidified.
”407 
 
Certain authors, on the contrary, claim that universal jurisdiction for non-international armed 
conflicts as such is now customary law and states are free to exercise it to punish violations of 
IHL: “all states have the right to punish such [common Article 3] breaches. In this sense, non-
                                                 
405
 Ryngaert (2006), p. 59. 
406
 See for example Prosecutor v Furundzija, ICTY Case No IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998), Judgment para 
156: „It has been held that international crimes being universally condemned wherever they occur, every State 
has the right to prosecute and punish the authors of such crimes.”. 
407
 See ILDC 636 (NL 2007) for the case H v Netherlands, The Hague District Court, 14 October 2005, LJN AU 
4373, C4. 
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grave breaches may fall within universal jurisdiction.”408 Furthermore, “[j]ust because the 
Geneva Conventions created the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare only with regard to 
grave breaches does not mean that other breaches of the Geneva Conventions may not be 
punished by any state party to the Conventions. (…) Even if there is no clear obligation to 
punish or extradite authors of violations of the Geneva Conventions that are not encompassed 
by the grave breaches provisions, such as common Article 3, all state have the right to punish 
those guilty of such breaches. In this sense, nongrave breaches may fall within universal 
jurisdiction.”409 
 
Wedgewood deducts the applicability of universal jurisdiction to non-international armed 
conflicts from the ICTY’s decision in Tadić: according to her reasoning, since the ICTY ruled 
that the denial of diplomatic protection to its own national makes that national protected under 
the Fourth Convention (irrespective of the nationality criteria described in Article 4), the 
provisions on universal jurisdiction, Wedgewood argues, are also applicable to violations of 
common Article 3. Furthermore, the ICTY avoided the limitation by prosecuting violations of 
laws and customs of war, and given its power through the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
plenary power, “any doubt about the applicability of universal jurisdiction to the prosecution 
of such violations of customary law was set aside”.410  
 
A further question emerges when the domestic court bases its procedure on an ordinary crime 
concerning an act that is otherwise an international crime – can universal jurisdiction be 
exercised in this case? If namely there is no link with the crime to be repressed as obliged by 
international law, then many authors argue
411
 that in this case there is no basis for universal 
jurisdiction.
412
 
 
 
2. Hurdles inbuilt in national law 
 
The present chapter lists potential problems inbuilt in national law that may arise as 
constraining factors for the domestic application of international law generally and 
                                                 
408
 Meron (1995), p. 569. 
409
 Ibid. 
410
 Wedgewood (2000), pp. 398-399. 
411
 See Van der Wilt (2008), p. 241. 
412
 This was discussed in more detail in Chapter III.1.(iv). 
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international crimes specifically. The chapter starts with general questions such as the 
eventual conflict of national implementation and application with the legality principle, and 
follows by an analysis of consequences of different approaches of national implementation on 
the domestic war crimes procedures. The chapter discusses issues related to the application of 
universal jurisdiction separately, due to specific aspects linked to it. 
 
It must be noted here that the classic division of practice of common law – continental law 
solutions does not necessarily make sense here. Although most of the problems tackled in the 
following pages are issues more for continental systems, general questions of legality may 
also come up in common law states. Therefore the division of sub-chapters follows the topical 
problems rather than the approaches of states from different legal traditions. 
 
 
(i) Implementation: a conflict with the legality principle?
413
 
 
In the Korbély case, already discussed above, the argument was raised by the complainant that 
the Geneva Conventions were not in force because the text with the official Hungarian 
translation had not been promulgated in the Official Gazette, but it was published in a 
separate document. According to Hungarian law, a condition for the entry into force of a law 
is promulgation in the official state gazette. The ECtHR did not accept this position, arguing 
that Korbély, who was in charge of military training, obviously knew about the obligations of 
the Geneva Conventions as these formed part of the training material available to him.  
 
Arguments related to accessibility of international norms sporadically come up in criminal 
procedures.  However, as Ryngaert also argues, “no sensible person can still assert that he or 
she was not informed of the international criminality of acts such as genocide, indiscriminate 
firing on crowds or wanton destruction of property in times or war, acts that are, especially 
since Nuremberg, crimes against international law the criminality of which is believed to be 
known by all.”414 The ICCPR, similarly, requires the non-applicability of principle of non-
retroactivity with respect to crimes that were criminal according to the general principles of 
law recognized by the community of nations at the time these were committed – a 
                                                 
413
 Here, the followings are understood under the principle of legality: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine 
lege, foreseeability of the law, accessibility of the law. 
414
 Ryngaert (2006), p. 58. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 123 
demonstration that arguing for not knowing that the said acts are criminal cannot be 
accepted.
415
  
 
The US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg had an orthodox opinion on the application of the 
prohibition of ex post facto law in international law in the Justice Cases, whereby stating that 
„[u]nder written constitutions the ex post facto rule condemns statutes which define as 
criminal, acts committed before the law was passed, but the ex post facto rule cannot apply in 
the international field as it does under constitutional mandate in the domestic field. Even in 
the domestic field the prohibition of the rule does not apply to the decisions of common law 
courts, though the question at issue be novel. International law is not the product of statute for 
the simple reason that there is as yet no world authority empowered to enact statutes of 
universal application. International law is the product of multipartite treaties, conventions, 
judicial decisions and customs which have received international acceptance or acquiescence. 
It would be sheer absurdity to suggest that the ex post facto rule, as known to constitutional 
states, could be applied to a treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an international 
tribunal, or to the international acquiescence which follows the event. To have attempted to 
apply the ex post facto principle to judicial decisions of common international law would 
have been to strangle that law at birth (…)”416  
 
Indeed, lack of implementing legislation or adoption of national legislation later than the 
perpetration of the act would not be a violation of the ex post facto rule, since the international 
rule, which is the source of the individual responsibility, already existed at the time of the 
commission of the act
417
. This should not, however, deprive the national legislator of its 
intention to correspond as best as possible to requirements of foreseeability of the law
418
. 
Lacking such domestic implementation, clarification of the contents and elements of the rules, 
and determination of conditions of punishability according to international law, its application 
corresponding to – often contradictory - national legal requirements would all be left to the 
national judge. Implementation of international crimes is therefore an important contribution 
to this goal. 
                                                 
415
 ICCPR, Article 15(2). 
416
 U.S.A. v. ALSTOETTER ET AL (The Justice Cases), available on  
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/alstoetter.htm#Commentary (last visited on 29 
March 2010). 
417
 When manifesting that in case of international crimes, accountability flows directly from international law, 
Wiener refers to the legality principle when saying that in a continental system, the condition of accountability is 
presence of the offence in national criminal law prior to the offence. See Wiener (1993), p. 197. 
418
 See Gellér (2005), p. 368. 
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Retroactive effect and the consequences of non-compliance of national legislation with 
international law was, inter alia, the subject of debate in the Bouterse-case as well in the 
Netherlands. Desi Bouterse was commander-in-chief – now President – of Suriname who was 
allegedly responsible for the torture and execution of 13 Suriname civilians and 2 soldiers for 
opposing the Suriname government in 1982. Two relatives of the victims filed criminal 
complaints in the Netherlands, and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ordered Bouterse’s 
prosecution
419
.  
 
The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam held
420
 that international crimes under customary 
international law were not time-barred, and that at the time of the commission of the act, in 
1982, customary law already allowed for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the case of a crime 
against humanity. It also held that prosecution was possible based on the Torture Convention, 
because although the CAT was ratified by the Netherlands only in 1988, it was only 
declaratory of pre-existing international customary law, i.e. customary law that already 
existed in 1982. Therefore, the Dutch Act implementing the CAT could be applied 
retroactively
421
.  
 
However, the Supreme Court
422
 twisted the issue, reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and said that as written international law at the time of the commission of the act did 
not provide for their application with retroactive effect, therefore the procedure was time-
barred. It also said that the Dutch Constitution and Criminal Code provided for the principle 
of legality, including the prohibition of retroactive application, and the decision of the Court 
of Appeal was incompatible with it.  
 
This led to the conclusion that the Dutch Act implementing the CAT could not have a 
retroactive effect, therefore could not be applied to the case at hand. Therefore the Supreme 
Court was of the opinion that even if customary international law accepted the non-
application of time-barring for crimes against humanity, but conventional international law 
                                                 
419
 Source: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/07c5ae1b4a999f1cc1256da200518c91!OpenDocument (last 
visited on 31 March 2012). 
420
 Source: Bouterse case, ILDC 80 (NL 2001). 
421
 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, judgment of 20 November 2000. 
422
 Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, judgment of 18 September 2001, nr. 00749/01 (CW 2323). 
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did not, the Dutch courts were still bound to apply their own national law implementing the 
Torture Convention.  
 
This judgment is of dubious wisdom. It clearly says that Dutch courts cannot base themselves 
directly on international law – in this case, the corresponding customary law -, but have to 
apply their implementing legislation. The Dutch Constitution says, that “statutory regulations 
in force within the Kingdom are not applicable if such application is in conflict with binding 
provisions of generally applicable treaties or of resolutions of international organizations. (…) 
[T]his provision should be interpreted as stipulating that the courts should test the prohibition 
on granting retroactive effect, as contained in Article 16 of the Constitution and Article 1(1) 
of the Criminal Code, against treaties and resolutions of international organizations, but that 
they may not do so against customary international law
423
.  
 
Consequently, if the Dutch legislature omitted to implement all international norms, including 
customary law – the implementation of which is rather difficult -, the Netherlands would be in 
violation of its obligations under international law in not being able to enforce them. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court said that “[i]t follows that, even if the obligation to declare offences as 
punishable retroactively were to result from customary international law, Dutch courts are 
nonetheless obliged to apply the Torture Convention Implementation Act. Article 94 of the 
Constitution does not accept the application of unwritten international law if such application 
conflicts with national legal regulations.”424 This last statement basically acknowledges that 
the Dutch Supreme Court found that national law enjoyed primacy over international law in 
case of collision. 
 
Criticisms against the so-called Lex Biszku, also formulated by the present author, included 
similar arguments
425
. Lex Biszku was prepared after the failure of initiating investigations 
                                                 
423
 See Court of Appeal of The Hague, H. v Public Prosecutor, 29 January 2007, ILDC 636 (NL 2007)  
 para 4.4.1. of the Judgment. 
424
 Ibid, paras 4.5. and 4.6. of the judgment. 
425
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Statutory Confirmation of that a Crime has not Passed and/or cannot Ever Pass Statutory Limitations), in: VII/4 
Iustum, Aequum, Salutare (2011) 9-18; Varga Réka: A nemzetközi jog által büntetni rendelt cselekmények 
magyarországi alkalmazása (a Biszku-ügy margójára) (Application of international crimes in Hungary – Notes 
on the Biszku-case), in: VII/4 Iustum, Aequum, Salutare (2011) 19-24; and comments by Gellér Balázs at 
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110127-penzbirsaggal-vegzodhet-a-biszku-elleni-vademeles.html and at 
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6 November 2012). The present author provided a document containing legal concerns about the the draft law 
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against Béla Biszku as a result of the prosecutorial decision. Lex Biszku basically copy-pasted 
the relevant chapters of the Nuremberg Charter – the formulation of crimes against humanity 
– and the 1968 UN Convention on the non-applicability of statute of limitations. The law 
manifested that war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are not time-barred. 
Although the law solved the particular problem with respect to the Biszku-case – investigation 
was initiated shortly after the law entered into force –, it is feared to result in an unfortunate 
interpretation by prosecutors. The problem notably is that the law basically constituted the 
non-application of time-barring instead of having just declared the already existing 
international norm. This could mean for the future that from now on prosecutors would expect 
that all international norms would be re-constituted in a piece of national legislation and 
would not apply international law lacking such national legislation. 
 
The application of the nullum crimen sine lege principle to international crimes under 
domestic procedure is an often cited problem. The difficulty lies in the determination of ‘lex’, 
ie. whether the act must be criminalized in international law or national law at the time of its 
perpetration. Wiener gives a very clear explanation citing human rights instruments which 
understand not only domestic law, but also international law under “lege”. Since the 
individual’s accountability is rested directly on international law in case of international 
crimes, the direct application of international law does not violate the legal guarantees of the 
individual.
426
  
 
On the other hand, the imprecisity of international crimes as formulated in international law 
may raise concerns in respect of the nullum crimen sine lege certa principle, since domestic 
criminal laws, especially in continental legal systems, have a higher standard requirement of 
the legality principle
427
. It follows therefore that it should be the task of implementing 
national law to conform international crimes to the internal legality requirements. Such a 
conformation would not establish new crimes – the accountability is still rested on 
international law -, it would only be a declarative measure by the national legislator
428
, in line 
with basic criminal justice guarantees.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and its effects on future application of international law in Hungary, unfortunately however the draft was not 
amended. 
426
 Wiener (1993), p. 210. 
427
 See Erich Kussbach, Nemzetközi és Európai büntetőjog, Szent István Társulat, Budapest (2005), pp. 83-85. 
428
 See M. Nyitrai (2010), pp. 17-18. 
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This would serve the security of the rule of law, however, its absence could not necessarily be 
a basis for a lack of domestic procedure in a given case. Especially considering crimes based 
on customary law, implementation into national law cannot be the condition for prosecution, 
but it could be a strongly suggested measure for the purposes of stability of the internal legal 
system.  
 
These considerations are more of an urging nature for crimes established under customary law 
or in earlier international treaties, such as the Nuremberg Charter or the Geneva 
Conventions/Additional Protocols, because more recent instruments, such as the Rome 
Statute, determine the crimes with more precisity. The Rome Statute is therefore much more 
exhaustive in both the general part provisions – material and mental elements, conditions of 
culpability and punishability – and the special part provisions – in the Elements of Crimes, 
however, the sanctions are still missing, although certain frameworks are laid down in the 
Rome Statute
429
. In addition, general part elements in the Rome Statute are largely based on 
common law traditions which cannot entirely be translated into continental legal terms
430
. 
Worth to mention that although the Rome Statute includes all of the grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and most of the war crimes stipulated in Additional Protocol I, there is 
no complete overlap
431
. 
 
As is well known, the Court of Cassation of France stated in the Klaus Barbie-case that 
statute of limitation is not applicable to crimes against humanity – deducting from Article 6 of 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, whereas it is applicable to war crimes, thus making 
conviction of Barbie possible only for crimes against humanity. The Court held that 
“[f]ollowing the termination of hostilities, it is necessary that the passage of time should be 
allowed to blur acts of brutality which might have been committed in the course of armed 
conflict, even if those acts constituted violations of the laws and customs of war or were not 
justified by military necessity, provided that those acts were not of such a nature as to deserve 
                                                 
429
 See Péter Kovács, Prononcé de la Peine, in: Ascensio-Decaux-Pellet (eds.), Droit International Pénal, 
Editions A. Pedone, Paris (2000). 
430
 For an analysis of the difference between general part elements of the Rome Statute and of ordinary crimes in 
continental systems, see M. Nyitrai (2010), pp. 18-19. 
431
 For a comparative table of war crimes defined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and in 
the Rome Statute, see http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/en_-_war_crimes_comparative_table.pdf (last 
visited on 31 March 2012). 
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the qualification of crimes against humanity” and that there was no international rule superior 
the French rules providing for the non-application of statutory limitations for war crimes
432
.  
 
Worth to note here that France had not ratified neither the 1968 UN Convention on the non-
application of statutory limitations, nor the 1974 European Convention on the non-
applicability of statutory limitations to crimes against humanity and war crimes, due to fear 
that it would weaken its policy concerning non-repression of war crimes committed during the 
wars in Algeria and Indochina. Eventhough, the Barbie-ruling was later much criticized for 
causing a confusion between war crimes and crimes against humanity
433
, which was 
particularly important for France, given that it did accept statute of limitations for war crimes 
but did not accept its applicability for crimes against humanity
434
. 
 
French courts later confirmed that statute of limitations is not a basic human right under 
Article 7 para 2 of the ECHR or under Article 15 para 2 of the International Covenant
435
. 
 
Many of the questions raised above were also dealt with in the case Kononov v. Latvia
436
, in 
front of the European Court of Human Rights. The case included the alleged commission of 
war crimes by the applicant through killing protected persons. Kononov was born in Latvia, 
holding Latvian nationality until he received Russian nationality in 2000. He joined a Soviet 
commando unit in 1943. In 1944 he participated in an operation behind enemy lines, with the 
purpose of sabotaging Nazi military installations. In May 1944 he was said to be responsible 
for the execution of nine persons, who he allegedly believed to be Nazi sympathizers. The 
Latvian Court of Appeal convicted him for violation of the laws and customs of war, as set 
out in the Hague Conventions of 1907, Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol I of 
1977 and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg of 1945. As to the 
complaint about retrospective application by the complainant, the Supreme Court found that 
the application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, irrespective of when 
they entered into force, was consistent with the Convention on Non-Application of Statute of 
Limitations for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.   
                                                 
432
 France, Cour de Cassation, 20 December 1985, source: http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_fr_rule160 (last visited on 1 April 2012). 
433
 See Pierrette Poncela, L’Imprescriptibilité, in: Ascensio-Decaux-Pellet (eds.), Droit International Pénal, 
Editions A. Pedone, Paris (2000), p. 888. 
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The Chamber of the ECtHR held that the Latvian Criminal Code was based on international 
law. The relevant treaty was the 1907 Hague Convention, but not the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I, because they were adopted after the perpetration of the act and had 
no retroactive effect. Then the Chamber examined whether the victims had been combatants 
and civilians, and with dubious wisdom, found that “even if they did not satisfy all of the 
elements of the definition of combatant, jus in bello did not a contrario automatically 
consider them to be ’civilians’ „437. Consequently, the Chamber held that Kononov was not 
responsible for violating laws and customs of war.  
 
It seems that the Chamber, instead of dealing with the question of retroactive application of 
the law, undertook to analyze facts and evidences, which should be the task of domestic 
courts. This was similarly done as in the Korbely case, and is, in the opinion of the present 
author, an unfounded extension of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. The Latvian government 
also made a note to this issue: „the respondent Government considered that the Chamber 
exceeded its subsidiary role in altering the factual determinations of domestic courts (…)”438.  
 
In this regard, the Grand Chamber made things right in saying that „[the Grand Chamber] is 
not therein called upon to rule on the applicant's individual criminal responsibility, that being 
primarily a matter for assessment by the domestic courts. Rather its function under Article 7 § 
1 is twofold: in the first place, to examine whether there was a sufficiently clear legal basis, 
having regard to the state of the law on 27 May 1944, for the applicant's conviction of war 
crimes offences; and, secondly, it must examine whether those offences were defined by law 
with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability”439. It goes on to say that „ it is not the Court's 
function to deal with alleged errors of fact committed by a national court, unless and in so far 
as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (…) and unless 
that domestic assessment is manifestly arbitrary”440. 
 
The Grand Chamber noted, that „[a]s regards foreseeability in particular, the Court recalls that 
however clearly drafted a legal provision may be in any system of law including criminal law, 
                                                 
437
 Ibid, para 146. 
438
 Ibid, para 151. 
439
 Ibid, para 187. 
440
 Ibid, para 189. 
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there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation.”441 It added that in case national law 
did not include specificities of a war crime, the domestic courts could rely on international 
law, without infringing the nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege principles
442
. The Grand 
Chamber also held that „where international law did not provide for a sanction for war crimes 
with sufficient clarity, a domestic tribunal could, having found an accused guilty, fix the 
punishment on the basis of domestic criminal law”443.  
 
As to the foreseeability of the actions to be considered criminal, the Grand Chamber argued 
that although international laws and customs were not formally published in the USSR or in 
the Latvian SSR – similarly to the Korbely case -, this was not relevant, because international 
laws and customs of war were in itself enough to base his criminal responsibility
444
. Therefore 
the Grand Chamber found that the law was foreseeable and accessible at the time of 
perpetration of the acts, consequently, conviction of the applicant did not violate Article 7 (1) 
of the ECHR. 
 
Such a heavy reliance on the findings of the Grand Chamber in this issue can be explained by 
that it gives an answer to many questions we have raised before. Namely, the ECtHR finds it 
non-problematic for domestic courts to directly rely on international law in the absence of 
relevant domestic legislation, and it also said that domestic courts could attach sanctions to 
crimes formulated under international law and not having a corresponding crime in domestic 
law, and still be in compliance with the nulla poena sine lege principle. It also states that 
international law was foreseeable and accessible in 1944 – and it has only crystallized since 
then -, therefore direct reliance on it did not violate principle of legality either. This should 
comfort states and domestic courts, at least in Europe. 
 
(ii) Consequences of basing the case directly on the international treaty – direct 
application 
 
Basically there are two ways of complying with the penalization obligation: either adopting 
the crimes through incorporation, or adopting the crimes through reference to international 
                                                 
441
 Ibid, para 185. 
442
 Ibid, para 208 
443
 Ibid, para 212. 
444
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law
445
. In reality there could be mixed solutions, whereby some parts of the crime are 
incorporated while other elements are referred to (for instance “who carries out an attack 
against civilian population in a way contrary to international law…”), or the crime itself is 
incorporated but for jurisdictional questions there is a reference to international law (for 
instance when universal jurisdiction is defined for cases “as international treaties stipulate”).  
 
In case of any of these solutions, the result has to be an effective penalization. In case of 
direct incrimination, the elements of the crime are defined by international law, and the state 
only has to establish its competence
446
. 
 
Many states chose a middle way in arguing for the applicability of ordinary crimes for the 
punishment of international crimes. Thereby these states argue that they actually incorporate 
the crimes and thus punish international crimes through judicial application of ordinary 
crimes to international crimes. Often these same states argue that in case the ordinary crime 
would not entirely cover the international crime, the judge could make a direct reference to 
international law – as it happened many times447.  
 
As it turned out, such states adopted this approach more because of convenience than it being 
a result of a careful examination of the issue. As we will see from the following pages, this 
approach seems to fail in most cases and as soon as states following such an approach had to 
deal with war crimes cases, they were inclined to re-examine their legislation and adopt a 
more workable solution. 
 
The following two sub-chapters will thus analyze the advantages and drawbacks of basing 
criminal responsibility directly on international law and basing responsibility for violation of 
international crimes on ordinary crimes. 
 
The drawback of basing a case directly on the provisions of an international treaty is a lack of 
clarity in many aspects that are necessary for the adjudication of a case. Such aspects may 
                                                 
445
 See Fichet-Boyle – Mossé (2000), p. 881. The same categorization is reached by Yokaris, he names them 
direct or indirect incrimination, where direct incrimination would mean a reference to international law. See 
Angelos Yokaris, Les critères de compétence des juridictions nationales, in: Ascensio-Decaux-Pellet (eds.), 
Droit International Pénal, Editions A. Pedone, Paris (2000), p. 897. 
446
 Yokaris (2000), p. 897. 
447
 Direct application by the judge could be problematic from many viewpoints. See Fichet-Boyle – Mossé 
(2000), p. 882. 
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include the elements of the crime, the sanctions or the applicability of the general part of the 
criminal code to the international crimes. This is the instance where the question of legality 
may also be raised. Namely, if the case is based directly on the international treaty, it may be 
questionable, whether this is in line with the legality principle: does the state’s legal system 
allow that a criminal charge is based on anything else than a crime specified in its own penal 
code, and if yes, was the treaty accessible and foreseeable for the citizen? Was it clear for the 
citizen at the time of commission of the crime whether the common grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility are applicable to the specific crime he/she perpetrated?  
 
Was the sanction clear for the perpetrator or were any sanctions attached to the crime at all? 
The wrongful application of sentences may raise violation of the nulla poena sine lege 
principle. International law does not define the sanctions attached the certain crimes, but 
leaves it to states to do that.  
 
Consequently, if a procedure is based directly on international law, the question of sanctions 
arises. The judge, in this case, has two alternatives:  
 
(i) in case the international crime has an equivalent in domestic legislation –for 
example unlawful attack against civilians and murder - the judge may use the sanction 
of the equivalent ordinary crime
448
. Whether this can be done depends on the legal 
system;  
 
(ii) the judge may choose to examine the guilt of the perpetrator but could not attach a 
sanction to it.  
 
An argument for direct application of international law by domestic courts is mentioned by 
Wiener, saying that the determination of specific features of international crimes requires such 
a detailed and well-founded interpretation that it can be done more precisely on the level of 
application than on the level of the legislator that is only capable of an abstract formulation.
449
  
 
                                                 
448
 This is what happened in Hungary at the volley – cases, where the Hungarian courts applied the sanctions of 
the conventional crimes that corresponded to the international crime, without its „international” content. 
449
 See Wiener (1993), p. 205. 
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In case the state decides to define sanctions later on in legislation, this should not be 
determined for crimes that were perpetrated before the adoption of such legislation because 
that would have a retroactive effect and could be seen as being in violation of the nulla poena 
sine lege principle. These questions call for an implementation of the international crimes in a 
way that sanctions are made clear. This is the only way that is in full compliance with the 
nulla poena sine lege principle. As Balázs Gellér notes, since the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court stated that the principle of legality must also be complied with by international crimes, 
codification is the best means to ensure compliance with that principle. He further states that 
the nulla poena principle is a constraint to the direct application of international law by 
domestic courts
450
. 
 
However, there are only a few cases where the legislator’s right to refer to criminalization in 
international law, instead of criminalizing in internal law, was questioned. Such a case was 
US v Smith,
451
 where the procedure was based on a rule prohibiting piracy as defined by the 
law of the nations. Defence argued that according to the Constitution, the Congress should 
define and criminalize piracy, and since the law of the nations does not include a precise 
enough definition, it becomes a task of the Congress. The Supreme Court finally turned down 
this defence, saying that a reference to an international crime is as constitutional as listing the 
prohibited acts. The Supreme Court did not, however, answer the most interesting question, 
whether in case international law does not define precisely the elements of a crime, and 
internal law refers to this international law, would that comply with the legality principle and 
the requirement of foreseeability of the law.  
 
(iii) Consequences of basing the case on ordinary crimes 
 
If the drawback of basing the case on international law was the lack of clarity, then the 
drawback of basing the case on ordinary crimes is the potential loss of many instances of the 
international crime
452
. The reason being that war crimes are so specific, committed in a 
special situation under special circumstances, that ordinary crimes can not adequately 
                                                 
450
 See Gellér (2009), pp. 58-60.  
451
 U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Smith, 1820, 18 U.S. 153. Quoted by Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 35. 
452
 Fichet-Boyle and Mossé raise attention that in case of incorporation of the crime into national legislation, the 
legislator is under the obligation to mirror the international crime in its entirety in domestic legislation. See 
Fichet-Boyle – Mossé (2000), p. 882. This means that in case the ordinary crime does not cover all elements of 
the international crime, the state has not fulfilled its international obligation. 
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represent its features. Many states, wanting to save energy on implementing legislation, are 
inclined to believe that grave breaches are all covered by ordinary crimes. While this may 
seem to be true at first look for crimes such as unlawful killing or torture, if we take a second 
look, it becomes apparent that this may not be correct, neither for the “simpler” crimes, such 
as murder / attacking civilian population, nor for other, more specific crimes, such as delay in 
repatriation of prisoners of war. 
 
One also has to bear in mind that the fact that all municipal laws penalize murder does not 
make murder an international crime. What makes killing of protected persons, genocide or 
crime against humanity an international crime, in addition to the international legal 
background, are additional elements, such as the context, intention, other circumstances or 
large scale, and the intention of the international community to make these acts punishable 
everywhere.
453
 It is these specific acts committed in special circumstances that make certain 
crimes international crimes, and it is these specific acts that the international community seeks 
to punish. In the end, it is precisely these additional elements that make the act an 
international crime as opposed to an ordinary crime.
454
  
 
In addition, there is a certain stigmatization attached to both grave breaches/war crimes
455
 
(and other serious international crimes) and war crimes prosecutions
456
. As Cassese put it, war 
crimes procedures (or other procedures related to serious international crimes) also have the 
important indication of “the international community’s purpose (…) [of] stigmatization of the 
deviant behaviour, in the hope that this will have a deterrent effect.”457 Although this 
particular quote refers to international trials, they are undoubtedly also true for domestic trials, 
considering, as we had already discussed, that domestic war crimes prosecutions are carried 
out representing the international community. 
                                                 
453
 Nyitrai notes that an international crime becomes an autonomous, abstract term when the elements of the 
crime – as opposed to an ordinary crime - directly include international elements and/or the relevant sources are 
international. See Nyitrai (2010), p. 14 
454
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why, states Abi-Saab, international tribunals (see ICTY Statute Article 10 para 2 (a) and and ICTR Statute 
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 See for instance Eve La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (2008), p. 152. 
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 See Ferdinandusse (2009), p. 739. 
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Thus, even in case a similar or same sanction would be applied as for an ordinary crime, the 
recognition that a serious international crime had been committed may contribute to the 
feeling of justice done. 
 
States are bound to acknowledge this difference and reflect it in their national legislation. As 
Judge Brennan opined in the Polyukhovich case, “[t]heir Lordships' statement that recognition 
of crimes as defined by international law is ’left to the municipal law of each country’ should 
not be understood to mean that international law accepts whatever definition of an 
international crime the municipal law may contain. Rather, what is left to municipal law is the 
adoption of international law as the governing law of what is an international crime.”458  
 
Therefore the state misses the point if it sees killing of protected persons as simple murder, 
and such confusion also raises practical questions during the qualification of the crime, 
attaching sanctions or applying mitigating circumstances. 
 
On the other hand, determination of the presence of necessary elements required by 
international law is very demanding. Taking wilful killing of a protected person as an 
example, according to international humanitarian law, this is a grave breach, if:  
 
(i) the person was protected. If the question arises whether the person was directly 
participating in hostilities, in other words, whether he lost his protection, we may face 
a question that is currently being discussed among experts around the world and is 
very difficult to answer, especially since ordinary national law is not serving any 
support in providing the solution.  
 
(ii) if the killing was wilful and illegal. This concept is also different from ordinary 
crimes: in national penal codes, wilfulness usually has to forms: dolus directus and 
dolus eventualis. The latter means that the perpetrator acquiesces to the consequences 
                                                 
458
 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth ("War Crimes Act case") [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501 (14 August 
1991), High Court of Australia, opinion of Judge Brennan, para 37. Polyukhovich was an Australian citizen, who 
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of his conduct. It can be rather difficult to squeeze the international crime of wilful 
killing into these frameworks
459
. 
 
Let’s think of an example where an important legal military target is attacked, the attacker 
knows that a few civilians are around, but considers that the military target is so important 
that he carries out the attack, making every precaution possible in the choice of means and 
methods of the attack. Finally, the civilians will also be victims of the attack.  
 
In such case, the attacker new that protected persons were around, he new that he could not 
avoid their death, but still considered his action proportionate because of the importance of 
the military target. Based on all these factors, the act was not illegal according to international 
law, therefore it was not a crime.  
 
Thinking in terms of an ordinary crime, the act would be difficult to be grouped under either 
dolus directus or dolus eventualis, and the analysis may lead to a different outcome. The 
intention could be qualified as dolus eventualis, because the perpetrator acquiesced to the 
consequences of his conduct, therefore it was a crime. Or else it could be seen as negligence, 
where the perpetrator foresees the possible consequences of his conduct but carelessly trusts 
in their non-occurrence. However, the problem here is that the attacker does not trust in the 
non-occurrence, but knows exactly that the civilians will be killed, although he does not wish 
to kill them. So if the prosecution is based on ordinary crimes, which form of perpetration 
should the judge choose if he wants to be in conformity with international law?  
 
Moreover, not only forms of perpetration of the crime, but the usual obstacles for the 
preclusion of accountability as occurring in national criminal codes could be confusing with 
respect to war crimes. In most of the cases, the closest obstacle could be justified defence. 
However, in the case of justified defence the attack that is prevented should be direct; in a 
military operation if the attack was a well-planned surprise attack, the condition of directness 
simply does not stand.
460
  
                                                 
459
 Kis and Gellér warn that definition of crime and the notion and forms of perpetrators are so different in 
international criminal law and national criminal law (especially in continental legal systems) that implementing 
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The Military Prosecution Service v Captain T1 et al. case
461
 in Denmark provides an excellent 
example as to the dangers in basing a case on ordinary crimes. The case involved the 
interrogation of Iraqi detainees by Danish service members stationed in Iraq, during which the 
detainees were made to sit in stress-provoking positions and the defendants talked to them in a 
defamatory manner. As a background, it must be mentioned that although the Geneva 
Conventions were ratified by Denmark, its provisions were not implemented. Violations of 
the Geneva Conventions are seen as violations of the Danish Military Penal Code (MPC), 
according to which it constitutes a criminal offence if a military person commits a grave 
violation of his official duties.  
 
The court held that based on the evidence presented, the treatment of prisoners might not have 
been in accordance with the protection of Geneva Convention IV. However, according to the 
court, it was not up to it to further evaluate compliance with Geneva Convention IV, but 
rather to evaluate whether the accused had been in grave violation of their official duties and 
thus were subject to punishment under the MPC
462
. 
 
This case presents a typical problem of national implementation. As the Geneva Conventions 
were not implemented, the court applied the Military Penal Code, which, however, did not 
match the international rules but reflected an inadequate implementation. Therefore a genuine 
examination of the acts in light of the Geneva Conventions did not take place. 
 
The determination of an international crime as an ordinary crime in national law does not 
deprive that crime of its international feature
463
. In case the ordinary crime cannot reflect all 
necessary aspects of the corresponding international crime, it should not be applied or it 
should be applied in a way corresponding to international rules. Although nothing prevents 
states from adopting national criminal legislation
464
, states may do this only so far as they are 
not restricting international treaty or customary obligations. Even if domestic law restricts 
international obligations, this does not change the presence or contents of the international 
                                                                                                                                                        
violation of international humanitarian law), in: III/1-2 Föld-rész Nemzetközi és Európai Jogi Szemle (2010) 86-
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2006 2927 Ø; ILDC 567 (DK 2006). 
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obligations, neither does it change the responsibility of the state or the individual vis-à-vis 
international law
465
. 
 
It is not only the definition of the crime that could become problematic if we base the case on 
ordinary crimes, but the sanctions linked to ordinary crimes may not always be satisfactorily 
corresponding to the gravity of the war crime. Although international criminal law typically 
does not attach sanctions to crimes it defines and leaves it to states to determine, numerous 
literature highlight that war crimes being among the most serious international crimes, their 
gravity cannot be compared to that of ordinary crimes, therefore their sanctions should also be 
graver. 
 
Because of the often lack of precise elements of international crimes defined in national law, 
as discussed above, national courts often reach back to international law for clarification. This 
was the case in Mugesera v Canada,
466
 where the Court, searching for clarification on the 
elements of genocide, drew back to international law: “international law is thus called upon to 
play a crucial role as an aid in interpreting domestic law, particularly as regards the elements 
of the crime of incitement to genocide”467. We may therefore conclude that although basing 
cases on ordinary crimes may be a back-up solution it is in no way a satisfactory solution. 
 
The Hungarian courts had to deal with this challenge in the Korbély case as well. Since the 
relevant crime was not included in the criminal code, the court could either choose to try 
Korbély based on homicide, or based on a direct reference to international law. The approach 
of the Hungarian courts was following a middle way: lacking provisions on crimes against 
humanity, it referred to customary law binding on Hungary and convicted Korbély based on 
the customary rule of individual responsibility for crime against humanity, and used only the 
penalty provisions of homicide but not its elements. Taking into consideration the 
international legal framework, when discussing the elements of the crime, the court referred to 
                                                 
465
 Kis-Gellér (2005), p. 368. 
466
 Mugesera, a hard-line Hutu politician, was charged in Rwanda with inciting hatred and thereby committing 
crimes against humanity during a speech he held in 1992 in Rwanda. The Minister of Citizenship and 
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the elements of Article 3 (whether Kaszás, the victim, was a protected person under Article 3 
or not), and did not refer to the ordinary criminal law exemption of self-defence
468
. 
 
(iv) Are there any controversies if national law punishes acts that are not war crimes?  
 
The answer to this question depends on what acts are punished and with what effect. The 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols only oblige states to criminalize the grave 
breaches: the most serious breaches of these instruments. However, if the state decides to 
criminalize other violations as well, it means that the national laws are stricter than they are 
necessary obliged by international law.  
 
A problem may arise if a foreign national commits such a non-grave breach against an own 
national of the state. In this case the perpetrator, although the act is not criminalized in his 
own country, may face criminal prosecution in the state of the victim. Van der Wilt suggests 
that such an exercise would “arguably trespass upon the other state’s sovereignty as it would 
expose foreign adversaries to a harsher regime than the one contemplated under international 
law.”469  
 
However, Van der Wilt starts from the assumption that “provisions of international 
humanitarian law (…) regulate the proper conduct of the warring parties on the basis of 
reciprocity”.470 We have to point down that nothing in international humanitarian law, neither 
the rules themselves, nor the repression provisions are built on reciprocity. Therefore there is 
nothing preventing states from adopting stricter criminal provisions to non-grave breaches 
than as absolutely obligatory by the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions 
themselves allow for such a free consideration, as they clearly give a free hand to the states 
when it comes to suppression of other breaches than grave breaches.
471
 Therefore a state 
                                                 
468
 A more detailed analysis of the Korbely case was undertaken in Chapter III. 1. (iii). 
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 Van der Wilt (2008), p. 253. For a similar opinion, see Chris Van den Wyngaert, Strafrecht, strafprocesrecht 
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criminalizing acts in cases where it is not bound by international law does not infringe the 
sovereignty of other states, it simply adopts a stricter regime than as obliged.
472
 This is the 
same kind of risk as we face with ordinary crimes, if a foreigner travels to another country 
where drinking and driving may meet a harsher punishment than at his home country. 
 
Van der Wilt further suggests that there is no national practice which would be stricter than 
the grave breaches regime.
473
 Examining the national laws discussed earlier in the present 
chapter, it may be easy to state that this statement is erroneous: many states have adopted 
stricter regimes than as obliged by international law, either by also criminalizing acts 
committed in non-international armed conflicts or by including non-grave breaches 
committed in international armed conflicts in their criminal codes.  
 
Where Van der Wilt is right, however, is the case where the state wants to criminalize an act 
that is not a violation of the Conventions or the Protocols, and so the act is in conformity with 
international humanitarian law. In this case the state is breaching international law, because its 
national legislation contradicts the international treaty by prohibiting an act which is not 
prohibited in international law.
474
 This is indeed not allowed, because national law cannot be 
called upon to justify non-compliance with international law.  
 
Another case of “overinclusion”,475 where national law breaches international law is where 
the state bases universal jurisdiction on an act that is not a grave breach. As universal 
jurisdiction bites hardly in the sovereignty of other states and the very concept of universal 
jurisdiction comes from the fact that the crimes in question are offensive to the international 
community as a whole,
476
 the exercise of universal jurisdiction can only be established by 
international law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Powers, (…) must include a general clause in their national legislative enactments, providing for the punishment 
of other breaches of the Convention.” See Commentary to GC I, pp. 367-368. 
472
 See Ferdinandusse (2009), p. 734 
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474
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Consequently, states are not free to define the list of crimes for which they can exercise such 
jurisdiction. Therefore if a state establishes universal jurisdiction for an act that is not a grave 
breach or a crime for which international law authorizes universal jurisdiction, it would be a 
breach of international law.
477
  
 
Some national courts, however, have taken a more lenient view in this regard. In H. v Public 
Prosecutor
478
 and Public Prosecutor v Kesbir
479
, Dutch courts thought that establishing 
universal jurisdiction for crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts is not 
prohibited under international law and, as it further stated, Article 3 only sets minimum 
standard from which national jurisdictions can deviate.
480
 The obligation to repress crimes 
committed in non-international armed conflicts and whether the provisions on universal 
jurisdiction can also be applicable to such crimes has been debated and it cannot be stated 
with certainty that a well-established and accepted result has been reached on the subject. This 
has been broadly discussed in Chapter III. 1. (iv). 
 
From the above statements, we can draw the following consequences:  
 
i) states are obliged to repress grave breaches; 
 
ii) states are free to decide on the criminalization of acts that are (non-grave) violations 
of the Conventions and Protocols, as long as these acts are contrary to the rules of 
international humanitarian law;
481
 
 
iii) states must not repress acts that are in conformity with the Conventions and 
Protocols; 
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states parties are obliged to observe, but do not preclude those states from enacting further reaching legislation.” 
See Van der Wilt (2008), p. 256. 
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iv) states can only establish universal jurisdiction over acts where international law 
allows so. 
 
A similar question arose with regard to the wording of the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT), in the case of Charles Taylor Jr. in the USA. The son of the former President of 
Liberia was sentenced for 97 years for torture based on the US Torture Act. Taylor Jr. argued 
that the Torture Act, which implemented the CAT, was unconstitutional, because, among 
others, its wording did not exactly represent the wording of CAT.  
 
Taylor Jr. (often referred to as Emmanuel during the proceedings) argued that the US Torture 
Act differed from the CAT in three instances: (i) the definition of torture in the CAT specifies 
“such purposes as”, meaning that the CAT requires the proscribed purpose as an element of 
torture, namely obtaining information, punishing, intimidating, or coercing a person, or for 
“any reason based on discrimination of any kind”, whereas the US Torture Act does not 
require a motive; (ii) the CAT requires that actually harm is inflicted, whereas the US Act 
requires only that the act is committed with the specific intent of inflicting pain or suffering; 
and (iii) the CAT describes the perpetrator being under official capacity, whereas the US Act 
mentions “under the color of law”482.  
 
Eventually, “[t]he district court specifically rejected Emmanuel’s argument that the Torture 
Act was unconstitutional because its language did not precisely mirror the definition of torture 
contained in the CAT; the court explained that Congress needed “flexibility” in performing its 
“delegated responsibilities,” and concluded that the Torture Act “plainly bears a rational 
relationship” to the CAT.” 483 This opinion was confirmed by the Court of Appeals, by saying 
that „the existence of slight variances between a treaty and its congressional implementing 
legislation do not make the enactment unconstitutional; identicality is not required. Rather, 
(…), legislation implementing a treaty bears a ‘rational relationship’ to that treaty where the 
legislation “tracks the language of the [treaty] in all material respects.”484 
 
                                                 
482
 US Court of Appeals in the Eleventh Circuit, No. 09-10461, USA v Roy M. Belfast, Jr, a.k.a. Charles Taylor, 
jr., pp.19., 33-34, pp.19-20 (available on: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200910461.pdf (last 
visited on 22 July 2010), pp. 28-29. 
483
 Ibid. 
484
 Ibid, pp. 33-34. 
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The Court of Appeals specifically demonstrated that none of the three instances where 
altering the wording of the CAT but included merely different wording. It pointed out that the 
list provided in the CAT (ie. the name purposes of torture) are not integral to the definition of 
torture, since it only provides an illustration of the common motivations. This is, in the view 
of the Court, reflected in the US Act’s language in that it requires that the acts must have been 
specifically intended to result in torture
485
. Second, the Court pointed out that the CAT 
obliged states to criminalize attempts to commit torture, and the attempt of torture is exactly 
the same as acts done with the specific intent to commit torture. Third, the Court stated that 
according to the Senate Executive Committee opinion, charged with evaluation the CAT, the 
phrases “in an official capacity” and “under the color of law” mean exactly the same. In sum, 
the Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the District Court, stated that “the CAT 
created a floor, not a ceiling, for its signatories in their efforts to combat torture” 486. 
 
Although the debate in the Taylor Jr. case mainly surrounded constitutional questions around 
the implementation of a treaty and how far Congress is authorized during such 
implementation, the international law aspect of the debate indicate the same considerations as 
we have discussed before. Although the US Court of Appeals argued that in substance it did 
not include a wider variation of torture than as stipulated in the CAT, it also stated that a 
wider definition would only reinforce the aims of the Convention in fighting torture. In 
addition, the CAT itself states that its provisions are without prejudice to any national 
legislation that may include a wider definition.
487
  
 
From an international law perspective there would be nothing illegal about a state formulating 
stricter conditions for criminal responsibility than international law as long as it is not 
criminalizing acts that are expressly permitted under international law – in this case, 
obviously, criminal responsibility is based on national law solely. Such a stricter formulation 
would be a natural exercise of state sovereignty through expressing the penal powers of the 
state.  
 
 
 
                                                 
485
 Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
486
 Ibid, p. 35. 
487
 Convention Against Torture, Article 1 (2). US Court of Appeals judgment in Taylor jr., p. 35. 
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(v) Place of the norm in the hierarchy of national laws 
 
Another side of the question posed in Chapter III. 2. (iii) is whether basing the crime simply 
on national law as opposed to international law has any consequence due to the high place 
taken by international law in the hierarchy of norms
488
. A consequence could be the 
applicability of amnesty, time-barring or existence of immunities with respect to the crime. 
Statute of limitations is excluded for war crimes, immunities are excluded for war crimes and 
amnesties may not be compatible with the obligation to prosecute. If we base the criminality 
on ordinary crimes, how are these considerations applied?  
 
If we base the criminality on implementing provisions in the criminal code, usually criminal 
codes prescribe the non-applicability of time-barring and immunities for such crimes. If we 
base the criminality on international treaty or custom, if applicable, the other rules of 
international law also apply, so the non-applicability of time-barring and immunities is not a 
problem. At the same time, if we base criminality on ordinary crimes, how are restrictions to 
the application of time-barring or amnesties given effect? 
 
This was the issue with the above-mentioned Biszku-case in Hungary. Since the prosecutors 
were not applying crimes against humanity to the acts in question, they regarded the acts as 
ordinary crimes and referred to time-barring when rejecting the criminal complaint. What 
would be important in determining whether ordinary or international crimes shall be applied, 
is that exclusively the features of the act should be looked at. Even lacking the corresponding 
crimes in national codes and thus having to apply ordinary crimes, the framework provided by 
international law shall be applied. 
 
(vi) Could the application of universal jurisdiction be contrary to the principle of 
legality?  
 
It could be argued that foreigners tried on the basis of universal jurisdiction are not aware of 
the acts that are criminalized in domestic codes therefore are in a disadvantageous position. If 
we therefore consider the question of the legality principle in light of exercising universal 
jurisdiction where the perpetrator may well be a foreigner, we can determine that while it may 
                                                 
488
 For a discussion on the place of international law in the hierarchy of norms in Hungary, see Molnár (2007), 
pp. 474-479. 
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be true that foreign perpetrators are not aware of the procedure under which their acts are 
judged, they cannot allege that they were not aware of the criminality of their acts.
489
  
 
Grave breaches are criminalized in the Geneva Conventions which enjoy universal 
ratification; therefore no one can allege that he/she was not aware of the criminal nature of 
such acts, nor of the list of crimes which were subject to universal jurisdiction. Besides, 
unfamiliarity with a foreign criminal procedure is not a specific phenomenon attached to war 
crimes. If we travel to another country, we may more or less be aware of what acts are 
criminal, but we may not be familiar with the procedure at all – this, however, does not pose 
any problems from the viewpoint of the legality principle. 
 
As regards the nullum crimen sine lege principle, difference must be made between how to 
apply this principle for national criminal offences defined in national criminal codes and for 
international offences not defined in national criminal codes but being under the proceedings 
of domestic courts.
490
  
 
While compatibility of criminal offences defined in the national criminal code with the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle can be determined relatively easy by checking whether the act was 
criminalized in national law at the time it was committed, punishment of international 
offences directly applied by domestic courts comply with the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle if (i) the international treaty establishing the international crime has been made part 
of national law
491
 according to the way required by national legislation at the time the offence 
was committed
492
,
 
or (ii) if it can be asserted that at the time the offence was committed the 
act was considered an international crime
493
 under customary law.
494
  
                                                 
489
 See Ryngaert (2006), p. 58.: „I believe that this objection to universal jurisdiction, which elaborates on the 
principle  of legality, is a rearguard action argument that international law has long since unmasked, an objection 
that equally applies to the ICC, or an objection that the entry into force of the Rome Satute has precisely 
deprived of its force.”. 
490
 As to the general difficulties in applying the nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege principles in international 
criminal law, see Gellér (2009), pp. 50-52 and 54. 
491
 This is not to be confused with the crime having been implemented in the domestic criminal code, which this 
is not a requirement for the punishability of the act in compliance with the nullum crimen sine lege principle. 
492
 It must be noted that several domestic legislation authorized its courts to proceed in cases concerning serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. This may be seen as a specific interpretation to be in compliance of 
the nullum crimen sine lege principle, in that the authorization happened after the crimes had been committed, 
although the referred acts were already seen as crimes in international law at the time of their perpetration. See 
Gellér (2009), p. 53. 
493
 In the understanding of the ICTR and ICTY, the notion of the nullum crimen sine lege principle is even 
broader. The ICTY stated in the Tadic case that prohibition of retroactive law is not violated only because 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not include and explicit obligation to repress. See Prosecutor 
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Therefore, in the first case, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a manner compatible with 
nullum crimen sine lege is closely linked to the state of the international crime in national 
law
495
. In addition, the authorization of national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction must 
be in force in the state at the time the offence was committed
496
 (for instance by promulgation 
of a treaty including such authorization) or it must be a general principle in customary law at 
the time the offence was committed. This means that even if the conduct was prohibited at the 
time of commission in the national law but the legal ground for exercising universal 
jurisdiction was not existent, the state could not exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the 
universality principle since this would infringe the nullum crimen principle.
497
 
 
The technique of how to make this effective in national law is indifferent from the point of 
view of international law: if the international treaty is in force in the state, the international 
obligation is present and can, theoretically, be applied by the courts. Furthermore, problems 
may arise for the prosecutors/judges if their national criminal code lists the crimes for which 
universal jurisdiction applies, but the list in the criminal code is not complete. Theoretically, 
punishment even in this case would be possible based directly on international law, but 
practical application would definitely be tricky. The question whether domestic judges can 
apply international law directly is dealt with in Chapter III. 1. (iii) of the present thesis. 
 
A further question is whether nullum crimen sine lege applies only for substantive elements, 
or also for jurisdiction and statute of limitation. Of course, the question additionally is 
                                                                                                                                                        
v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A "Dule", Decision on the Defence motion on jurisdiction, 10 August 1995, paras 70-71: 
„The individual criminal responsibility of the violator need not be explicitly stated in a convention for its 
provisions to entail individual criminal liability. (…)A further indication that the acts proscribed by common 
Article 3 constitute criminal offences under international law is that, assuming arguendo that there is no clear 
obligation to punish or extradite violators of non-grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions, such as 
common Article 3, all States have the right to punish those violators. Therefore, individuals can be prosecuted 
for the violations of the acts listed and thus prosecution by the International Tribunal based on primacy does not 
violate the ex post facto prohibition.”. 
494
 The European Convention on Human Rights also expressly makes this distinction in its Article 7 para 2: 
„This article [Article 7 para 1 on nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege] shall not prejudice the trial 
and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”. 
495
 „Unless otherwise authorized by national law, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege would prevent the 
national judge from giving effect to the aut dedere aut judicare principle in a treaty or universal jurisdiction 
based on customary international law.” See statement of Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Institut de droit international , 
Annuaire, Volume 71, Tome II, Session de Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième partie, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, p. 
212. 
496
 O’Keefe comes to the same conclusion: „the nexus relied on to ground prescriptive jurisdiction over given 
conduct must exist at the time at which the conduct is performed” See O’Keefe (2004), p. 742. 
497
 Ibid, p. 743. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 147 
whether jurisdiction and statute of limitation are seen as substantive or procedural elements; 
different legal systems think differently about it. Enough to say that the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle was usually understood as applying both to substantive and procedural features. 
This was also the outcome of the Bouterse-case
498
 in the Netherlands (the case was discussed 
in more depth in Chapter III. 2. (i)).  
 
Van der Wilt, the commentator of the Bouterse-case in ‘International Law in Domestic 
Courts’, noted that “[i]n the opinion of the Supreme Court, the ramifications of the nullum 
crimen principle did not only bear upon the substantive issue of qualification, but affected the 
jurisdiction and the statute of limitations as well. (…) This point of view seems reasonable. 
After all, it would be inconsistent to deny the retroactive applicability of substantive 
provisions while upholding the retroactive application of procedural features which derive 
their existence from the very status that torture holds under international law.”499 
 
3. Hurdles inbuilt in national jurisprudence / national application 
 
“Even with the creation of new international 
tribunals in this decade, national tribunals 
remain essential in deterring and remedying 
violations of the laws of war.”500 
 
However exhaustive national implementation may be, enforcement cannot be effective 
without the proper input of domestic courts. Many examples below show that courts may, 
even in the presence of adequate implementation, block effective procedures. First, the 
general attitude of domestic courts will be analyzed with an attempt to determine the reasons 
for their approach. A separate assessment of application of universal jurisdiction also seems 
necessary due to its unique features within war crimes procedures. Therefore as a second step, 
a more specific examination of domestic courts’ approach towards universal jurisdiction will 
follow. 
 
                                                 
498
 Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, judgment of 18 September 2001, nr. 00749/01 (CW 2323). 
499
 The Bouterse-case, ILDC 80 (NL 2001), C4. 
500
 Wedgewood (2000), p. 393. 
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(i) Are domestic courts ready to try war crimes cases? 
 
A common characteristic of repression of war crimes is the relatively meager number of 
national procedures. In fact, there are few other international obligations that are so poorly 
complied with as the obligations on repression and effective application through judicial 
enforcement.
501
 At the same time, effective prosecution of the perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes cannot be achieved without the input of domestic courts
502
. As the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC put it, there is a risk of “an ‘impunity gap’ unless national authorities, 
the international community and the Court work together to ensure that all appropriate means 
for bringing other perpetrators to justice are used”503 
 
This may have several causes. First, war crimes are usually not isolated, therefore with one 
case there are several accused which leads to loads of cases to be tried
504
. Second, war crimes 
procedures require special knowledge of international law, international jurisprudence and 
special application of national law in conjunction with international law. In addition, the 
primary and secondary sources may be difficult to access, either because physically they are 
hardly available (with internet this obstacle seems to be gradually decreasing) or because of 
language problems.  
 
Third, war crimes procedures tend to be expensive and time-consuming: because of the 
distance in place and time between the place of the procedure and where the crime was 
committed, evidence is difficult to reach, witnesses live far away and often don’t speak the 
language of the place of the procedure, for more than one reason cooperation with other 
states’ authorities is necessary and thus the proceedings are dependent on the cooperation of 
the state of locus delicti. Due to especially such and similar reasons it is not difficult to 
imagine why a judge would be hesitant to have a war crime case. 
 
Although, due to the acceptance of international treaties in the national legal order, 
prosecutors and judges are technically applying national law during the procedure, they are, in 
                                                 
501
 See Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 95.  
502
 See also Kirs (2012), p. 19. 
503
 See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, September 2003, p.3, available at:  
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25- 
60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf. (last visited on 10 January 2012). 
504
 Domestic procedures also allow for trying lower ranking perpetrators as well. See Kirs (2012), p. 19. and 
Eszter Kirs, Challenges in the post-genocide Rwanda regarding criminal accountability, in: 5/2 Miskolc Journal 
of International Law (2008) 28-34, p. 31. 
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the end, in need of specialized knowledge of international law. It is not enough to find one’s 
way around the Geneva Conventions or other relevant international treaty only, the 
prosecutor/judge also needs to know the corresponding literature, international jurisprudence 
and other related international norms in order to effectively deal with war crimes cases or 
international crimes in general.  
 
Coming back to an earlier example, in order for a prosecutor/judge to understand the principle 
of proportionality in humanitarian law, it is not enough to read Additional Protocol I, but 
he/she needs to know the development of the law, the existence or non-existence of 
corresponding customary law, etc. Therefore, prosecutors/judges require specialized training 
in international humanitarian law and international criminal law in order to conduct effective 
and high standard national criminal proceedings in such matters.
505
 
 
Moreover, trying a war crime case is not necessarily a motivating factor for the judge. It 
usually does not assist in his/her career, and because of the legal specificities and the length of 
the procedure, it does not help much the statistics of judged cases. Being an expert in 
international law or war crimes cases does not bring the judge further in his career path nor is 
he/she compensated in any other way for taking up such a difficult task.  
 
The question gets even more complicated when it comes to trying own nationals or nationals 
of a friendly or powerful nation. In such cases political considerations also come in, and the 
prosecutor may well decide to drop the charges, or the judge may try to find reasons for 
excluding the criminality of the accused. Even democratic states have these considerations, 
and, as history has shown, they are not better in prosecution their own people than non-
democratic countries.
506
 
 
A comparative analysis
507
 of behavior of national judges has shown that judges are reluctant 
to apply international law if they consider that this would injure national interests
508
. 
                                                 
505
 Regarding a need for international law training for judges/prosecutors, see Mettraux (2006), p. 371. 
506
 For an analysis of „minimalism and selectivity” of war crimes cases by national judicial authorities, see 
Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 89-98. 
507
 Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of 
Attitudes of National Courts, 4 European Journal of International Law (1993), p. 159. (Quoted by: Eyal 
Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International's Resolution on 'The 
Activities of National Courts and the International Relations of their State', in: 5 European Journal of 
International Law (1994), 423-439, p. 424). 
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Recognizing the problem of independence of national courts when dealing with international 
law, the Institute of International Law adopted a Resolution calling on national courts to 
maintain their independence while interpreting and applying international law, determining 
the existence and content of international law, both treaty and customary or when deciding 
about the adjudication of a question related to the exercise of the executive power.
509
 
 
The consideration of prosecutors and judges is important, because the success of a national 
process depends on them. Prosecutors may tend to drop charges based on alleged lack of 
jurisdiction, the denial of the international law character of the crime
510
 or simply trying to 
extradite the person instead of prosecuting him domestically, and judges by putting restrictive 
interpretation on jurisdictional issues, or applying ordinary crimes instead of the international 
crime. 
 
Some states acknowledge these difficulties and take measures to overcome them. Many states 
concentrate war crimes procedures to one bench or one specific court, hire experts to advise 
them on international law matters and systematically collect material and documents on 
international law for their own consultation and use. Unfortunately, none of these measures 
have been taken in Central European countries, leaving prosecutors and judges with a difficult 
task which they have to sort out themselves.  
 
Nonetheless, when confronted with the issue of lack of preparedness of the judiciary to try 
war crimes cases, states simply shrug their shoulders and refer to the independence of the 
judiciary saying there is nothing they can do. While no one questions the independence of the 
judiciary, it has to be noted that preparing and training judges to stand the difficult test of 
trying war crimes requires state intervention in many fields and is also state responsibility. It 
needs money for training, determination and funds to allocate personnel for these special 
                                                                                                                                                        
508
 Unfortunately this is also true in the EU law versus domestic law relationship. For the relationship between 
domestic courts and the Court of Justice of the EU, see Varga Csaba, Jogrendszerek, jogi gondolkodásmódok az 
európai egységesülés perspektívájában – Magyar körkép Európai Uniós összefüggésben (Legal systems, legal 
mentalities in the perspectives of the European Unification – Hungarian overview – in a European Union 
context), Szent István Társulat, Budapest (2009), pp. 148-150. 
509
 Institute of International Law, Resolution adopted at the 66th session in 1993 in Milan: „The Activities of 
National Judges and the International Relations of their State”, available at: http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1993_mil_01_en.PDF (last visited on 27 January 2010). 
510
 This is exactly what happened in Hungary at the Biszku-case, where Prosecution did not raise charges arguing 
that the acts in question did not constitute crimes against humanity therefore prosecution is time-barred. 
Remarkable, that the prosecution did not examine nor did it explain why it had come to the conclusion that the 
acts were not crimes against humanity, it simply stated so. See Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, NF 27942/2010/1 
and Public Prosecutor’s Office, NF. 10718/2010/5-I. For an analysis, see Varga R. (2011). 
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cases, adoption of internal measures to assign such cases to specifically trained judges and 
forming an environment that makes it motivating for a judge to try such cases.  
 
States which have a more responsible attitude and are thus more experienced in such trials 
have established exclusive competence for such cases. In Germany, it is the office of the 
federal prosecutor that is competent for prosecution, in Belgium the federal prosecutor, in 
Netherlands a special unit was established for prosecution. It is not enough to assign one 
specific body but it must also be ensured that trained personnel are ready to accept the 
assignment. This is what is mostly lacking in Central European states. While in Hungary the 
Metropolitan Court and the General Public Prosecutor has exclusive jurisdiction, in many 
cases there has been no judge or prosecutor who would have felt trained enough even to speak 
at an IHL conference. This negligence obviously tells us something about the system, not the 
individual judges or prosecutors. And this brings us back to the responsibility of the states to 
ensure effective prosecution of grave breaches, an obligation under international law. 
 
Judges are often reluctant to apply international law directly, because they feel that it is a 
body of law that is distant from them, and over which they have absolutely no influence 
through their precedents or interpretative decisions. Although it may well be understood that 
it is more convenient to move in the framework of well-known domestic laws, on the other 
hand it has to be noticed that national judges do bear significance for international criminal 
law through their cases. It must be noted that national jurisprudence can count as a factor in 
the formation of customary law, and international tribunals may also draw examples from 
national cases. The ICTY has, for example, referred to national cases several times.
511
 
Furthermore, courts that do apply international law can be part of a dialogue on experiences 
and lessons learnt and can thus contribute to each others’ efforts. 
 
Effective implementation also requires that courts interpret national law in conformity with 
international law. This is the so-called principle of consistent interpretation, and it has 
become, it seems, a general principle of law.
512
 This principle assists in reaching that national 
law does not put obstacles on the application of international law. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court in its decision of 1993 also acknowledged this rule by saying that “the 
                                                 
511
 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Tadic, 7 May 1997, papa 642., refers to the judgment of the French Cour de Cassation 
in the Barbie case, and ICTY, Trial Chamber, Furundzija, 10 December 1998, para 194, refers to British military 
courts. See Ferdinandusse (2006), p. 111. 
512
 See more on the principle of consistent interpretation at Ferdinandusse (2006), pp. 146-153. 
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Constitution and domestic law must be interpreted in a manner whereby the generally 
recognized international rules are truly given effect.”513 In order to exercise this rule, 
however, judges have to be aware of the rules of international law. 
 
Serious errors in domestic procedures can most probably be cited from many countries. In 
Hungary, the Supreme Court
514
 thought in the Korbely case
515
 that the interpretation of 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should be drawn directly from Additional 
Protocol II
516
. What makes this already serious misinterpretation worse is that this was opined 
in connection with events that happened in 1956, before Additional Protocol II was adopted. 
Eventhough it does occasionally occur that a treaty is interpreted or clarified in light of 
documents adopted later, confusing the scope of application of Additional Protocol II and 
Common Article 3 is a serious mistake given that both the Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions
517
, and both legal literature and state practice have repeatedly manifested that the 
scope of application of the two instruments are different. Although the Supreme Court later 
corrected this reasoning
518
, it gives us an insight on how much judges in certain cases 
understand international law
519. As Péter Kovács notes, “the interpretation of an anterior 
treaty on the basis of a posterior treaty is hardly reconcilable with the principle of effet 
intertemporel.”520  
 
Evenmore, the European Court of Human Rights raised attention that the Hungarian courts 
interpreted the notion of crimes against humanity with a retroactive effect in that they referred 
to, among others, the ICTY Statute and the ICC Statute for a definition of crimes against 
humanity – documents that did not exist in 1956. In addition, Hungarian courts did not 
consider all elements of crimes against humanity applicable in 1956, specifically whether the 
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 Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 53/1993 (13 October 1993). 
514
 For an analysis of the 1956 volley cases, see Tamás Hoffmann, Individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
committed in non-international armed conflicts – The Hungarian jurisprudence on the 1956 volley cases, in: 
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 Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of János Korbély, Bf.V. 1344/1998/3. 
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 The qualification of the 1956 revolution was seriously discussed within the Hungarian legal literature. See 
Bruhács János, 1956 a nemzetközi jogban, in: Tanulmányok az 1956. évi forradalom és szabadságharc 50. 
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(2006). 
517
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Commentary to Additional Protocol II, p. 1348, para 4447. 
518
 Decision of the Supreme Court, Revision Panel, Bfv. X. 207/1999/5. 
519
 For an analysis of the Korbély case and the legal error made by the Supreme Court, see Péter Kovács, 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 1999, Vol. 2, T.M.C. Asser Press (2000), pp. 375-377. 
520
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attack formed part of State action or policy or of a widespread and systematic attack on the 
civilian population. Therefore, in addition to other reasons, the Court held that Hungary was 
in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. 
 
In Estonia for instance, there is hardly any case-law, the only ones existing are related to 
genocide and crime against humanity committed by the Stalinist regime. Here retroactivity 
questions appeared, because the acts were committed between 1941 and 1949, however, the 
question whether these acts were considered criminal according to general international law at 
the time was not analyzed by the national courts. A common characteristic in Estonian 
national courts typically seems to be a lack of knowledge of international law and 
international case law, which resulted in that the judgments are “loftily worded and open to 
attack”.521 
 
Finally, legal correctness is only one aspect of proceedings in international crimes, but „[n]ot 
only legislators and authors of constitutions need to be culturally open, given that they 
formulate the human rights and the criminal law subject thereto. Criminal judges must also be 
culturally open so that they can assess the perpetrators and victims in criminal proceedings 
arising from typical cultural conflicts equally.”522 
 
Although it can be argued that the “insertion of an aut dedere aut judicare principle into these 
treaties testifies to the strongly held belief of the international community that States are 
sufficiently equipped to adequately address international crimes through the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction”523, it must also be examined whether those applying the law are 
equipped enough to proceed in a case concerning war crimes, especially in Central Europe.  
 
Namely, effective war crimes procedures also require the knowledge, experience and often 
the language skills of the members of the judiciary. Extensive literature and legal 
commentaries are regularly only available in languages foreign to the prosecutors and 
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judges.
524
 This is an important aspect since lacking such resources one cannot really talk 
about effective application.  
 
In Central Europe, although international humanitarian law and international criminal law are 
often taught as an optional subject, neither of these appears in the training of judges in the 
region. The basic sources are not to be found in the library of the courts or only in foreign 
languages. Therefore it would be illusory to say that prosecuting war crimes is not dependent 
on the will of the state and its sacrifice in terms of financing, personnel and training.  
 
In addition, the question is always raised, especially by judicial training institutions, whether 
this is a relevant topic today. There may be two answers. First, repression of grave breaches 
and war crimes is an international obligation, irrespective of the present political context or 
other considerations. States taking their international obligations seriously cannot be accepted 
to neglect their obligations for considerations of comfort or short-sightedness.  
 
The whole point in the system of obligation to repress is on the one hand that states adopt 
such measures already in peacetime, on the other hand, that all states comply with it, because 
only this could lead to an end of impunity. This does not mean that a state “prepares for war”, 
as many government functionaries put it, but it signals a comprehension of the internationally 
accepted belief that war crimes violate the basic principles of civilized nations to such an 
extent that no state can turn a blind eye on it.  One way to do it is making our own system 
capable of sanctioning war criminals.  
 
In addition, it is far from true that punishing war crimes is an irrelevant question today. 
Soldiers of all Central European states participated in multi-national missions in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Kosovo and other similar contexts, in situations where international humanitarian law 
was applicable. This makes it even timelier to be ready to proceed in cases of violations. It is 
also known that many states already had problems, such as looting, seizure of cultural 
                                                 
524
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property and illegal trade with cultural property. It can thus not be closed out that procedures 
related to war crimes may arise.  
 
(ii) Domestic courts’ attitude towards universal jurisdiction 
 
“Imperfect justice may be preferable to no justice at all.”525 
 
As already outlined above, international law generally lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms. One of the few mechanisms that do work is criminal prosecution. When an 
international crime is prosecuted in the name of the international community, we first think of 
international tribunals as the forum. At the same time, prosecution by national courts can also 
represent prosecution in the name of the international community. A tool to make this work is 
universal jurisdiction, where, although prosecution is carried out in a national forum, it is 
done representing the interests of society at the international level
526
. 
 
At the same time, one of the obligations least complied with in the Geneva Conventions is the 
obligation to prosecute and punish perpetrators of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, irrespective of the nationality of the offender. Although the obligation to 
exercise universal jurisdiction is not expressly named, it is clear that the obligation to search 
for and prosecute in fact means that states are obliged to exercise universal jurisdiction
527
. 
 
We must admit, however, that it may not be entirely clear at first glance what the text of the 
Geneva Conventions exactly means:  
 
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to 
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, 
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and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made 
out a prima facie case.”528 
 
To be more precise: what does „search for” exactly cover:529 does it cover the requirement to 
search in the territory of the state or does it cover the whole world?
530
 The first approach 
seems logical and realistic, as supported by many writers,
531
 moreover, this approach is the 
one corresponding to the aim of universal jurisdiction: not to let perpetrators hide between 
state boarders. This approach would then mean that in case such a person is present on a 
state’s territory, the state is bound to search for this person and bring him before its own 
courts. The ICRC Commentary to the Geneva Conventions clearly states that „[a]s soon as 
one of them [i.e. a state] is aware that a person on its territory has committed such an offence, 
it is its duty to see that such person is arrested and prosecuted without delay.”532 Neither the 
text of the Conventions, nor the Commentary attaches further conditions to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, therefore the obvious conclusion is that the drafters of the Conventions 
did not actually want to attach any more conditions. 
 
Universal jurisdiction is, at the same time, often seen as a dangerous phenomenon interfering 
with state sovereignty
533
 and politics, threatening politicians and developing a tyranny of 
judges. Henry Kissinger warns that “[t]he danger lies in pushing the effort to extremes that 
risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments; historically, the dictatorship of 
the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch-hunts. (…) When discretion on what 
crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction and who to prosecute is left to national 
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prosecutors, the scope for arbitrariness is wide indeed. (…) The doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction is based on the proposition that the individuals or cases subject to it have been 
clearly identified. (…) But many issues are much vaguer and depend on an understanding of 
the historical and political context. It is this fuzziness that risks arbitrariness on the part of 
prosecutors and judges years after the event and that became apparent with respect to existing 
tribunals.”534 Belgium, for example, stated in 1990 in its observation to the Draft code of 
crimes against the peace and security of mankind, that “it must be recognized that the 
principle of universal punishment is not the ideal solution in respect of international crime; 
that is so for the two following reasons. (…) Firstly, there has always been some opposition to 
universal punishment because it makes national tribunals responsible for judging the conduct 
of foreign Governments.”535 
 
Another danger usually seen in universal jurisdiction is the risk that it becomes an instrument 
in the hands of developed countries to exercise a modern form of colonialism over developing 
countries.  
 
The neo-colonialism argument was also raised in the debate between the European Union and 
the African Union, which is described in the AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction.
536
 Since the points raised by both sides perfectly demonstrate the usual 
arguments – counter-arguments raised around universal jurisdiction, and many of the findings 
of the Report provide a general overview of the state of proceedings based on universal 
jurisdiction in European and African countres, an introduction to the main points seems 
useful. 
 
The roots of the debate were the practice of European states in investigating and prosecuting 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide based on universal jurisdiction against 
numerous accused of African origin – many of the cases mentioned in the present study. The 
African Union, acknowledging the need to end impunity, feared the abusive application of 
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universal jurisdiction which could endanger international law.
537
 Hence, the African Union’s 
Commission on the Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction requested that a meeting is arranged 
between the AU and EU to discuss the matter. Consequently, two meetings were held in 2008 
which resulted in the issuance of the Expert Report. The Report was prepared by independent 
experts tasked by the AU and EU and reflected the outcome of the experts’ analysis and not 
those of the AU or EU. 
 
The Report seeks to strike a balance between the widely accepted rationale of universal 
jurisdiction and its allegedly abusive application. First, it clarifies the link between the 
concept of universal jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut judicare principle by indicating that 
the obligation to empower states’ organs with universal jurisdiction is a logically earlier step 
than exercising the aut dedere aut judicare principle. Hence, says the Report, “[i]t is only 
once (…) competence [to exercise universal jurisdiction] has been established that the 
question whether to prosecute the relevant conduct, or to extradite persons suspected of it, 
arises.”538 As the Report points out, the aut dedere aut judicare principle can not only be 
applied for universal jurisdiction, but to other forms of jurisdiction as well. Finally, the Report 
notes that due to these two obligations, States are not only obliged to vest their authorities 
with universal jurisdiction, but once this is done, they are also obliged to exercise this 
jurisdiction by either prosecuting or extraditing the given case.
539
 
 
The Report also highlighted that African states were also making serious efforts in exercising 
universal or other forms of jurisdiction or alternative systems to fight impunity. Although no 
universal jurisdiction case had taken place in the African Continent, numerous states tried 
persons for serious international crimes based on ordinary jurisdictions, using alternative 
systems like truth and reconciliation commissions or the gacaca system, or referred cases to 
the ICC – all in an effort that perpetrators face criminal justice.540  
 
On the side of EU practice, the Report underlined that as of the time of the report, only eight 
states had initiated proceedings based on universal jurisdiction, involving suspects from 
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various states and geographic regions, out of which only less than half are African
541
. At the 
same time, the majority of the cases had been discontinued based on various reasons, 
including immunity.
 542
 
 
Regarding the specific AU and EU concerns, the findings of the Report held that although 
African states supported the notion of universal jurisdiction, they would need institutional 
capacity-building to be able to exercise it. African states find that universal jurisdiction 
exercised by European states are targeted mainly against African accused, and already the 
public issuance of indictments and warrants of arrest are intimidating against those states, 
evenmore, the fact that officials of African states are tried by European jurisdictions evokes 
memories of colonialism. At the same time, the writers of the Report raise attention to the fact 
that the number of African suspects is only a part of the overall cases of universal jurisdiction, 
and the number of cases which resulted in an indictment, let alone trial and conviction, are 
exceptional, in most cases because of immunity.  
 
They also point out the independence of the judiciary, the limited EU competence in matters 
of universal jurisdiction, the need that criticism against application of universal jurisdiction by 
European states be backed up by an expression of real willingness from African states to 
exercise jurisdiction – with European states having proposed their technical assistance. The 
Report also reminds that although in many cases African states requested extradition of their 
nationals from European states, such requests had been denied due to uncertainty about 
humane treatment and the availability of fair trial in the given state.
543
 
 
The recommendations formulated by the experts basically reflect the answers to the concerns 
raised by the African Union and European Union respectively. They call on AU member 
states to adopt legislation to allow them to try persons accused of serious international crimes, 
to ensure adequate treatment of detainees and fair trial guarantees, and to appoint judicial 
contact points with Eurojust. However, most of the recommendations are addressed to 
European states. These include the observance of friendly relations during decisions on 
proceedings, the need to refraining from public discreditation and stigmatization and to 
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respect the presumption of innocence, the need to observe immunities as prescribed by 
international law, the need to give primacy to the territorial state to prosecute as a matter of 
policy. 
 
Last, certain recommendations are institutional in nature, namely the recommendation to 
appoint a minimum level of judges to deal with universal jurisdiction cases and to adequately 
train prosecutors and judges, the need for further dialogue between the EU and AU on the 
question and the need for furthering capacity-building measures of African states with the 
assistance of the EU and its member states.
544
 
 
Summarizing the present author’s reflections on the findings of the Report, the Report seeks 
to respond to the concerns and criticisms of both sides. Neither of the arguments raised are 
new, nor are the responses. What comes clear is that it would be unfair to say that European 
states are concentrating on African cases. At the same time, considering that European states 
are also struggling with the technical, legal and financial difficulties of universal jurisdiction 
cases, it is easy to understand why African states cannot effectively deal with such 
procedures.  
 
Since, as the Report also pointed out, such crimes primarily cause harm in the state or area 
where they had been committed, the best forum for the process would be the territorial state. 
Therefore the most desirable goal would be to reach that the territorial state proceeds, and the 
cooperation of the AU and the EU should concentrate on this through cooperation, assistance 
in capacity-building, sharing of information, and other similar measures.  
 
At the same time, until this goal can be achieved, the second-best option is proceedings based 
on universal jurisdiction, which African states also acknowledged. Although this undoubtedly 
has political consequences, it is still a better solution than impunity. What is certain is that 
states cannot rely on the ICC as a solution, given the very limited number of cases the ICC 
can deal with. 
 
As the Report also pointed out, the competence of the European Union is very limited with 
respect to influencing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European States. As a matter of 
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fact, taking judicial independence as a starting point, the influence of the states themselves is 
also rather limited in this respect, namely on how prosecutors and courts apply universal 
jurisdiction. Although politics has clearly influenced certain decisions on prosecution, our 
belief should still be that the prosecutors and judges are primarily weighing legal 
considerations when assessing the cases. This being said, it is clear that prosecutors and 
judges will probably not want to stir up a hornet’s nest. 
 
Certain considerations, however, could be taken into account to decrease the perception of an 
abusive use of the principle. The recommendation of keeping a low profile during 
investigations in order to avoid stigmatization of the accused and the nation especially in case 
of an accused holding office merits attention. The upholding of communication on diplomatic 
and other channels between the forum state and the territoriality/nationality state also deserves 
consideration. Although these measures are rather procedural and may not substantially tackle 
the problem. 
 
A substantial solution can probably only result from a multifaceted approach. Notably, we 
must admit that the ideal solution would be if the territorial states could deal with the cases. 
However, as the African Union also mentioned, many of these states would need capacity-
building so that they can address such a challenge. European and other states and 
organizations should assist and continue to assist in this endeavor, it being a common interest. 
 
In many cases the territorial state could still not handle the cases due to an ongoing conflict or 
its very involvement in the commission of the atrocities. In an ideal situation, the application 
of universal jurisdiction should only come into play in such instances, and not necessarily by 
European states. Feelings of neocolonialism may be less intensive if other African states 
would also proceed based on universal jurisdiction. This could also be practical due to their 
proximity to the territorial states and their better understanding of the political, cultural and 
other contexts of the area where the crimes had been committed. 
 
Whether an international body should monitor such procedures could be questionable. Such 
an idea was raised at the Assembly of the African Union in July 2009. The States adopting the 
Decision felt the „need for an international regulatory body with competence to review and/or 
handle complaints or appeals arising out of abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by 
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individual States”545 The existence of an international body reviewing the decisions of 
domestic prosecutors or judges could seem to be an intrusion into their independence and 
could raise issues of state sovereignty. In case such decisions are violating international law, 
they can be handled in front of already existing bodies, such as the International Court of 
Justice or, less likely, in case the violations would constitute violations of human rights, in 
front of regional human rights bodies. 
 
Regional international bodies, such as the European Union or the African Union, could play a 
role – with limited competence, however – in assisting cooperation among states, exchanging 
best practices and common problems and continuing a dialogue among each other. Such role 
would be restricted to enhancing cooperation rather than having a say in substantial issues, 
these being state competences. 
 
Viewing the main points of the AU-EU debate, and considering the possibility of biasm of 
domestic judges and the neo-colonialism argument, many consider that the ICC is in a better 
position to handle such cases. However, as we will see below, neither of these arguments is 
convincing enough to make universal jurisdiction obsolete.
546
 Considering the freedom of the 
judiciary from the executive powers in all civilized states, the judges, even if exercising 
universal jurisdiction, will have to carry out these proceedings within the strict framework 
provided by international and national law. Therefore raising the possibility that foreign 
judges will be driven by political motives is questioning their independence.
547
 At the same 
time, to see the ICC as a solution to this problem is an approach that completely looses the 
point of the concept of universal jurisdiction.  
 
Bringing this in connection with the colonialism argument, we discover that while universal 
jurisdiction gives a possibility to all states, including developing countries, to exercise 
jurisdiction, the ICC may be more influenced by developed countries through funding, the 
election of judges, substantive and procedural rules and in many other ways.  Moreover, there 
may be situations where the ICC is not willing to prosecute certain crimes - either due to the 
“insignificance” of the case or due to political considerations -, consequently exercising 
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universal jurisdiction may be the right and only choice.
548
 Finally, it must be noted that 
universal jurisdiction is a generally accepted legal concept laid down in various international 
treaties, among them the universally ratified Geneva Conventions. 
 
Similarly to how prosecution by the ICC is complementary to prosecutions of national courts, 
prosecution based on universal jurisdiction is often seen as complementary to ordinary 
jurisdictions.
549
 This means that states with an ordinary jurisdictional link would be required 
and practical to exercise jurisdiction in the first place, while prosecutions by other states based 
on universal jurisdiction would only step in should the state primarily concerned not be able 
or willing to exercise its prosecutorial powers. This also means that should the concerned state 
later decide to take on the case and with the prerequisite that a fair and impartial trial can be 
expected, an extradition by the state exercising universal jurisdiction would be desirable to the 
concerned state. This mechanism may serve a similar purpose as the complementarity 
principle of the ICC: the possibility of another state punishing based on universal jurisdiction 
may have the effect that the concerned state rather chooses to initiate prosecution itself than 
letting another state do it. 
 
At the same time, states usually prefer to proceed based on traditional jurisdictions as opposed 
to universal jurisdiction. To see advantages and disadvantages of certain jurisdictional bases, 
it is worth going through the grounds of jurisdiction possible in case of a domestic procedure:  
 
(i) jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender. In this case the state may 
prosecute because the object is to defer future violations, or because in the long run it 
is advantageous to show that the state is committed to bringing perpetrators to justice. 
In addition, since the offender is a national of the state, probably no extradition issues 
arise. On the other hand, the trial may be easily bias towards the offender;  
 
(ii) jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim. The presence of the victim and 
easy availability of his/her testimony makes such trials easier, and it is a reassurance 
for the victim to see justice done so close and most probably in a way that is 
sympathetic to him;  
                                                 
548
 See Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: „Human Rights in Palestine and 
Other Occupied Arab Territories”, A/HRC/12/48 of 15 September 2009, p. 515. at 1654. 
549
 See opinions of Georges Abi-Saab and Theodor Meron, in: Institute de droit international, Annuaire, Volume 
71, Tome II, Session de Craccovie, 2005 – Deuxième partie Editions A. Pedone, Paris, p. 207 and 211. 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 164 
 
(iii) jurisdiction based on the territory where the act was perpetrated: the trial at the 
locus delicti makes the collection of evidence, testimonies easy;  
 
(iv) jurisdiction based on the protective principle, i.e. when the act endangers national 
security or basic state/government function. In this case collection of evidence may be 
difficult given that the crime was committed abroad (otherwise it would be the 
territoriality principle), but it would be important for the state in its own interest to 
prosecute the case and also to show to its citizens that it is capable of defending state 
security from hostile acts. Difficulty may arise if the state of the perpetrator also has 
an interest in the case;  
 
(v) jurisdiction based on universal jurisdiction: this is where the trial procedure meets 
the biggest hurdles: collecting evidence is difficult and costly, it is often politically 
difficult for the state; here the motive is to not let anyone who had committed such 
acts be unpunished.
550
 Although it is demanding for a state to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, this is the “last resort” in the circle of domestic prosecutions, before 
international prosecutions would take place. 
 
Since universal jurisdiction is one of the most contested and least complied with obligation, 
its examination deserves a detailed analysis. The following pages elaborate on different 
aspects of universal jurisdiction and how states and international tribunals interpret and apply 
the treaty provisions and the corresponding customary rules. Certain procedural elements are 
also examined due to their direct consequence on a wide application of universal jurisdiction 
or on a restrictive interpretation. The sub-chapter follows on to discuss eventual conflicts with 
basic guarantees and certain practical hurdles during its application.  
 
Conditions often linked to the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
 
State law and practice usually reflects two understandings of universal jurisdiction: one 
applies universal jurisdiction without restrictions, the other puts some kinds of restrictions to 
it. In the verbatim interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, it is an obligation on all states to 
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exercise jurisdiction if a grave breach of the Conventions has been committed, irrespective of 
the offender, the place of the act and the victim, hence, such a jurisdiction is fully universal. A 
narrower / more restrictive application of the obligation stipulated in the Geneva Conventions, 
although at times legally questionable, is to link a state’s jurisdiction to certain conditions: 
such as the perpetrator having legal residence in the state or the act having a link with the 
given state’s interest551.  
 
Many states, however, establish their own jurisdiction without conditions, the jurisdiction 
being fully universal. Interestingly but logically, Central European states mainly do not apply 
any restrictions. This is logical because these states have not yet tested their legislation in 
practice and have not met the practical or political hurdles that go with trying cases based on 
universal jurisdiction.
552
 Obviously typically those states have restricted their jurisdiction 
based on either of the conditions mentioned above where criminal procedures were initiated 
based on universal jurisdiction. It remains a question whether the constrained application of 
universal jurisdiction in national law fully conforms to the Geneva Conventions.  
 
A non-restrictive approach was taken first by Spain and Belgium as well, however, as soon as 
they started handling cases, the courts started including restrictions which were later reflected 
in national legislation. The Spanish High Court in 2003 placed restrictions on the application 
of universal jurisdiction for genocide in the Guatemalan General case, whereby stating that 
universal jurisdiction could only be exercised as a subsidiary principle and the Spanish courts 
could only have jurisdiction if there was a link with Spain, i.e. the victim is of Spanish 
nationality or the perpetrator is in custody in Spain. The case was brought to the 
Constitutional Court by the claimants arguing that a restrictive interpretation of universal 
jurisdiction under the law of 1985 violates the right of access to justice and the right of due 
process in the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish Constitutional Court held that “[t]he basic 
aim of the principle of universal jurisdiction is to achieve 'the universal extension of the 
jurisdiction of states and their organs to deal with facts of interest to all, the logic consequence 
of which is the competition between jurisdictions, or in other words, the competition between 
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competent states'”, hence, „the sole limitation being the principle of res judicata. Article 23(4) 
[of the Spanish Law on Judicial Powers of 1985] establishes an absolute principle of universal 
jurisdiction based on the particular nature (gravity) of the crimes prosecuted.”553 The 
Constitutional Court thus established that the restriction of the High Court on the application 
of the universal jurisdiction contradicts the principle of universal jurisdiction, annulled the 
decision of the Supreme Court and sent it back to the investigating judge. The new law of 
2009, however, reflected the opinion of the Spanish High Court. 
 
The ICJ also dealt with the question of restrictions in the Arrest Warrant case
554
. Although 
the judgment itself was highly contested, separate and dissenting opinions involved 
interesting lines of thought. Judge Guillaume expressed in his separate opinion that 
international treaties allow for subsidiary universal jurisdiction in case the accused lives on 
the territory of the state in question. Judge Van den Wyngaert, however, thought that Belgium 
did not violate international law by issuing an international arrest warrant against the minister 
of foreign affairs of Congo at the time.  
 
Cassese reminds that “one should not be unmindful of the risk of abuse which reliance upon 
the broader conception of universality may involve. This in particular holds true for cases 
where the accused is a senior official, who, because of the possible exercise by a foreign court 
of the universality principle, may end up being hindered in the exercise of his functions 
abroad (…). Nonetheless, it would be judicious for prosecutors, investigating judges, and 
courts of countries whose legislation upholds this broad notion of universality to invoke it 
with great caution, and only if they are fully satisfied that compelling evidence is available 
against the accused.”555 However, it is also true that in most cases universal jurisdiction was 
applied in relation to “small fishes” who were present on the territory of the state as refugees 
or asylum-seekers so their prosecution did not really raise issues for the foreign relations of 
the state.
556
 
 
Generally the aim of introducing restrictions is to avoid that states are bound – due to a flood 
of cases filed by the victims - to proceed in a series of cases which have absolutely no relation 
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to the given state, to proceed in cases where the relevant (territorial or nationality) state is a 
friendly state or given the relevant state’s economic or political power, it would be highly 
inconvenient for the forum state to proceed. Since there is no international legal basis for the 
introduction of such conditions or restrictions, these factors seem to be the driving force 
behind introducing them in national legislation. 
 
At the same time, many writers agree that restrictions other than presence of the accused in 
the forum state (a restriction which the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions also 
acknowledges
557
) would go right against the aim of universal jurisdiction, the aim of which is 
exactly that somewhere a procedure be carried out against perpetrators trying to hide among 
states. Any other approach would be contradictory to the raison d’être of universal 
jurisdiction and would link it to “ordinary” conditions.558 
 
Trials in absentia 
 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is also a critical question partly because not 
all states accept trials in absentia in general, and partly because restricting exercise of 
universal jurisdiction to cases where the state is holding the accused in custody is a principle 
accepted by many national laws and many writers. The issue raised in Belgium was whether it 
was legal to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia. Exactly this question was raised in the 
Sharon and Yaron case
559
, where relatives of victims of the Lebanese refugee camp filed 
reports for ordering the commission of grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The 
Court of Appeals in Brussels in its pre-trial session stated that Belgian courts did not have 
jurisdiction because the accused were not present in Belgium at the commencement of the 
proceedings. The Court of Cassation found, on the other hand, that the absence of the accused 
was not an obstacle to the proceedings, arguing that the Belgian law referred to by the Court 
of Appeals, the Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relates to ordinary 
crimes, while it is not applicable to grave breaches of humanitarian law, as such crimes are 
dealt with by a separate law. Still, the Court of Cassation denied the case based on an absence 
of nexus of the case with Belgium and an additional obstacle of immunity in the case of 
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Sharon. Belgium finally amended its law in 2003 making at least three years of legal presence 
of the accused in Belgium a requirement for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  
 
Many of the Central European states’ legislation do not hold absence of the accused as an 
obstacle to the proceedings.
560
 These states, however, have not yet carried out trials based on 
universal jurisdiction so no practical experience is at hand yet. 
 
Immunities 
 
Another widely contested legal problem is the question of immunity of persons holding 
official functions in universal jurisdiction cases
561
.  
 
The International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case
562
 manifested that international 
law ensures absolute functional immunity to the minister of foreign affairs currently holding 
office, even in the case of an international crime. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, however, expressly closes out the immunity of state officials. Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute states that even heads of state, members of government or members of 
parliament are not immune from its jurisdiction, and neither national nor international 
immunities can be obstacles to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
563
 This is an obvious rule in the 
Rome Statute, as it is mostly exactly such “big fishes” that the Court intends to try.  
 
Although, given the principle of complementarity, this rule in itself does not oblige national 
authorities in any way in their national procedures, if states provide immunity to such 
functionaires either while exercising ordinary or universal jurisdiction, the ICC could gain 
jurisdiction over the case. Although the ICJ also made a difference between immunity in front 
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of foreign domestic courts and international courts, whereby saying that immunity does not 
bar prosecutions in front of an international tribunal/court
564
, in light of the complementarity 
principle this differentiation may have a different aspect in the future. 
 
The approach of national courts varied with respect to the question of immunity. The national 
court decisions rounded around the issues of different handling of immunity rationae 
materiae and rationae personae and with respect to former functionaires and acting 
functionaires. 
 
Perhaps the most well-known and most cited decision with respect to immunity was the 
Pinochet-proceedings. Although the Pinochet-case is not strictly a universal jurisdiction case 
since Spain was rather relying on passive personality jurisdiction
565
, the findings of the House 
of Lords in their decisions merit attention.  
 
Briefly, the House of Lords first found that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity. Lord 
Nicholls stated in this decision often named ‘Pinochet 1’, that “international law has made 
plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking are not acceptable 
conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it 
does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international 
law”566.  
 
This was previously also stated by Lord Steyn: “the development of international law since 
the 1939-45 war justifies the conclusion that by the time of the 173 coup d’état, and certainly 
ever since, international law condemned genocide, torture, hostage-taking and crimes against 
humanity (…) as international crimes deserving of punishment. Given this state of 
international law, it seems to me difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes 
may amount to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of state.”567 
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Although the subsequent decision commonly referred to as ‘Pinochet 3’ also dealt with 
questions of double criminality, the most controversial issue was still immunity. Certain 
Lords held that unless the Torture Convention included an explicit exception from immunity – 
which it had not –, Pinochet could claim immunity as head of state568. Other Lords held that 
Pinochet could not claim immunity, but they differed in how they reasoned for this. The first 
group, consisting of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Saville and Lord Phillips, basically argued 
that immunity is contradictory to the purposes of applicable international law, notably saying 
that the prime suspects for torture are state officials and international law cannot provide 
immunity to commissions of the very crimes it punishes
569
. 
 
The other group, consisting of Lord Hope and Lord Hutton, concentrated on the argument that 
the prohibition of torture was customary law, overriding any other rules, and the Torture 
Convention prohibited torture under any circumstances, allowing no justification whatsoever, 
and consequently torture cannot be the official function of a head of state
570
. Finally, the 
House of Lords removed Pinochet’s immunity. However, as a consequence of subsequent 
developments, based on the observance of Pinochet being unfit to stand trial, he left UK 
territory and was released back to Chile. 
 
As David Turns noted, the heart of Pinochet’s case was that “if international law condemns 
certain acts as criminal, how in logic can it then also extend immunity for certain persons who 
commit those same acts? Since many international crimes are virtually by definition 
committed expressly or implicitly by state authority, the upholding of immunity for state 
officials subsequently charged with those crimes would render the law toothless.”571 Besides, 
it must not be forgotten that “the doctrine of personal immunity for heads of state did not 
conceive of such persons being charged with crimes against international law committed in 
their own states, but was aimed more at shielding them from prosecution for ‘common 
crimes’.”572 
 
The Pinochet-case, although the House of Lords decision binding only on the United 
Kingdom, has had an important effect on legal thinking regarding the application of 
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immunity. It did raise important questions of the different sides of immunity and the extension 
to which it could be applied to certain conducts prohibited by international law. Several 
opinions expressed during the House of Lords proceedings contested an absolute 
understanding of immunity and undeniable had an effect on subsequent domestic decisions. 
As it was clearly summarized: “Whatever the restrictions in the reasoning used by the Lords, 
it seemed that what emerged is that “international crimes in the highest sense’ cannot per se 
be considered as official acts”573. 
 
Although the Pinochet-case is the most widely known, there were several other cases that 
raised the immunity issue. The French prosecutor came to a similar conclusion in the 
Rumsfeld-case as the International Court of Justice. The prosecutor closed the file and rejected 
the criminal complaint filed by several human rights NGOs against the then former US 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld for alleged torture committed in Guantanamo Bay and 
in Abu Ghraib detention facility, reasoning that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed 
regarding diplomatic immunity, that “in application of the rules of customary international 
law, approved by the International Court of Justice, the immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
of heads of State, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs continues, after the end 
of their functions, for acts carried out in their official function, and that, as former secretary of 
defense, Mister Rumsfeld must benefit, by extension, from the same immunity, for acts 
carried out in the exercise of his functions.”574 
 
The Branković-case in Bulgaria also demonstrated the controversies of immunity during the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. Branković was a Serbian colonel, later general of the 
Yugoslav National Army, who entered Bulgaria in 2005 as part of a Serb military delegation 
on official visit. He was eventually arrested based on the request of the Interpol, for 
accusations of war crimes committed in Croatia in 1991, and for which he was convicted in 
Croatia
575
. The Sofia Court of Appeals ordered the release of the colonel referring to 
immunity under the 1969 Convention on Special Missions576.  
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A Dutch court in the first instance in the Bouterse-case held that international immunities 
posed no bar to prosecution for international crimes.
577
 In Italy, the highest court of appeal has 
held that state immunity, an immunity rationae materiae, is unavailable in respect of 
international crimes that violate jus cogens, such as war crimes.
578
 In both cases the case 
involved former state functionaires. 
 
At the same time, other courts upheld immunities. Such decisions included the already 
mentioned Sharon-case and various other cases in Belgium
579
, the Kadhafi-case in France
580
 
and cases concerning Rwandese suspects in Spain
581
. The Danish prosecutor rejected a file for 
prosecution of Carmi Gillon, Israeli Ambassador to Denmark, former Head of Shin Bet, for 
alleged torture carried out under his assignment with the Security Services, saying that 
diplomatic immunity overruled the obligation of the Torture Convention.  
 
The German prosecutor also rejected similar complaints. It rejected an application for 
investigation against former head of state of China, Jian Zemin for crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed while in office
582
, as well as against Ramzan Kadyrov, Vice-President of 
Chechnya
583
.  
 
Accepting such immunities in front of international courts/tribunals can also be contested in 
light of recent legal history. Immunity of state functionaries was not accepted in the 
Nuremberg tribunals, the very procedures that are seen as the basis of today’s international 
tribunals and courts. Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter states that the fact that the 
perpetrator of the international offence was a head of state or held government functions at the 
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time of the commission of the offence does not relieve him of responsibility under 
international law.
584
  
 
The central argument against accepting immunity for serious international crimes was the fact 
that if international law prohibits acts that are typically carried out by state officials, it would 
be controversial to accept immunity of the very same state officials.  
 
Examining national jurisprudence regarding immunity, it may be stated that an absolute 
acceptance of immunity of state officials begins to be undermined. The decision in the 
Pinochet-case and emerging arguments stating that the commission of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide cannot be the functions of a state functionaire indicate an 
emerging, although still not clearly accepted view that in case of the most serious 
international crimes, immunity would not be an obstacle to proceedings on the national fora 
either.  
 
The question whether this non-acceptance of immunity in front of national courts would also 
be applicable for acting state officials is still an open one. A compromise seems to be that 
state functionaires could be brought to justice after they had left their office, however, this 
solution still leaves the question unresolved in cases a head of state guarantees himself/herself 
a protocollar function for life, thereby relying on immunity and escaping criminal 
prosecution. The submissions of the amicus curiae by Philippe Sands and Alison Macdonald  
on head of state immunity to the Special Court for Sierra Leone
585
 also stress that the Yerodia 
judgment discusses acting state functionaries
586
. This question deserves further examination, 
since immunity is the most serious obstacle to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, however, 
a further analysis would exceed the limits of the present thesis. 
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Subsidiarity in the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
 
 
Is universal jurisdiction a subsidiary ground of jurisdiction vis-à-vis ordinary jurisdictions?587 
The rationale of universal jurisdiction is ending impunity, at the same time not weakening the 
jurisdictional grounds of the territorial/nationality states. The text of the Geneva Conventions 
does not provide for such subsidiarity, it simply puts extradition to other party as an 
opportunity:  
 
“Each contracting party shall be under the obligation to search for (…), and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it 
prefers, (…) hand such persons over for trial (…) provided such High Contracting Party 
has made out a prima facie case.”588 
 
The Commentary sets out a kind of order of jurisdictions: first, the jurisdiction of the state 
where the accused is, then, subject to the extradition laws of the first state, another state that 
made out a prima facie case and which furnishes evidence that the charges against the accused 
are “sufficient”. However, since “most laws and international treaties refuse to extradite 
accused persons who are national of the country holding them”589, if it is the nationality state 
which is holding the accused, it will probably not extradite him, but at the same time “the 
spirit of Article 49 clearly demands that the State holding them should bring them before its 
own courts.”590 Since extradition is dependent on the extradition laws of the state which is 
holding the accused, and, following the wording of the Geneva Conventions, the state may, if 
it prefers, extradite the person, therefore extradition is left to the discretion of the state, the 
conclusion would be that the strongest plea for jurisdiction would be that of the state holding 
the accused.  
 
Universal jurisdiction was not developed to contest or challenge the jurisdiction of 
nationality/territorial states. It was developed as a last resort, in case nationality/territorial 
states fail to exercise their duties to repress, in the interest of the community of states. In case 
the state with ordinary jurisdiction does proceed in an adequate way, no state will likely 
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challenge its jurisdiction with arguments of universal jurisdiction.
591
 Therefore the question 
around universal jurisdiction is not that much of a question of competition; rather it is a back-
up solution in case no state with ordinary jurisdiction would want to carry out the 
proceedings.
592
 In such a sense, universal jurisdiction is complementary to ordinary 
jurisdictions, similarly as the ICC is complementary to domestic jurisdictions
593
, even though 
no subsidiarity is legally required. As Abi-Saab mentions: “[t]he great danger here, in terms 
of probability calculus, is not of a positive, but of a passive conflict of jurisdiction, leaving the 
fundamental interests and values of the international community unprotected most of the time. 
This is a danger for which universal jurisdiction purports to provide a modest and partial 
antidote”.594 
 
Obviously, denial of extradition by a state holding the accused but not having any link with 
the accused or with the crime would seem odd if the territorial/nationality state would want to 
do the proceedings, and it would also seem unrealistic. At the same time, such requests from 
states with ordinary jurisdiction should not aim to bar prosecution all in all, since this would 
go contrary the aim of universal jurisdiction
595 
and such states would also be in violation of 
their obligations to repress violations. 
 
Therefore state practice has shown that states are sensitive to pleas by states having ordinary 
jurisdiction and they only exercise universal jurisdiction if the state with ordinary jurisdiction 
is not requesting extradition. The Spanish court in the Pinochet-case said with respect to 
genocide that a state should abstain from exercising jurisdiction where the territorial state is 
trying the case.
596 
 
 
The Spanish Supreme Court furthermore formed the principle of ‘necessity of jurisdictional 
intervention’ in the 2003 Peruvian Genocide Case. The Court stated that “the criterion for the 
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application of the principle of necessity of jurisdictional intervention was the absence of an 
effective prosecution by the territorial State. It held that such a principle would not imply a 
judgment as to the reasons of the political, social or material conditions of impunity. 
Apparently, as long as the territorial State is dealing with the case, albeit inefficiently, another 
State should defer to it.”597  
 
In a few years, the Spanish Constitutional Court in the Rigoberta Menchu case
598 
gave a more 
precise explanation of the subsidiarity requirement, stating that a demand that the applicant 
proves the legal impossibility or prolonged inaction of the judges of the territorial state would 
contradict the principle of universal jurisdiction and thus the Spanish Constitution. Rigoberta 
Menchú was an indigenous leader and Nobel Peace Prize Winner who initiated a case against 
former Guatemalan leaders for an assault on the Spanish Embassy in 1980 resulting in 37 
deaths, several of whom were Spanish nationals.  
 
The amended Spanish law reflected the findings of the Constitutional Court in saying that 
proceedings based on universal jurisdiction must be suspended in case a state with nexus to 
the crime has started to carry out proceedings.
599 
The Belgian law of 2003 on universal 
jurisdiction gives the power to the federal prosecutor to refuse to initiate proceedings if the 
needs of justice or the international obligations of Belgium require that the case be brought 
before the court of a state with ordinary jurisdiction.
600  
 
It will probably not be contested that territorial/national states are in the best place to hold the 
proceedings. It will also probably not be met by opposition to hand over such sensitive and 
mostly expensive cases to the states with ordinary jurisdictions. Resulting from a general 
reluctance to interfere with other states’ matters, “a number of States appear to have 
legitimately adopted a stricter variant of the subsidiarity/complementarity principle. It is 
walking a fine line for these States though, since too strict a variant may rob the principle of 
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its core function of ensuring that international crimes are prosecuted by bystander States in 
case other States fail to adequately do so.”601  
 
It cannot be stated that international law requires subsidiarity as a prerequisite for exercising 
universal jurisdiction.
602 
Contrary to this, some authors argue that the principle of subsidiarity 
is in the process of becoming a customary norm.
603 
Others, however, expressly state that 
universality is not subsidiary to other forms of jurisdiction.
604
 It therefore seems that the 
reason some states do require subsidiarity is because of practical considerations – either to get 
rid of the difficult task of trying a war crime case or wanting to avoid infringement of 
sovereignty with the other state - rather than seeing it as an international legal obligation.  
 
At the same time, such consideration may oblige the prosecutor to examine whether the state 
with ordinary jurisdiction has carried out good faith proceedings, which may at times also be 
a very sensitive exercise. This inconvenience, notably the checking of another sovereign 
state’s criminal proceeding may easily lead to a situation where the prosecutor or judge 
refuses to proceed without thorough examination of the proceedings of the state with ordinary 
jurisdiction.
605 
In addition, depending on the wording of national legislation requiring 
subsidiarity, the mere filing of a complaint in a state with ordinary jurisdiction may lead to a 
halt in proceedings in the universal jurisdiction state for years without eventually any genuine 
attempt to proceed with the case in the state of ordinary jurisdiction. This, in the end, leads to 
a way of bypassing universal jurisdiction.  
 
Hence, we can conclude that although the principle of subsidiarity has no basis in 
international law, some states apply this principle, and application of subsidiarity could lead 
to a discreditation of the very aim of universal jurisdiction. At the same time we may 
understand the uneasiness of national courts to judge on the appropriateness of other states’ 
national procedures. The question, however, as we have mentioned above, will probably not 
be whether states are exercising the subsidiarity principle, but whether states will be willing to 
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exercise their jurisdiction at all, therefore the subsidiarity question seems to remain a mainly 
theoretical issue for now. 
 
Private prosecutor or substitute private prosecutor 
 
Although it is relatively common in the case of universal jurisdiction that states’ law make 
private prosecution or substitute private prosecution possible, the final decision whether to 
carry on with a case ultimately usually stays with the public prosecutor or the court. The 
advantage of the possibility of participation of the private or substitute private prosecutor in 
the criminal proceedings lies in that it could, to a certain extent, distance the proceedings from 
legal politics: the decision regarding initiation of the criminal proceeding would not only lie 
with the prosecutor.  
 
Additionally, the prosecutor may reject the starting of investigation or initiation of a case due 
to the inherent difficulties of a war crimes case. The availability of private prosecution may be 
a cure for this phenomenon as well. Of course, even in case of the presence of private or 
substitute private prosecutor, the state prosecutor could, eventually, block proceedings. In the 
UK, private prosecution is possible with respect to crimes under universal jurisdiction; still, 
the agreement of the Attorney General is necessary so that the prosecution goes ahead.
606
 In 
Poland, the injured person may act as substitute private prosecutor, but finally the prosecutor 
decides on the initiation of proceedings. Should the substitute prosecutor not agree with the 
Prosecutor’s decision, it can file an indictment at the court.607 Hungary has a similar approach, 
the victim may, under certain circumstances, act as substitute private prosecutor, although the 
final decision still lies with the public prosecutor.
608
 
 
Practical hurdles during the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
 
Although it can be argued that the “insertion of an aut dedere aut judicare principle into these 
treaties testifies to the strongly held belief of the international community that States are 
                                                 
606
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sufficiently equipped to adequately address international crimes through the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction”609, it must also be considered that in addition to immunity or other 
legal limits of exercising universal jurisdiction, its application has many practical obstacles as 
well.  
 
Due to the characteristics of the crimes, such acts have been mostly committed in far-away 
countries leaving evidence, victims, the scene of the crimes and witnesses difficult and costly 
to reach. Although high costs are often brought as an excuse for non-compliance with this 
international obligation, topped with a usual lack of support from the public to spend so much 
money on crimes having no link with their states, this may sound controversial in light of how 
much money is spent on international military missions for the purpose of protecting 
international peace and security, the aim of universal jurisdiction being similar, but from a 
different approach. No one would disagree that the repression of the crimes labeled as the 
gravest by the international community is not least important, still, many countries neglect 
this obligation.  
 
Cassese states rightfully that repression of international crimes can be most successfully 
regarded if we consider the “individual” or “systematic” commission of such crimes: in the 
first case the perpetrator commits the crime from his own motive – for example looting -, 
whereas in the latter case the crimes are perpetrated on a wide scale, encouraged by the 
regime or at least the regime is keeping a closed eye on it, to reach mainly military or political 
aims – for example the killing of civilians in order to spread terror among them.610 Crimes 
committed on an individual motive are often tried by national courts, while systematic crimes 
are usually tried by international courts or courts of the hostile country. However, „[t]he 
paradox is that noninvolved countries are more likely to deliver impartial justice if there is 
ever a fair trial, but they are at the same time less likely to want to have such a trial in the first 
place.”611 
 
It must be noted here that exercising universal jurisdiction over individual crimes will most 
probably be far less inconvenient politically than over systematic crimes. This is so because in 
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the latter case a whole regime or government would be condemned by the state trying the 
case, however, such inconvenience would be much diminished if the vast majority of the 
international community had already condemned the acts and political power relations would 
also be favorable. A case linked with the Rwandan genocide would probably not be too 
unacceptable for any state, whereas a case concerning an Israeli soldier having allegedly 
committed a crime against Palestinians would be most likely too inconvenient. The absence of 
such procedures can thus probably be lead to political causes; at the same time we can witness 
legal problems as well, and we should also examine the role of domestic courts in establishing 
relevant practice. At the same time, “the real life limits of politics do not change the radical 
theory of this legal framework”.612 As confirmed in the Eichmann case, “so far from 
international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes, 
in the absence of an International Court, the international law is in need of the judicial and 
legislative authorities of every country, to give effect to its penal injunctions and to bring 
criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal.”613 
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IV. Possible ways of overcoming the hurdles 
1. On the level of international jurisprudence: effects of jurisprudence of international 
tribunals on domestic war crimes procedures 
 
While discussing war crimes procedures in front of domestic courts, we must also examine 
whether statutes, rules of procedure and case law of international tribunals have an effect of 
clarifying international rules and whether they ultimately have an effect on procedures of 
domestic courts
614
.  
 
International law contains far more obligations related to substantive criminal law than to 
procedural law. Taking international legal obligations for war crimes (grave breaches) as an 
example, discussed in Chapter II.3. of the present thesis, or similar obligations for genocide or 
crimes against humanity, we may observe that the relevant international treaties formulate 
numerous obligations that affect states’ criminal codes or that put obligations on the legislator 
to criminalize certain acts by the way of criminal law. Many of such obligations are ius 
cogens.  
 
At the same time, if we examine procedural obligations at the international sphere, we may 
conclude that it is really only the human rights treaties that contain procedural constraints or 
conditions binding on states procedures, and humanitarian law obligations, if any, have 
basically copied the obligations stipulated in human rights treaties. Summing up, normally 
humanitarian law treaties tell states which acts to criminalize, but they don’t tell how to try 
them, apart from repeating the human rights obligations. 
 
When examining substantive criminal law, it is undeniable that case law of international 
tribunals has an important influence on both the evolution of international criminal law and on 
domestic procedures. In the case of violations committed in non-international armed conflicts 
it is obvious that case law of international tribunals played an important role in that the ICC 
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Rome Statute accepted violations of non-international conflicts as war crimes, and thus, this 
case law also frequently formulates national case law. Referring to a rule as customary law by 
international courts and tribunals may also contribute to how national courts view that certain 
rule. The effect of their case law is also important in how domestic courts determine elements 
of grave breaches/war crimes or the qualification of conflicts
615
.  
 
When it comes to procedural law, however, it is more difficult to make a link, as the 
procedural rules of international tribunals have been formed on a completely different 
foundation than those of state procedures. Procedural rules of states have, namely, been 
formulated as a result of an organic historical and legal development, while in the case of 
international tribunals, political considerations have often played an important role.  
 
As an example, procedural rules of international tribunals are based on the contradictorial 
system mainly as a result of the huge influence of the United States during the formulation of 
statutes and rules of procedures of such tribunals, however, many inquisitorial elements have 
also been included. The result is a mixed system, which raises many difficulties in practice 
and cannot be said to be the result of an organic development.  
 
Other important differences between procedural rules of international tribunals and national 
courts may be the consequence of the fact that international tribunals are subjects of 
international law. Therefore the effect the procedural rules of international tribunals can have 
on domestic procedures depends largely on whether the rule is independent from the 
international legal personality or the international feature of the tribunal/court. Where, as an 
example, the rule relies on the international feature of the tribunal, such rule cannot be 
embodied in a national system, or will have to be relying on international cooperation in 
criminal matters.
616
  
 
At the same time, international and national procedural law have common elements, namely 
those deriving from human rights obligations as the minimum common standard. Although 
the exact application of human rights in international procedures is debated, it is surely the 
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human rights standards that provide the basis and framework of international criminal 
procedures.
617
 What is certain is that apart from the human rights obligations (fair trial, 
equality of arms, etc.) there are no general obligatory international rules for war crimes 
procedures of domestic courts.  
 
Despite the differences of international and national procedures there are important aspects 
where the influence of rules relevant to and jurisdiction of international tribunals can be 
observed. As examples we can mention the protection of witnesses in international 
procedures. Although such rules already existed in domestic procedures, international 
tribunals have given it such a specific dimension which can serve “as a point of departure, or 
international standard, which is capable of influencing domestic war crimes trials. At least, 
one could say that the rules also have relevance in relation to national prosecutions of war 
crimes.”618 
 
We may also mention as an example the case where Dutch authorities carried out a procedure 
against Afghan nationals for war crimes.
619
 In this case the accused argued for the equality of 
arms referring to the ICTY’s fair trial rules. The Dutch court in the Van Anraat case620 took 
ICTY rules proprio motu as a basis, despite that the ICTY statute does not have any binding 
effect in this respect on the Netherlands.
621
  
 
There is evidence that national courts consider the jurisprudence of international tribunals as a 
source in their proceedings in the Canadian practice as well. In Mugesera v Canada, the 
Canadian Supreme court stated that „[t]hough the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR are not 
binding upon this Court, the expertise of these tribunals and the authority in respect of 
customary international law with which they are vested suggest that their findings should not 
be disregarded lightly by Canadian courts applying domestic legislation provisions (…) which 
expressly incorporate customary international law.”622 
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In the following lines the subject of examination will be the ways law, jurisprudence and 
proceedings of international tribunals specifically can effect domestic war crimes trials as 
regards substantive and criminal procedure law. 
 
 
(i) Substantive criminal law aspects 
 
Definition of the contents of customary rules and reference to a certain rule as customary are 
typical fields where domestic courts rely on or refer to judgments and decisions of 
international tribunals. Especially if we look at the development of jurisprudence on crimes 
committed in non-international armed conflicts, an eventual obligation to prosecute these 
crimes, the elements of such crimes or universal jurisdiction applicable to such crimes, we 
may witness the important influence of international case law on national case law.  
 
The same is true with the definition of crimes or elements of crimes. Since the treaties usually 
do not describe the elements of the crimes with the same precision as national law often does, 
state courts are left with elements of crimes formulated in annexes to statutes of international 
tribunals and with the case law of such tribunals. In fact, this is the only source national courts 
can reach to, to define elements of war crimes or grave breaches. 
 
Certain criminal law principles may have different interpretations on the national and the 
international level. The question is whether these two interpretations have any effect on each 
other. The ICTY, for example, pointed out that although nullum crimen sine lege is a general 
principle of law, some factors, such as the specific nature of international law, the fact that 
there is not one authority as legislator in international law and the supposition that the norms 
of international law will be implemented leads to the fact that the legality principle is different 
in international law than in national law when it comes to their application and standards.
623
  
 
The applicability of the nullum crimen sine lege principle to the interpretation of crimes is 
also an interesting issue and has partially been discussed in Chapter III. 2. (i). The European 
Court of Human Rights in the Jorgić-case found that a stricter interpretation of genocide by 
the ICTY and ICJ can not be relied on in front of domestic courts, because these judgments 
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were delivered after the commission of the offence. If, however, an interpretation was 
consistent with the essence of the offence in question and was reasonably foreseeable, such an 
interpretation was legal.
624
  
 
Questions of interpretation of war crimes seem to be another issue, however. As a 
comparison, whereas a wider interpretation of the crime of genocide by a national court may 
result in that the accused would face a harsher regime in certain states, the only limits to 
interpretation of war crimes are the rules of international humanitarian law: states are free to 
criminalize violations that are not war crimes, but are not free to criminalize acts that are not 
violations at all. This cannot be said about the crime of genocide, because the Genocide 
Convention, which makes it obligatory for states to criminalize genocide, is not a convention 
setting up a whole set of legal rules, such as the Geneva Conventions, rather defines one 
particular crime and obliges states to punish it in national law. Still, obviously states remain 
free to include a stricter variant of genocide, in this case this stricter variant can only be 
applied if it was adopted before the commission of the offence. 
 
The effect of nullum crimen sine lege on concepts of criminal responsibility and defences is 
also contested.
625
 In the end, it seems that “the nullum crimen principle outlaws any deviant 
practice under jurisdictions as well, at least as far as the general parts of criminal law are 
concerned.”626 Boot explains the differences of the application of the nullum crimen sine lege 
to international tribunals and domestic courts by the following features:  
 
(i) international treaties were meant to be implemented by domestic legislation and 
were not meant to be directly implemented by international tribunals;  
 
(ii) therefore definitions are not as elaborated as they would be in national criminal 
codes or in the Rome Statute – which was, from the beginning, intended to be directly 
applied by the ICC -;  
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(iii) therefore the Tribunals developed the elements of crimes and conditions of 
responsibility adapted to their own procedures and the features of an international 
tribunal
627
. 
 
From the above we may conclude that there is no standardized understanding, universally and 
formally approved, of the basic criminal law principles which could lead to a uniform 
application of international criminal law by domestic courts. 
 
(ii) Criminal procedural law aspects 
 
As seen above, the only procedural frameworks relevant to international criminal law 
tribunals are provided by human rights treaties
628
. However, some derivations are necessary, 
eventhough not uncontested. A perfect example of an attempt at reduced applicability of 
human rights law by an international tribunal due to the particularity of international criminal 
trials is demonstrated by the following opinion: „[t]he fact that the International Tribunal must 
interpret its provisions within its own legal context and not rely in its application on 
interpretations made by other judicial bodies is evident in the different circumstances in which 
the provisions apply. The interpretations of Article 6 of the ECHR by the European Court of 
Human Rights are meant to apply to ordinary criminal and, for Article 6 (1), civil 
adjudications. By contrast, the International Tribunal is adjudicating crimes which are 
considered so horrific as to warrant universal jurisdiction. The International Tribunal is, in 
certain respects, comparable to a military tribunal, which often has limited rights of due 
process and more lenient rules of evidence.”629  
 
Although this decision received strong criticism and its finding was not followed by 
subsequent case law as such, it provides a good example when an international tribunal is 
struggling with human rights law in its procedure.
630
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When considering whether there are international standards, apart from human rights law, for 
international war crimes prosecutions, Sluiter notes that in determining whether such 
international standards exist, the following factors play an important role:  
a. the complexity and volume of war crimes prosecutions; 
b. security risks in countries concerned; 
c. consequences of investigations for national security; 
d. high level leaders as accused; 
e. the truth-finding and reconciliatory functions of international criminal 
tribunals; 
f. the great dependency on national jurisdictions and law enforcement 
officials.
631
 
 
The next question is, to what extent are international criminal procedure rules to be applied by 
domestic courts in war crimes trials. In the Van Anraat case in the Netherlands
632
, the Dutch 
court considered proprio motu the ICTY law in relation to this question, although the ICTY 
jurisprudence having no binding effect on the Netherlands.
633
 This makes sense, as domestic 
war crimes procedures are also in need of specific procedural rules for war crimes trials, and 
they gain inspiration from international cases, even if these are not binding on them.  
 
One has to bear in mind that when applying international criminal procedure in domestic war 
crimes trials, the judges also have to consider conforming a foreign system to their own: as for 
example the ICTY procedural rules are mainly following common law procedures, it would 
be difficult to apply typically these rules in an inquisitorial procedure. However, some rules 
may have developed in international criminal procedure from practical considerations, 
irrespective of common law or continental law traditions, such as the rules related to 
protection of witnesses – in such cases it may be useful and less difficult to use international 
procedure as reference for the national judge in a war crimes case.  
 
These thoughts cannot be better expressed than as Sluiter formulated: “[i]f one acknowledges 
possible shortcomings of the domestic law of criminal procedure in respect of war crimes 
investigations and prosecutions this may change views as to the incompatibility between the 
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law of international criminal procedure and domestic law of criminal procedure. Especially, if 
one adopts the legitimate position that domestic law of criminal procedure has not been 
developed for and is to a certain degree ill-suited to deal with war crimes investigations and 
prosecutions there is from a national perspective a vacuum, where international criminal 
procedure can fulfill a useful gap-filling function, in spite of possible conflicting models of 
criminal procedure.”634  
 
Furthermore, “International criminal procedure may in spite of all its flaws fulfill an 
important gap-filling function and serve as important point of reference for participants in 
domestic war crimes trials with an open eye and mind for procedural solutions and 
approaches coined in other systems. In this light, the ‘legislator’ in the field of international 
criminal procedure should become aware of its relevance and impact beyond the scope of 
international criminal trials.”635 
 
(iii) Effects of the functioning of international tribunals on national justice systems 
 
Finally, we must mention the important effects the functioning of international tribunals, 
especially the ICTY, but also the ICTR, have had on the respective national justice systems. 
These effects had been a logical result of the completion strategy of both Tribunals, 
acknowledging that the need to define a timeframe for the closing of proceedings of both 
Tribunals go parallel with increasing the capacities of domestic authorities, including the need 
to adjust the quality of such proceedings to international standards, which also meant 
adjusting national legislation enabling such changes and procedures.  
 
In the case of the ICTY, the Rules of the Road program, signed by the participants of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement in 1996, stipulated that national authorities could only arrest 
suspects – not indicted by the ICTY – with the authorization of the Prosecutor. This method 
was expected to prevent arbitrary arrests, arrests made without reasonable ground or steps 
motivated by political grounds. 
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The OTP has given green light in more than half of the cases: the ICTY has reviewed 1419 
documents concerning 4985 suspects, and gave its authorization for indictment in case of 848 
persons.
636
 This review mechanism inevitably had an improving effect on domestic 
mechanisms. 
 
One year later, in 1997, Rule 11bis was added to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ICTY and ICTR. Rule 11bis, amended four times since 1997, basically makes it possible that 
the Tribunals refer cases to domestic jurisdictions. The reason for the adoption of Rule 11bis 
was similar to the Rule of the Road program: on one hand to ease the workload of the 
Tribunals by handing over cases of mid- to low level suspects, and, on the other hand, to 
progressively involve domestic authorities in the procedures
637
. 
 
According to Rule 11bis, which is basically identical for both Tribunals, the Tribunal, after 
confirming the indictment, but before the start of actual proceedings, irrespective whether the 
accused is in its custody, may decide, through a special bench consisting of three judges (an 
ordinary bench in case of ICTR) whether to refer a case to the domestic courts. Such court 
may be the court of the territorial state, the custodial state or any state that has jurisdiction and 
is willing and able to proceed.  
 
The question to which domestic court the case should be referred is to be decided by the 
bench,
638
 usually the principle of ’significantly greater nexus’ was applied.639 Generally it can 
be stated that the benches referred the cases to the territorial state, therefore, in case of the 
ICTY, most of the 11bis procedures had been conducted in front of the courts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
 
During the assessment of referral, the bench had to consider the gravity of the crime and the 
level of responsibility of the accused. It also had to assess whether the accused would receive 
a fair trial and would not be subject to death penalty. The bench could refer a case based on its 
own initiative or on the request of the Prosecutor based on Rule 11bis.  
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The accused and the Prosecutor of the ICTY may appeal the decision. The concerned state 
was to be heard during the decision-making process, in order that the bench may satisfy itself 
of the guarantees for a fair trial and of the non-imposition of the death penalty.  
 
The ICTY maintained the right to monitor the domestic procedure. This had been exercised 
through OSCE missions, based on an agreement between the ICTY and OSCE in 2005. A 
further important rule implied that before the final judgment of the domestic court, the ICTY 
had the right to request that the case is deferred to it; in such a case the domestic court was 
obliged to defer the case the same way as it was when the ICTY wanted to proceed initially.  
 
Based on the rules of 11bis and the practice of the Tribunal, some authors considered that the 
primacy of the Tribunal had changed to a modified form of complementarity. This means that 
the ICTY would refer cases to the Bosnian (or other) state authorities until they demonstrated 
an inability to proceed such as the non-observance of fair trial guarantees
640
. 
 
The legitimacy of Rule 11bis has been questioned in the Stankovič-case641. The accused 
questioned the decision of the bench, arguing that Rule 11bis was not in the Statute of the 
Tribunal, therefore the bench had no authorization to refer cases to domestic courts. 
According to the accused, neither the completion strategy formulated in the Security Council 
Resolution provided any ground for such a procedure, nor the Statute gave any legal ground 
for the adoption of Rule 11bis. The bench did not accept the arguments of the accused, 
referring to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The judges found that the rationale of 
concurrent jurisdiction was precisely to give way to alternative, notably national jurisdictions. 
 
According to various authors, the above referred argument of the Court did not stand its place, 
since the meaning of concurrent jurisdiction under Article 9(1) of the Statute is that the 
Tribunal may proceed instead of national courts, but does not wish to entirely take their place. 
At the same time, Rule 11bis does not deny concurrent jurisdiction either, since it does not 
rule on referring every single case to national courts, it merely provides a possibility of 
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sharing between international and national jurisdiction.
642
 Usually Security Council 
Resolution 1503 is mentioned as a legal ground for procedures under Rule 11bis, which 
expressly accepts the completion strategy of the ICTY, an important part of which, although 
not expressly mentioned, is Rule 11bis. 
 
The ICTY has eventually referred 13 persons to national courts under Rule 11bis, out of 
which 10 persons were referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina, one to Serbia and one to Croatia
643
. 
 
National courts had more and more case pressure because of the developments described 
above and, due to the 11bis procedures, they were dealing with many cases in which the 
ICTY carried out investigations but did not issue an indictment. Therefore, the ICTY gave 
importance to referring documents and evidence to the respective national courts. In order to 
ensure adequate, impartial and fair procedures, the ICTY provided, with the consent of the 
given state, judges and other experts experienced in international law and relevant procedures 
for the national courts. This meant that although the processes were national in character, they 
also bore considerable international participation. 
 
Obviously, since most of the 11bis procedures were carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
most substantial changes had been done in this country. A new court was established in 2003, 
which was tasked to try cases taken from the ICTY. Cases tried by this special court were also 
those where the ICTY initiated investigations but did not issue an indictment, new cases 
initiated by the court itself, and cases left from the Rules of the Road program. Beside this 
new court, a special department had been established in the office of the Prosecutor General 
to deal with war crimes cases. Evenmore, a new penal code and a new penal procedure code 
had been adopted in 2003. These developments enabled the authorities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to deal with war crimes cases that came under its jurisdiction either from the 
ICTY or otherwise.
644
 
 
Even with the developments described, many 11bis procedures were subject to serious 
criticism. Such examples are the Ademi and Norac case, where the Croatian prosecution could 
not adequately extend the forms of command responsibility to the accused which resulted in 
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the acquittal of one of the accused and the very lenient punishment of the other
645
. Another 
case was the Kovačevič-case in Serbia, where the ICTY referred the case to Serbia 
eventhough it was clear that the accused cannot appear before the court and consequently the 
case did not even start.
646
  
 
Still, the mixed system of national and international judges had many beneficial effects: on 
one hand it eased the case-load of the ICTY, on the other hand it enriched national authorities 
with considerable knowledge and experience in trying war crimes cases. As time went by, 
international presence in the procedures decreased and national experts and judges became 
dominant.  
 
According to the completion strategy of the ICTY, the emphasis was more and more on 
national procedures. Although the ICTY is determined to finish the trials of Radovan 
Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, irrespective of the time frames defined in the 
completion strategy, the ICTY is not initiating any new cases and is otherwise determined to 
stick to its original and frequently modified deadlines.  
 
Therefore, although there are still procedures ongoing in front of the Tribunals, the Rules of 
the Road program and Rule 11bis, or more generally, its primacy cannot be invoked anymore. 
New cases are thus entirely left to national authorities. Due to all the investment the ICTY put 
in national expertise, it can now be stated that the national authorities received such 
knowledge and experience that they are able to carry out adequate procedures.  
 
11bis procedures had a quite different character and different hurdles in case of the ICTR. Its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence contains a nearly fully identical Rule. However, since the 
readiness of the Rwandese justice system was severely questioned, many 11bis requests had 
been turned down, especially due to references of lack of fair trial guarantees.  
 
In order to remedy the situation, Rwanda adopted laws to respond to the concerns of the 
ICTR. As a first step, the Rwandese legislature adopted in 2007 a law related to cases taken 
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 Bekou (2009), pp. 724-725. 
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 Bekou (2009), p. 725. 
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from the ICTR, which regulated the procedures in such cases and detailed fair trail guarantees 
for such cases. The law ensures the ICTR’s right to monitor the procedures.647  
 
Since in most cases the obstacle or referral was the eventual possibility of the death penalty, 
another legislation adopted in 2007
648
 eliminated the death penalty for cases referred by the 
ICTR. Due to the Tribunal’s further concerns related to whether life sentence in isolation 
could be carried out with relation to referred cases
649
, Rwanda adopted a further legislation to 
eliminate this form of punishment
650
.  
 
Although the legislation seemingly solved the problem for cases taken over from the ICTR, it 
did not apply to other genocide cases
651
, therefore fair trial guarantees for such cases were still 
missing. These ’ordinary’ procedures, where several high profile cases had been tried, 
therefore received serious criticism. They demonstrated serious problems related to rights of 
defence, protection of witnesses or execution of the sentences. In light of the above, until 
today, there is serious debate over whether the ICTR should refer cases to local authorities, 
considering on one side the lack of fair trial guarantees and, on the other side, the need that 
states with closest nexus to the crimes are proceeding, as well as the need to comply with the 
completion strategy of the ICTR.  
 
Many authors mentioned that procedural guarantees adopted in the Western world are 
expected in countries with different legal culture, and the ICTR does not take Rwandese legal 
traditions and legal environment into consideration
652
. The fact that more than fifty cases were 
referred to Rwanda in which no indictment had been made, while only four cases were 
                                                 
647
 Law No. 11/2007 of March 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
March 19, 2007 (Transfer Law). 
648
 Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, July 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?Information_ID=2088 (last visited on 16 October 2012). 
649
 See for instance Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, (4 December 2008), paras 31–38. 
650
 Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, July 25, 2007, art. 3, 
modified and complemented by Law No. 66/2008 of 21/11/2008, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Dec. 1, 2008, available at  
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=30698444&type=public&L
angue_ID=An#a30698445 (last visited on 16 October 2012). 
651
 The 2004 Gacaca Law categorized genocide crimes into three categories. See Law No. 16/2004 of June 19, 
2004, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, June 19, 2004, art. 51, modified and complemented by Law 
No. 13/2008 of 19/05/2008. All cases except those involving people who planned and organized the genocide or 
those who held significant leadership positions and participated in or encouraged others to participate in the 
genocide (the first two subsections of the first category) are heard in the gacaca courts. Those aforementioned 
exceptions are heard by ordinary or military courts. See Melman (2011), footnote 154. 
652
 See references in Melman (2011), p. 1321. 
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referred where the ICTR had already issued an indictment (two to France and two to Rwanda) 
may be a result of the consideration mentioned above
653
. 
 
It can be stated that assessments carried out with respect to ICTR cases to be referred to 
Rwanda were different from ICTR cases to be referred to European jurisdictions of ICTY 
cases. In the latter cases notably the ICTR/ICTY merely carried out an analysis only of the 
relevant legislation, while in the former cases the ICTR also examined the practical 
application of the legislation. The reason probably was on one side the serious concerns 
related to procedures carried out in Rwanda, on the other side the fact that the ICTY put 
serious efforts in rebuilding national systems in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first place, 
therefore the trust in fair procedures was considerably higher in cases of the post-Yugoslav 
states and Western states
654
. 
 
The examples demonstrated above testify to the uncontested effects of the Tribunals on 
domestic justice systems and legislation. Although these effects are restricted to the sates 
concerned, those experiences may be, at least to a certain extent, transferred to other states as 
well. The difficulties of Rwanda in adjusting to fair trial guarantees expected by the ICTR and 
the ’legal imperialism’ argument may provide some food for thoughts for other African states 
when dealing with universal jurisdiction cases and their relation with European states who are 
proceeding against accused of African origin based on universal jurisdiction. 
 
2. On the level of internal legislation  
 
The following pages will see ways domestic legislation dealt with the difficulties of 
international crimes. First, a general analysis of the specificities of implementation of the 
Rome Statute is made, followed by an examination of common features of universal 
jurisdiction-related domestic legislation in Central Europe. These two general discussions are 
followed by a detailed introduction of criminalization techniques in four selected Central 
European states. 
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 See http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/Default.aspx?id=7&mnid=7 (last visited on 26 September 2012). 
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(i) The importance of effective implementation techniques 
 
Effective implementation may prevent possible conflicts with the legality principle or other 
guarantees during the application of international law by the courts. Actually a thorough 
implementation would be the key to effective application: conflicts between international law 
and national law, the difference in legal cultures, the difficulties arising from the unique 
features of international rules should not be left to be addressed by the judges alone.  
 
Therefore the state of implementing legislation already predicts the successful or non-
successful application of international law by the courts and partly determines whether the 
state will be able to comply with its international obligations. In the following chapter a 
selection of domestic solutions follows, concentrating on Central European states, which have 
numerous common characteristics: similar legal cultures, all of them revised their criminal 
legislation after the changes in the 1990s, have only had very few war crimes trials – most of 
these in connection with the Soviet regime but non linked to “modern” conflicts - and are 
therefore relatively inexperienced in war crimes trials.  
 
These examples may demonstrate the inbuilt dangers in national implementation that may 
have serious effects during their application. After the analysis of the legislation of certain 
countries, an examination of common features follows, with indications as to their effects on 
war crimes trials. In addition, the Annex to the thesis contains a comparative table indicating 
the most important aspects of Central European states’ attitudes towards serious international 
crimes and the application of universal jurisdiction. 
 
(ii) Specific aspects of implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
 
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC urged states to overview their national legislation 
implementing IHL treaties and usually resulted in conceptual changes in domestic legislation 
vis-à-vis grave breaches and war crimes. This task forced states to consider the specific 
hurdles discussed in Chapter III. 2. However, certain specificities of the implementation of the 
Rome Statute need to be addressed in order to get a full picture of the frameworks of national 
legislation. 
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To start with, it must be noted that in certain continental legal systems, the idea of adopting a 
specific code for international crimes came only with the Rome Statute. Anglo-Saxon systems 
had in many cases adopted specific codes implementing all kinds of obligations arising from 
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
655
, mainly concentrating on listing the 
grave breaches and other violations. This special approach can be probably attributed to the 
complex nature of the war crimes listed in the Rome Statute, a few of which will be 
mentioned here. 
 
First, the list of war crimes in the Rome Statute is rather long and is divided into sections 
according to the situation in which the crimes were perpetrated: in international or non-
international armed conflicts. This may be difficult to translate in an ordinary criminal code. 
In many cases, states chose to include both kinds of conflicts into the term “war” or “armed 
conflict”, providing a simple solution to the problem. In this case, the list of crimes can be 
substantially shortened, due to the fact that there are many overlappings between the crimes 
committed in international and in non-international armed conflicts. 
 
Second, although there seems to be an overlap between certain crimes, simply merging them 
could be counterproductive resulting in that specific acts would fall out from the coverage of 
such a merge
656
.  
 
Third, although the Rome Statute is much more elaborate than the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I on certain general part elements, such as modes of liability, forms of 
perpetration or the mental elements, as already mentioned above, these do not fully comply 
with the logic of criminal law elements applied in continental legal systems. For the states to 
translate the Rome Statute rules into their criminal law language is not only demanding, but 
also bears a certain danger during their application.  
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 See for instance: Canada, Geneva Conventions Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. G-3); United Kingdom, Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957; Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962; United States, War Crimes Act of 1996 
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 For instance, the Ministerial explanations attached to the draft of the Hungarian Criminal Code - which are 
expected to reflect the Rome Statute - expressly say that the intention is to simplify and merge the crimes of the 
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Evenmore, States that choose to include the Rome Statute crimes into their ordinary criminal 
code also face the problem of having different kinds of general part elements for ordinary 
crimes and for international crimes; or, eventually, not establishing specific elements for the 
Rome Statute crimes but applying their ordinary elements, in which case full compliance with 
the Rome Statute could be questionable. 
 
Either ways, generally, states either chose to adopt a separate code (this is more rare), or to 
include the crimes in their ordinary criminal code. Both solutions can provide adequate 
answers to the need to implement the Rome Statute crimes. As for Hungary, Dr. Gellér argues 
that there are three theoretic possibilities of incorporating its crimes, finding the third 
possibility the best solution:  
1) the national legislator does not do anything arguing that international criminal law 
is part of national law; 
2) no further legislative action is necessary if the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols are part of national law; 
3) there is need for further legislative action either in the form of amending the 
criminal code or through adopting a code on international crimes
657
. 
 
If we compare the measures adopted by Central European countries, all states of this region 
chose to implement the crimes in their ordinary criminal code. This can probably be led to a 
general lack of comfort with having crimes established anywhere else than in the criminal 
code. The comparison shows that most states understand both international and non-
international armed conflicts under “conflict”, and most states merged most or some of the 
Rome Statute crimes to arrive to a smaller number of crimes. Most states believe that they 
have fully complied with the Rome Statute, and no state in the region
658
 has ever had a case to 
test it
659
. Therefore it would be too early to judge whether states in the region really 
successfully implemented the Rome Statute. 
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 See Gellér (2009), p. 81. Concerning point 2, it could be debatable whether the incorporation of Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols is enough to cover the crimes of the Rome Statute. Although a large part 
of the crimes are identical, there are many „new” crimes in the Rome Statute. Concerning points 1 and 2, the 
question would obviously arise what sanctions the judge would have to apply. This was discussed in Chapter 
III.2.(ii). 
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 The case against Polish soldiers for acts committed in Afghanistan is unique in the region, however, it was 
not based on legislation mirroring the Rome Statue, because Poland only amended its criminal code in 2009, 
implementing the Rome Statute. The procedures related to the events in Afghanistan started in 2007. 
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(iii) Common characteristics of national legislation on universal jurisdiction in Central 
Europe 
 
All criminal codes in Central Europe establish universal jurisdiction for international 
crimes
660
. Although this provides for a legal possibility of procedures, the number of universal 
jurisdiction cases in this region is zero.  
 
There are usually two techniques of implementing universal jurisdiction: (i) the criminal code 
refers to the part where war crimes are covered or lists the war crimes and other crimes to 
which it attaches universal jurisdiction,
661
 or (ii) it simply says that universal jurisdiction shall 
be exercised in cases international law so demands
662
. 
 
The crimes themselves are to be punished in both cases based on domestic law, but with two 
solutions: (i) the crimes are fully integrated in the criminal code without any mention of 
international law, or (ii) war crimes are specifically listed, but they refer to international law 
(e.g. attack against persons protected by international law, or use of a weapon prohibited by 
international law), and (iii) the criminal code defines “war” or “armed conflict” referring to 
international law – or, in less fortunate cases, the legislator forgot to define armed conflict.  
 
In such cases the court would have to examine whether the act in question (i) can be attached 
to the relevant crimes: this is done based on national law, (ii) is an act that is to be punished 
based on international law: the court would have to examine international law and see 
whether such an obligation exists. In both cases the procedure is based on national law. 
 
In case (i), however, if the criminal code does not contain all crimes for the punishment of 
which an international obligation exists, then there is a lacuna in domestic legislation and so 
the state may be in violation of international law by not making enforcement of international 
law possible. In this case does the court have the possibility to make this wrong do, can it 
directly apply international law? If so, what sanction would the court apply?  
                                                                                                                                                        
the Communist regime. These procedures, however, had been based on earlier legislation that did not reflect the 
Rome Statute. 
660
 A comparative table of Central European states’ legislation on universal jurisdiction and other 
implementation measures is attached in the Annex. 
661
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What happens if the law calls the crimes by wrong names, for instance name a war crime as 
crime against humanity? For instance, the attack to be widespread or systematic is an element 
of crimes against humanity, but not an element of war crimes. What should, in this case, be 
the basis for the judge to qualify the act: the erroneous national law, or international law that 
is contradicting national law? In case the court chooses to proceed based on international law, 
could the defence argue for violation of the principle of legality – saying that the perpetrator 
could not have foreseen the exact elements of the crime? These questions will be discussed in 
Chapter III. 2. 
 
All these small issues illustrate the real question: what is more effective: to implement 
everything in national law or to directly apply international law? Although the answer largely 
depends on the state’s legal system and culture, it will be demonstrated further down that no 
“clear” solution exists and usually neither of the ways can be pursued alone. Namely, if a state 
implements all international obligations, the prosecutors and judges will still be bound to 
apply international law to a certain extent, whereas if the state is not implementing, 
prosecutors and judges would, with most probability, not be able to proceed. 
 
(iv) Criminalization techniques in Central Europe 
 
Implementation of war crimes into national law has often been discussed in legal literature, 
including the question whether war crimes are different from ordinary crimes, i.e. whether for 
instance an unlawful attack against protected persons can be effectively punished on the basis 
of murder and whether this crime committed in armed conflict is graver than murder. The 
Canadian Supreme Court in the Finta case
663
 was of the majority opinion that war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are not only different from ordinary crimes in their elements, but are 
also much graver crimes
664
. The case involved a Hungarian captain who was involved in 
persecution and deportation of Jews in Szeged, Hungary during the Second World War.  
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 See also: Anne-Marie Slaughter: Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in: Stephen 
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Judge Cory’s majority opinion interpreted war crimes and crimes against humanity as crimes 
created by international law which, in their essence, are not linked to ordinary crimes defined 
in national criminal codes. These crimes have been adopted by the community of nations due 
to their horroristic and cruel features. 
 
In some cases the judiciary also has a possibility to choose between proceeding based on 
international law or national law: either if the legislator decided to implement the crimes but 
did not do it satisfactorily, or if the legislator forgot or omissed to implement the crimes in the 
national penal code. In both cases the prosecutor and judge still have a possibility to either 
directly apply the international crime, or to base the charges and the decision on ordinary 
crimes.  
 
As Ferdinandusse states, “It is generally the imperfect state of national legislation on core 
crimes that prompts the question whether general direct application can provide an alternative 
basis for a prosecution that can not otherwise take place.”665 Therefore, it is the legislator’s 
responsibility to make sure that the national legal framework is satisfactory, because if it is 
not, the judge would have to base himself either on the international treaty or on ordinary 
crimes, and problems may arise with both solutions.  
 
Most of the Central European states have chosen to criminalize these acts separately. The 
most common solution was to include a separate chapter in the criminal code for war crimes 
and other international crimes. However, it often created problems that definition of “war” or 
“armed conflict” was either forgotten by the legislator or was done in a rather clumsy way. 
Such a hiatus could cause serious difficulties during the qualification of an act or while 
deciding whether a certain crime can be applied to the act. 
 
Here it has to be noted again that although the Geneva Conventions bind states to criminalize 
grave breaches committed in international armed conflicts, the state may decide, and 
customary law also seems to develop this way, that crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflicts are criminalized the same way. A vast majority of national laws followed this 
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tendency; it has also been strengthened by Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which punishes war 
crimes committed in both kinds of conflicts
666
. 
 
Although many states intend to incorporate grave breaches/war crimes defined in the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols in their national legislation, they mostly tend to forget 
about similar obligations contained in other humanitarian law treaties. Such treaties are the 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
667
 and its Second Protocol
668
, the 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
669
 and the Ottawa 
Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines
670
.  
 
After a general analysis of the different approaches to criminalization of war crimes in the 
region, the following pages will provide specific examples of techniques chosen by four 
Central European states that together could provide an overall picture of different solutions.  
 
Hungary 
 
Hungary adopted a new Criminal Code which enters into force on 1 July 2013
671
. The Code 
contains provisions relevant to the punishment of war crimes in both its General Part and 
Special Part. The closing provisions include the definition of armed conflict. The term “armed 
conflict” includes conflicts described in Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 1 
(4) of Additional Protocol I and Article 1 of Additional Protocol II. “Armed conflict” also 
covers state of emergency with extraordinary measures, state of emergency, and, in case of 
war crimes and crimes committed by members of the armed forces, operations (according to 
the terminology of the Code: “use of Defence Forces”) carried out by the Hungarian Defence 
Forces abroad. 
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 See Lattmann Tamás, Nemzetközi és nem nemzetközi fegyveres konfliktusok (International and non-
international armed conflicts), in: III/1-2 Föld-rész, Nemzetközi és Európai Jogi Szemle (2010), p. 22. 
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 A draft international crimes code was prepared by Norbert Kis and Balázs Gellér for the Hungarian 
government, with the view to adopt all international crimes and conditions of their punishment within that code 
in a solution close to the German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch. However, the government did not adopt the draft code 
and chose to leave these crimes in the Criminal Code. See Kis –Gellér (2005) and Gellér (2009). 
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The inclusion of non-international armed conflicts – including situations defined by common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – into the definition of armed conflicts is plausible. This 
is one of the important developments of the new Code compared to the previous regulations, 
which only referred to Additional Protocol II. With this new, extended rule, Hungary stepped 
in line with most states in Europe that consider crimes committed in both kinds of conflicts 
the same way. At the same time it may be worth to mention that the extension of the 
definition of armed conflict to operations of the Hungarian Defences Forces abroad may be at 
times controversial. Foreign missions may also include peace-keeping missions or missions 
that accomplish merely training tasks; application of the law of armed conflict to such 
situations is quiestionable. 
 
Provisions in the General Part include the provision confirming the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle, making an exception to crimes that are to be punished based on generally accepted 
rules of international law, ie. customary law
672
. This provision makes it possible that 
procedures based on customary law are not in violation of the nullum crimen principle as 
stipulated in the Code, since they were punishable at the time by customary law.  
 
At the same time, the subsequent paragraph of the Code confirms the nulla poena sine lege 
principle, without any special rule for crimes to be punished under international law. The 
question then would raise, what sanction could the judge apply in case of a crime to be 
punished under international law, but not punishable under Hungarian law. The answer is to 
be found in the next paragraph, which states that “the new criminal code shall be applied with 
a retroactive effect in case of crimes to be punished based on generally accepted rules of 
international law, in case the act was not punishable by the Criminal Code at the time of 
commission of the act.”673 This means that in case of an act perpetrated before entry into force 
of the Code, the judge will apply the Code retroactively, including the sanctions. However, if 
the judge is confronted with a case involving a crime under international law that is not 
stipulated in the Code, he/she would have to rely on the text of the international treaty or on 
customary law. 
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 Law nr. 100 of 2012, Article 1. § (1):„Criminal responsibility of the perpetrator may only be confirmed for 
acts – excluding acts that are punishable based on generally accepted rules of international law – that were 
punishable by law at the time of commission of the act.”. 
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Regarding jurisdiction, the Code states that it shall be applied for an act committed by a non-
Hungarian citizen abroad “in case of crimes formulated in Chapters XIII or XIV, or any other 
crime whose prosecution is prescribed by an international treaty promulgated in law.” Chapter 
XIII of the Code includes crimes against humanity – a form of which is genocide, while 
Chapter XIV includes war crimes. In such cases the criminal procedure shall be initiated by 
the Prosecutor General.
674
 Although this provision seeks to provide for universal jurisdiction 
in case of international crimes, it may not be complete. First, not all international crimes are 
covered in Chapters XIII and XIV (see comments below). Second, this does not seem to cover 
universal jurisdiction based on customary law. While the Constitution says that “Hungary 
accepts generally recognized rules of international law”, the Code specifically says 
“international treaty promulgated in law”, and customary law is clearly not an international 
treaty. Although we may argue that in case of contradiction, international law prevails, this 
could cause problems in individual cases. 
 
Regarding statute of limitations, the Code makes an exception from the general rule in several 
cases out of which two exceptions are relevant for the prosecution of war crimes: (i) in case of 
exceptions stipulated by the law closing out statute of limitations for certain crimes, (ii) 
crimes defined in Chapters XIII and XIV.
675
 Evidently the objective was to close out statute 
of limitations for war crimes and other international crimes. In case international law provides 
for the non-application of statute of limitations for a crime that is not included in the Criminal 
Code, the first exception should be applicable, because the international treaty must have been 
promulgated in law. The theoretical question again stands if non-applicability of statute of 
limitations would be based on customary law, this international provision could not be applied 
based on the Criminal Code. At the same time, the formulation of the relevant sentence: 
“exceptions stipulated by the law closing out statute of limitations…”, instead of by a law, 
may refer to one specific law, probably Lex Biszku, which, as previously discussed, basically 
repeated the provisions of the 1968 Convention on the non-application of statute of 
limitations. 
 
The Criminal Code does contain the non-applicability of defence of superior order: Article 
130. § (1) stipulates that “The soldier is not punishable for an act executed based on an order, 
except if he knew that he commited a crime through executing that order.” Although the law 
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does not expressly say that in case of international crimes the soldier may not claim that he 
did not know he was committing a crime, this interpretation is widely accepted. 
 
Regarding specific crimes, the new Code includes important developments in order to cover 
all grave breaches and war crimes, however, the list is still not comprehensive. Article 149 
deals with attacks on protected persons, but left out the following crimes: prohibition of 
starvation of the civilian population, prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment and 
punishment, and prohibition of deporting own citizens to occupied territories and unlawful 
deportation or displacement of the population of occupied territories. 
 
Article 153 provides for the prohibition of attacks against protected objects. The provision 
confuses protection of non-defended localities with protection of objects and is also not clear 
on proportionality. The provision suggests that only those attacks are prohibited that are 
directed against objects that are not military objectives and are non-defended, and it only 
prohibits attacks that are not in conformity with the proportionality principle in case of non-
defended localities. It is important to note that as in case of installations or buildings designed 
for the treatment of sick and wounded, belonging to the armed forces, they can be defended, 
and the proportionality principle does not only apply for non-defended localities. It seems that 
the legislator confused the notion of protected objects (or non-military targets) with non-
defended localities.
676
 
 
At the same time, the provision correctly included protection of cultural property, including 
property under special and enhanced protection. It also stipulates prohibition of use of cultural 
property for hostile purposes and looting and destruction of cultural property. It also provides 
for the protection of the natural environment. 
 
Article 157 prohibits abuse of emblems protected by international law. The provision states 
that abuse of the red cross, red crescent, red crystal or other emblems servinig a similar 
purpose and protected by international law are punishable, in case a more serious crime had 
not been committed. This text was adopted based on the recommendation formulated by the 
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present author, but the Code left out the further recommendation to prohibit the abuse of the 
white flag, and emblems or uniforms of hostile forces or the UN; and a more severe 
punishment in case abuse results in death or serious injury. 
 
The other plausible and important improvement of the new Code is the manifestation of 
command responsibility. Article 159 basically adopted the text of the Rome Statute regarding 
responsibility of the military commander. Regarding responsibility of a civilian leader, the 
Code uses the term “official person or foreign official person in a leadership position”, 
providing an even more comprehensive definition. 
 
In addition to the new Criminal Code, recognizing the difficulties in dealing with past 
international crimes cases on the level of application as a lesson learnt from the Biszku-
case
677
, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law in 2011
678
, copy-pasting the Nuremberg 
Statute to affirm the definition of the crimes included therein and stating that crimes listed in 
the UN Convention on the Non-Application of Statute of Limitations, and in Articles 2 and 3 
of the Geneva Conventions are not subject to statute of limitations – basically repeating the 
rules of international law (which is questionable in the case of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions). The acknowledged direct aim of the legislation was to make punishment of 
Béla Biszku possible679 and the less direct, or long-term, aim was to make the rules of the 
Nuremberg Charter and the UN Convention applicable by prosecutors and judges. 
 
However, according to the present author, this piece of legislation, although plausible in its 
aims, may prove to be counter-effective and demonstrates the main dilemma of the present 
thesis: whether direct application of international law or implementation of international 
norms into national legislation is the more effective way. The rules of international law – both 
the Nuremberg Charter and the UN Convention are parts of Hungarian legislation due to their 
promulgation – are applicable without further implementing legislation in Hungary680.  
 
However, for all the reasons outlined in the previous chapters, the Hungarian legislator may 
find it more effective and easier to apply international law if implementing legislation is in 
                                                 
677
 See Chapter III.1.(ii). 
678
 Law nr CCX of 2011. 
679
 See http://nol.hu/belfold/20111107-eddig_is_indithattak_volna_eljarast (last visited on 25 May 2012). 
680
 See corresponding opinion of Balázs József Gellér, in:  
http://mno.hu/migr_1834/uj_feljelentes_keszulhet_a_biszku-ugyben-191445 (last visited on 25 May 2012). 
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place. Lex Biszku, however, only touches on a very small part of the various rules of 
international law with respect to the punishment of international crimes, furthermore, it gives 
the impression that statutes of limitation is non-applicable for certain crimes because it has 
been said so in Lex Biszku, and not because it has been so stated in an international treaty 
which is in force in Hungary.  
 
Indeed, various other criminal complaints were initiated since Lex Biszku entered into force, 
for instance against Yugoslav partizans involved in the massacre of Hungarian and German 
civilians in 1944-1945, because, according to the complainant, now, according to Hungarian 
law in force, genocide is not subject to statutes of limitations
681
. Hence, the fear that Lex 
Biszku created an incorrect precedent, notably that it is because of Hungarian implementing 
legislation that the rules of international law are to be applied – thereby giving the 
implementing law a constitutive meaning instead of it clearly being declarative
682
 – seems to 
be unfortunately well-founded. 
 
Consequently, the Hungarian prosecutor or judge may now justifiably expect, pointing to Lex 
Biszku, that all international norms are included in implementing legislation, otherwise they 
will not apply international norms. As outlined above, although there are important merits of 
adopting implementing legislation, this is not a legal requirement for the application of 
international treaties in front of domestic courts but should rather be seen as a tool to ease 
application
683
. In addition, usually implementing legislation is expected to be adopted once an 
international treaty comes into force in the given state and not in an ad hoc manner, intended 
to solve one specific case. 
 
Summarizing the observations above, it must be stated that Hungarian legislation is now 
considerably more in line with international treaties in terms of national implementation of the 
greva breaches/war crimes regime, it still lacks certain instances due to the lack of certain 
crimes and, more importantly, the fact that the Rome Statute has still not been promulgated.  
 
                                                 
681
 See http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/28/nyomozas_indult_az_1944-45-os_delvideki_meszarlas_miatt/ (last 
visited on 25 May 2012). 
682
 For the significance of declarative versus constitutive effect of the law, see Varga Cs. (2011).  
683
 For a detailed criticism of Lex Biszku see Varga R. (2011). 
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The Korbely-case in front of the European Court of Human Rights
684
 made many aspects 
apparent related to problems of implementation and dialectics between international and 
national law. A short assessment of the judgment of the Court follows, demonstrating 
shortcomings in national legislation, in the domestic judgments as well as the surprising 
failures in the evaluation of the case and related international law by the ECtHR. 
 
To begin with, the Court stated that “[i]n order to verify whether Article 7 was complied with 
in the present case, the Court must determine whether it was foreseeable that the act for which 
the applicant was convicted would be qualified as a crime against humanity. (…) Thus, the 
Court will examine (1) whether this act was capable of amounting to “a crime against 
humanity” as that concept was understood in 1956 and (2) whether it can reasonably be said 
that, at the relevant time, Tamás Kaszás [the victim] (…) was a person who was ‘taking no 
active part in the hostilities’ within the meaning of common Article 3.”685 
 
In the present case the ECtHR had to consider whether it was foreseeable that the act qualified 
as a crime against humanity, but it had no reason to examine whether Tamás Kaszás, the 
victim, was hors de combat. Because if applicability of Article 3 is confirmed - and it is 
confirmed that such an act amounted to a crime against humanity at the time when it was 
committed and provided an armed conflict took place -, then the case has to be viewed under 
the rules of international law. The alternative question therefore is simply whether a crime 
against humanity was committed or not.  
 
It must also be mentioned that in 1956, at the time of the commission of the act, the 
Hungarian Criminal Code did not have a provision for crime against humanity - nor does it 
actually have now. There was a chapter on war crimes, including the punishment of those who 
violated the international laws applicable to war through the treatment of the population of 
occupied territories or treatment of prisoners of war. Consequently, the act had to be qualified 
under homicide, meaning only that the penalty was identified based on the provision of 
homicide, but the elements of the crime were qualified based on the elements of crimes 
against humanity. The significance of charging with homicide or crime against humanity lies 
in that criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity is not statute barred – and this has 
to be regarded by courts ex officio. 
                                                 
684 
Case of Korbely v. Hungary, no. 9174/02 – (19.9.08). 
685 
Ibid, Grand Chamber judgment, paras 76-77. 
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Since the Hungarian courts were referring to international law when establishing the criminal 
liability of Korbély, his criminal responsibility should be viewed from an IHL point of view, 
that is, the question whether Tamás Kaszás was hors de combat or not will decide whether 
Korbély committed a crime against humanity or not. If Tamás Kaszás was hors de combat, 
Korbély committed a crime against humanity; whereas if he was not hors de combat, 
Korbély’s act was legal under international humanitarian law. Therefore it is wrong for the 
ECtHR to examine whether Tamás Kaszás was hors de combat or not, because this is a 
question to be decided by the domestic court and has in itself no effect on the question of 
whether the act should be qualified as crime against humanity or homicide. 
 
An interesting question is why the Hungarian courts examined the crime as a crime against 
humanity and not as a war crime. The Hungarian Constitutional Court held that the crimes 
committed in 1956 could amount to crimes against humanity for the following reasons. For 
the crimes committed until 4 November 1956 (when the conflict became international), such 
acts could not be qualified as war crimes, because in 1956 in international law the concept of 
war crimes was only to be understood for the context of international armed conflict. 
Therefore such acts would amount to crimes against humanity,
686
 to which, similarly to war 
crimes, statutory limitations are not applicable, according to the 1968 New York Convention 
on the Non-Application of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity
687
. 
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR said that “[i]n the Court's view, one of these criteria – a link or nexus 
with an armed conflict – may no longer have been relevant by 1956 (...). However, it would 
appear that others still were relevant, notably the requirement that the crime in question 
should not be an isolated or sporadic act but should form part of “State action or policy” or of 
a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population”.688 Why does the Court come 
to the conclusion that a link or nexus with an armed conflict is not relevant if the act was 
                                                 
686
 Definition of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter: „(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution 
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated”, See Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to 
the London Agreement (8 August 1945), Article 6  (c). 
687
 Adopted in New York, 26 November 1968. 
688
 ECtHR judgment, para 83. 
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committed in an armed conflict and it is this very consideration why the Hungarian courts 
regard this question as a crime against humanity?  
 
The Court goes on to say after an analysis of the particular events: ”The Court therefore is of 
the opinion that Tamás Kaszás did not fall within any of the categories of non-combatants 
protected by common Article 3. Consequently, no conviction for crimes against humanity 
could reasonably be based on this provision in the present case in the light of relevant 
international standards at the time.”689 
 
First is must be highlighted that there is no notion of combatant or non-combatant in a non 
international armed conflict. If Tamás Kaszás was indeed not a protected person under Article 
3, then Korbély did not commit any crime at all, as killing a person directly participating in 
hostilities is not a crime under international law. It is even more confusing that the Court 
earlier indicated that a nexus with war was not relevant in this case. A nexus with war is 
indeed relevant, otherwise Article 3 could not be applied at all. Second, and more importantly, 
the ECtHR has no jurisdiction to examine and evaluate evidence. This is the task of domestic 
courts. The ECtHR’s jurisdiction extends to examining whether domestic courts proceeded in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, it seems that the 
ECtHR went too far with the above statement in intruding into national proceedings. 
 
Poland 
 
The Polish Criminal Code
690
 has certain similarities with that of the Hungarian. Although 
there is a special chapter on „Offences against peace and humanity, and war crimes”, it is not 
complete either. The following crimes are missing: removing tissues or organs for the purpose 
of transplantation, the definition of the crime of attack against cultural property is not 
corresponding with international law, and the Polish penal legislation also has drawbacks in 
integrating command responsibility as well.  
 
                                                 
689
 ECtHR judgment, para 94. 
690
 Criminal Code of 6 June 1997, Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny. (Dz. U. z dnia 2 sierpnia 1997 
r. Nr 88, poz.553), Chapter XVI. The Polish Parliament adopted important amendments to the Criminal Code in 
2009 mainly to reflect obligations of the Rome Statute. 
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The Polish penal code makes the same mistake as the Hungarian, to omit to exactly define 
armed conflict. It is not clear either whether violations committed in a non-international 
armed conflict are to be qualified under ordinary crimes. Giving a definition of armed conflict 
should not be very complicated. Many states give the definition in a specific article providing 
for definitions for the whole code (like in Hungary in the Criminal Code in force, although not 
satisfactorily for the time being), or at the beginning or end of the relevant chapter dealing 
with international crimes or list of the crimes, with a formulation such as ‘who, in an 
international armed conflict, …” (a similar formulation can be found in the German 
Völkerstrafgesetzbuch). For the sake of clarity, it could be advisable even in such cases to 
define international armed conflict. This could either be done through a reference to Article 2 
of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 (4) of Additional Protocol I, or through an 
integration of the text of these treaty provisions.  
 
Estonia 
 
Estonia adopted a new criminal code in 2001
691. Chapter 4, titled “War crimes” includes the 
grave breaches with respectable details and in a systematic manner. It also adopted a unique 
but useful provision, saying that violations committed in armed conflicts that cannot be found 
in Chapter 4 shall be qualified based on ordinary crimes. This, on one side, is self-evident: 
acts that have been committed in an armed conflict, but not related to it (for instance 
burglary), are obviously not to be judged as war crimes. On the other hand, it may also mean 
that acts which were committed in relation to an armed conflict but for one reason or another 
cannot be qualified as war crimes, are to be applied under ordinary crimes, or, as a third 
interpretation, it could mean that with respect to violations to be repressed under international 
law where there is a lacuna in Estonian legislation, ordinary crimes serve as a back-up (an 
example could be the crime of damage or unlawful seizure of property of the enemy, which 
only qualifies as a war crime if committed in a large scale, in other cases, it would be an 
ordinary crime.
692
  
 
                                                 
691
 RT I 2001, 61, 364 (consolidated text RT I 2002, 86, 504), last amended 24.01.2007, entered into force 
15.03.2007. 
692
 See the presentation of Estonian participant at the Conference „The role of the judiciary in the 
implementation of international humanitarian law”, held in Budapest, 29-30 October 2007. Presentation on file 
with the author. 
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The Estonian Criminal Code does not define war either, but the Commentary states that “war” 
is a situation that is described in Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, Article  1 (4) of 
Additional Protocol I and Article 1 of Additional Protocol II.
693
 This means that Estonia has a 
included non-international armed conflicts, but only in the understanding of Additional 
Protocol II. Here the question arises, whether common Article 3 was forgotten, or was left out 
with intention. It must be mentioned here that a reason why national criminal codes are 
reluctant to include non-international armed conflicts in the understanding of Article 3 may be 
that its exact scope of application is difficult to define. One obvious omission in Estonian 
penal legislation is the crime of endangering the physical or mental health of a person under 
the power of a party; otherwise, the Estonian law covers grave breaches and war crimes quite 
extensively
694
. 
 
Lithuania 
 
The Lithuanian criminal code
695
 has dealt with the incorporation of grave breaches and war 
crimes into national legislation with similar depth. The criminal code adopted in 2000 lists 
grave breaches and war crimes in a systematic and exhaustive way. This piece of legislation is 
also clear in regard to the scope of application: the crimes start with the following 
formulation: “who, in international armed conflict, occupation or annexation…”. Lithuania 
can generally be called an eminent in taking its international obligations serious and 
incorporating even those treaty obligations into its legislation that most other countries of the 
region usually forget.   
 
It becomes clear from the examples above that national legislation is still not complete. These 
faults and inaccuracies in national laws may cause major hickups in domestic application, 
because although reference to international law can always be made, it caused in most cases 
problems: either the judges could not interpret international law correctly or issues of legality 
arose.  
                                                 
693
 Ibid. 
694
 Other lacunae: ICC Art 8IIb(xxvi) and e(viii): Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively; ICC Art 8 IIb(xi) and art 8IIe(ix) of the ICC 
Statute: Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary; ICC Art 8IIb(xxiii): Utilizing the presence of 
a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military 
operations; Art 85III(e) of the AP I: Killing or wounding a combatant hors de combat who has not yet 
surrendered at discretion. See presentation of Andres Parmas, note 44. 
695
 Baudžiamojo Kodekso Patvirtinimo Ir Įsigaliojimo, Įstatymas, 2000 m. rugsėjo 26 d. Nr. VIII-1968. 
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3. On the level of internal jurisprudence  
 
Domestic courts are often fighting hard to apply international law, carry out war crimes 
procedures, conform different legal regimes in cases of extradition requests concerning war 
crimes or to withstand political pressure. This daring task demands a concerted effort from 
judges and prosecutors and can only be really successful in case adequate mechanism are at 
place, both in preparing judges for these challenges and in making adequate resources 
available.  
 
The present sub-chapter first lists some cases which demonstrate the difficult circumstances in 
which courts have to operate, often pressurized by politics, the media or public opinion, it 
then gives an overview of mechanisms that may enhance courts’ work, followed by specific 
recommendations for Hungary. The sub-chapter then concentrates on domestic courts’ role in 
exercising universal jurisdiction, followed by a presentation of domestic cases cases in this 
field.  
 
The separate discussion of domestic practice on universal jurisdiction is again necessitated on 
one hand by the fact that given the uncertain legal definitions in international law, domestic 
practice has greatly contributed to an understanding of the application of universal 
jurisdiction, and on the other hand because domestic practice on universal jurisdiction is a 
field where the national jurisprudence’ role is probably greater than in other fields in further 
developing questions arising from not sufficiently clear or controversial international 
obligations. 
 
(i) When domestic courts are trying to solve the problem… 
 
Although we have argued in most of the above pages for the legislator to solve the problems 
and questions of application of international law in national legal systems, in many cases it 
was precisely the domestic courts who were seeking to find a solution to the emerging 
problem and were fighting their way out of political and other pressure. These efforts did not 
always come up with comforting solutions, but are good indicators that it is not only the 
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legislator that is responsible for the body of international law to be regarded in national 
systems. 
 
In the already cited Klaus Barbie-case, French courts faced the problem of making a 
difference between crimes against humanity and war crimes. This problem, notably the 
difficulty in differentiating between these two groups of crimes is a typical drawback of 
international law and its lack of precise definitions. This was even more a crucial question for 
France, since it did allow statute of limitations for crimes against humanity, but not for war 
crimes. In the Barbie-case, the Court of Appeal and the Criminal Chamber disagreed in the 
interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter in this question: while the Chamber adopted a strict 
interpretation of crimes against humanity, the Appeals opted for an extensive application, 
therefore allowing for the punishment of the acts concerned as crimes against humanity
696
.  
 
The root of the question was political, as it was due to fear of the French government that war 
crimes cases could be opened regarding acts of torture carried out by the French army in 
Algeria in the 1950s that it did not accept the non-application of statute of limitations for war 
crimes, as stipulated by the 1968 New York Convention. Since the attempt to shield France’s 
own criminals backfired, the judges had to make do and concentrate on charges of crimes 
against humanity against Barbie in order that he cannot get away from justice. Even with this 
solution, the fact that he could not be tried for war crimes was seen as a major failure of the 
procedure. 
 
Similarly, difficult issues had to be counterbalanced by the judges in the Eichmann-case. Here 
the whole procedure could have been corrupted due to the questionable way and legality of 
apprehension of Eichmann
697
, had it not been the insistence of the Israeli courts arguing for 
the right and interest of Israel to proceed in the case. 
 
Another interesting example was the Képíró-case698. Képíró was a lieutenant in the Hungarian 
gendarm, who participated in the Novi Sad raid in 1942, later called as the “cold days”, an 
infamous series of events during which, as a response to Yugoslav partisan attacks against 
                                                 
696
 See Poncela (2000), pp. 893-894. 
697
 As is well known, Eichmann had been living in Argentina under an alias name. He was apprehended and 
actually kidnapped by the Mossad, without the knowing of the Argentinean authorities. The apprehension was 
clearly in violation of international law infringing the sovereignty of Argentina. 
698
 Sources on the Képíró-case: http://index.hu/belfold/2011/07/18/kepiro_itelet/ (last visited on 23 May 2012), 
the judgment is available at: http://nja.hu/hirek/kepiro-sandor-csendor-ugye/ (last visited on 23 May 2012). 
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Hungarian forces who re-occupied Novi Sad, a raid was held resulting in the death of cca. 
3000 Serb and Jew civilians. Képíró was sentenced in 1944 for 10 years imprisonment for his 
role in the raid, however, he did not have to serve the sentence and was soon replaced into the 
gendarmerie service, due to a decision of Governor Horthy annulling the judgment. His exact 
and direct role was never cleared, and Képíró has always denied charges of directly 
participating in the events. After Képíró moved back to Hungary from Buenos Aires, in 2006 
the Simon Wiesenthal Center made a criminal complaint against Képíró in front of the 
Hungarian authorities for charges of war crimes. The court proceedings started in May 2011, 
followed by a huge media attention.  
 
The Metropolitan Court raised Képíró from the charges on first instance in July 2011, due to 
lack of evidence. The Court did not find that the case was violating the ne bis in idem 
principle, since the decision of the Governor annulling the judgment applied to the judgment 
itself and not the facts determined in it. Since the judgment was in fact sent back to the Chief 
of Staff who, in his discretionary role did not initiate new proceedings, the case cannot be 
considered as inadmissible under the ne bis in idem rule.
699
 
 
Since Képíró died in September 2011, no appeal process could take place. Although the 
Wiesenthal Centre, as well as the Serbian authorities expressed their discontent with the 
judgment, the case remained highly controversial in Hungary due to it having been very badly 
prepared and from the first minute lacking any convincing evidence, many seeing it as a 
makeshift case lacking real evidence pushed by the Wiesenthal Centre to justify its existence. 
The Képíró judgment demonstrated the will of the domestic court being able to free itself 
from political considerations and expectations from parts of the international community and 
relying exclusively on legal issues. 
 
The Zentai-case also merits attention due to its way of handling by the courts, notwithstanding 
the political and media attention around it. Charles Zentai, now an Australian citizen, was a 
member of the Hungarian Army during World War II. He was charged with beating to death 
an 18-year-old Jewish civilian in 1944 for not wearing the yellow star, and dumped his body 
into the Danube. Zentai was tracked down by the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The Center 
initiated his extradition from Australia to Hungary to stand charges of war crimes, which was 
                                                 
699
 See point III. / Facts of the case in the judgment. 
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official confirmed by Hungary in the face of an extradition request. Consequently, in 2005 he 
was arrested in Australia to stand extradition hearings.  
 
The 86-year-old Zentai at the time, suffering from several illnesses, was said not to survive 
the trip to Hungary. After several turns of appeals against extradition and the emergence of 
new evidences, including a testimony from his former commander blaming a fellow soldier 
for the crime Zentai was alleged to have been committed and a polygraph test passed by 
Zentai, he remained in Australia, since the Federal Court stated that it could not extradite 
Zentai due to the fact that Hungary had not laid charges against him but merely wanted to 
question him.  
 
The confusion was about whether Hungary wanted to question him or lay charges against 
him. As the lawyers stressed during the proceedings in Australia, according to Hungarian 
legislation, questioning would come first, during which Zentai would have the possibility to 
argue his innocence, and the questioning could result in charges being brought against him
700
. 
The important issue for Australia though is whether Zentai is wanted for only questioning or 
for trial – a question that is not so clear-cut in the face of Hungarian criminal legislation. 
 
The Australian Minister for Home Affairs appealed the decision in January 2011, but the 
decision was upheld by the Federal Court.
701
 The Court said that it could not accept the 
extradition, because the offence ‘war crime’ did not exist in Hungarian legislation in 1944702. 
The controversy of the case was that the act could have constituted the crime of murder, and 
this was what the Minister of Home Affairs based the extradition decision on.  
 
The issue reached the High Court of Australia, which considered at its hearing in May 2012 
that the crime could have been qualified as murder according to the laws in force in Hungary 
at the time. However, murder was not listed in the extradition treaty with Hungary, but war 
crime was, eventhough war crime did not appear in Hungarian legislation until an 1945 
                                                 
700
 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/hungary-wants-zentai-to-face-murder-charge/story-e6frg6nf-
1226057069337 (last visited on 23 May 2012). 
701
 http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/9461464/o-connor-was-misled-on-zentai-case/ (last visited on 
23 May 2012). 
702
 http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/charles-zentai-war-crimes-case-goes-to-high-
court/story-e6frg13u-1226312099139 (last visited on 23 May 2012). 
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law
703
. The High Court finally decided against the extradition of Zentai. It held, similarly to 
the Federal Court, that the condition of double criminality did not stand, because war crimes 
were not punishable under Hungarian laws in 1945
704
. 
 
The resolution of the Institut de Droit International
705
 raises attention on the need for balance 
between the role of national judges in the application of international law and the fact that 
being functionaries of their own country they are often exposed to political considerations or 
even pressure by their own government. The report sees the strengthening of independence as 
a part of the solution, including through “by removing certain limitations on their 
independence which are sometimes imposed with regard to the application of international 
law by law and by practice”706. The resolution sets out certain guidelines that should lead 
national courts during the application of international law. Although there is nothing striking 
new in the guidelines from the face of international law, some of its points merit attention and 
certainly point towards a more effective system. 
 
The resolution, as a start, supposes that national courts do apply international law: “[n]ational 
courts should be empowered by their domestic legal order to interpret and apply international 
law with full independence.”707, including international customary law – which, as we had 
seen from cited cases, was not always obvious for national courts –, and general principles of 
law
708
. It also states that courts should enjoy the same freedom of interpretation as they do 
with other sets of rules. Finally, the following Article of the resolution could be easily 
understood, but not only, for universal jurisdiction cases: “[n]ational courts should have full 
independence in the interpretation of a treaty, making every effort to interpret it as it would be 
interpreted by an international tribunal and avoiding interpretations influenced by national 
interests”709. 
 
                                                 
703
 http://www.echotv.hu/kulfold/megnyitottak_a_charles_zentaiugy_utolso_fejezetet.html (last visited on 23 
May 2012). 
704
 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/charles-zentai-case-the-last-nazi-pursuit/story-e6frg6nf-
1226451325521 (last visited on 3 September 2012). 
705
 „The Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of their State, Final Report”, adopted in 
Milan, in: 65 Yearbook of the Institute of International Law (1993) (hereafter the Milan resolution). 
706
 Ibid, Preamble, paras 4-5. 
707
 Ibid, Article 1. 
708
 Ibid, Articles 4 and 6. 
709
 Ibid, Article 5.3. 
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Although Benvenisti accused the wording of the resolution by being bold and watered-down, 
and not without reason, he admits that the principles adopted by the resolution are meant to 
address doctrines that had been used by national courts to shield themselves from applying 
international law.
 710
 At the same time, when it comes to political pressure, it is not the courts 
that are to blame. The recommendations of the resolution are therefore grouped around these 
two issues: the need for courts to regard international law during their proceedings, and the 
abstaining of the other branches of the state from intervening. The existence of the two are 
inevitable for effective procedures that comply with international law. 
 
The cases cited above in the present chapter and in other chapters of the present study testify 
to the difficulties, not only on the legal field, of courts in facing their tasks. We could not have 
imagined Belgian prosecutors and courts allowing for the prosecution of Ariel Sharon or 
French courts for allowing a criminal procedure against Donald Rumsfeld due to the politics 
around those cases.  
 
The International Law Association established a committee to study the principles on the 
application of international law by domestic courts
711
. Although the report is still in the 
making, the terms of reference of the working group give us a picture of the questions they 
are examining. While the committee is supposed to work on principle of national courts vis-à-
vis “international obligations stemming from international institutions, including international 
courts, rather than to treaty obligations”, the terms of reference acknowledges that „the 
difference between the categories of decisions of international institutions on the one hand 
and treaty obligations, on the other, is not sharp and it may well be that national practices in 
regard of both categories are subject to similar principles.”712 
 
The paper describes the perplexity of the question with the following: “these organs [national 
courts] remain grounded in the legal system and political order of the very state whose acts 
and policies they are to assess against the standards of international law” 713. Yet, the paper 
approaches this issue from the side of international institutions as well: „[t]his duality leads to 
                                                 
710
 Benvenisti (1994), p. 429. 
711
 The Committee working on ’Principles on the engagement of domestic courts with international law’ started 
working in May 2011. See http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/1039 (last visited 5 
October 2012). 
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 Proposal for an ILA Study Group on the Principles on the application of international law by domestic courts, 
adopted by the International Law Association in May 2011, pp 1-2. Available at: http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/1039 (last visited 5 October 2012). 
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(…) practical questions as to when international institutions can, or cannot rely, on decisions 
of national courts.”714 It will be interesting to see the findings of the committee. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that are indeed present for national courts and cannot be 
sided, there are important steps the state could make. The following sub-chapter introduces 
practical mechanisms that could enhance the work of authorities when facing war crimes 
procedures. 
 
 (ii) War crimes units 
 
Recognizing the difficulties in trying serious international crimes, a number of states have set 
up specialized units within their investigative authorities (police and prosecution), 
immigration services and courts to deal with cases concerning international crimes. Such units 
allow for the concentration of information, experience, know-how, expertise and good 
relations with other similar units, with international organizations and within the state 
authorities
715
. Recognizing the boosting effect of war crimes units on effective domestic 
procedures, the EU Council adopted several decisions supporting the formation of such 
bodies
716
.  
 
These units usually comprise of police officers, prosecutors and immigration officials – either 
in one single unit or in separate units within the respective authorities, but working in close 
cooperation. Usually separate units exist in courts. As to the size of the units, the word “unit” 
is often misleading, as these mostly consist of one or two persons only. The personnel of such 
units participated at specialized trainings organized by international organizations, the 
Interpol or by experts of their own countries with experience in international tribunals or 
                                                 
714
 Ibid. 
715
 See REDRESS/FIDH, Strategies for the effective investigation and prosecution of serious international 
crimes: The practice of specialized war crimes units, December 2010 (hereafter REDRESS/FIDH report on war 
crimes units), p. 9. This sub-chapter relies in principle on the findings of this document.  
716
 Preamble, Council Decision 2002/494/JHA, 13 June 2002: “The investigation and prosecution of, and 
exchange of information on, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is to remain the responsibility of 
national authorities, except as affected by international law.” Article 4, Council Decision 2003/335/JHA 8 May 
2003: “Member States shall consider the need to set up or designate specialist units within the competent law 
enforcement authorities with particular responsibility for investigating and, as appropriate, prosecuting the 
crimes in question.” 
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elsewhere
717
. Exchange of information or study trips among units are also contributing to their 
training and further education.  
 
As for the expenses, although it is true that procedures related to international crimes are 
usually bearing high expenses, the setting up of units and their training have very low costs. 
Setting up of the units is merely an administrative measure, with personnel of the units being 
assigned to other cases as well. Trainings provided by international organizations or NGOs, 
such as the ICRC, OSCE or FIDH/REDRESS, are usually either free of charge or financial 
support is available. 
 
The first war crimes units were set up with respect to investigation and prosecution of 
suspects with respect to Nazi crimes. Such units had been set up in Germany in 1958
718
, in the 
US in 1979
719
, in Canada in 1985
720
, in Australia in 1987
721
, in the UK in 1991
722
 and in 
Poland in 1998
723
. However, these units finally ended up prosecuting only a very small 
number of suspects
724
. In the United Kingdom for instance, out of 376 investigations, only 
one prosecution took place. The expenses connected to this one conviction reached an absurd 
sum: the cost of investigation only in the first three years was 5,4 million GBP.
725
 Not many 
                                                 
717
 See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, pp.10-11. 
718
 The Central Office of the State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes  
(Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen)  
www.zentrale-stelle.de/servlet/PB/menu/1193355/index.html?ROOT=1193201 (last visited on 10 January 2012). 
719
 US Department of Justice Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section,  
www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/about/ (last visited on 10 January 2012). 
720
 Canadian Department of Justice, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program. In 1987, the 
Department of Justice Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada were given specific mandates to take appropriate legal action against alleged Second World War crime 
suspects believed to be in Canada. In 1998, the Government expanded its war crimes initiative to modern (post-
Second World War) conflicts, because there was no real distinction between the process and policy applicable to 
WWII and Modern War Crimes. See www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/wc-cg/wwp-pgm.html (last visited on 11 January 
2012) . 
721
 Blumenthal, David A. and McCormack, Timothy L.H. (eds.), The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising influence 
or institutionalized Vengeance? Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008). See Review by Ben Batros, 7/2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009) 440-442. 
722
 See War Crimes Act 1991. 
723
 The Institute of National Remembrance - Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation 
(IPN). See www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/en/35/1/Brief_history.html (last visited on 11 January 2012). 
724
 For instance, the Australian unit was strongly criticized after the decision not the extradite Charles Zentai to 
Hungary. „At its height, from 1987 to 1992, a Special Investigations Unit set up by the Hawke government 
examined up to 800 cases of suspected Nazi-era war criminals living in Australia, but a lack of hard evidence 
and the unreliability of aged witnesses made it difficult to lay charges. Some questioned whether Australia's 
heart was really in the hunt to prosecute crimes committed half a century earlier. A 2006 US-government 
commissioned report accused Australia of having "an ambivalent" attitude to hunting Nazi war criminals and a 
"lack of the requisite political will". See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/charles-zentai-case-the-
last-nazi-pursuit/story-e6frg6nf-1226451325521 (last visited on 3 September 2012). 
725
 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/309814.stm (last visited on 12 January 2012). 
DOI 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2013.002 
 220 
states can afford this. Probably this was the main reason why most of these units were finally 
called off or reorganized.    
 
An impediment of the setting up of specialized units could be that procedures related to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are very rare compared to ordinary cases. Most 
of the domestic cases were related to crimes committed in one specific state or related to one 
specific situation which for any reason had a connection with the prosecuting state: either 
historical links (such as between Rwanda and Belgium and France), geographical proximity, a 
legislation open to universal jurisdiction cases (like in Belgium) or the fact that many 
immigrants arrived from the conflict as a result of advantageous immigration policies (e.g. 
Sweden). At the same time, in Western Europe, nearly all the states already had such cases, 
therefore it can be generally stated that for this or that reason all or most states will have to 
face such procedures.  
 
In addition, the number of processes related to war crimes perpetrated by own soldiers in the 
framework of multi-national military missions has also decreased. The challenges to 
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by own soldiers may be less demanding due 
to the easier availability of the suspect and evidences, still, in substance, these bear a 
significant similarity with cases where the perpetrator was not an own national. 
 
An additional motive for states to set up war crimes units to allow effective procedures was 
that none of these states wanted to be seen as safe havens for criminals committing such 
crimes. The more states establish a set-up allowing for such procedures, the more other states 
will be considered as safe havens. This is especially true for Central European countries, 
where no such units exist, whereas most of the Western European countries either have such 
units or are otherwise dealing effectively with serious international crimes. Consequently, the 
more effective Western European countries become, the more Central European countries will 
be considered as safe havens. 
 
In the endeavor to avoid that a state becomes a safe haven, the immigration authorities also 
have an important role to play. The part played by immigration authorities is often 
underestimated in inexperienced states. At the same time, if we think of it, it is just logical 
that in cases where the perpetrator is not a national of a foreign country, it is the immigration 
authorities that can stop the influx of such persons into the country without being noticed. 
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Therefore their training and close cooperation with other law enforcement authorities is 
inevitable.  
 
Correspondingly, war crimes units or small teams had been set up within immigration 
authorities in various countries to avoid that a person suspected of having committed a serious 
violation of international law can enter the country unnoticed and eventually seek asylum, 
refugee or other status.
726
 The personnel of such units are often specialized in specific 
countries or contexts and work closely with law enforcement authorities. In other cases, 
personnel of war crimes units merely advise immigration officials or carry out specific 
methods, such as special interviewing techniques, to go through 
immigration/citizenship/refugee requests in order to sort out possible suspects of serious 
international crimes
727
. The action specialized units may take varies from refusal to enter the 
country, revoking citizenship or refugee status, refusal of granting refugee status or eventually 
handing the person over to the police.  
 
In addition, immigration authorities may also be useful for ongoing cases in that they may be 
able to track potential victims and witnesses. In Denmark, for example, the Special 
International Crimes Office has access to the files of the immigration authority through which 
it can track down potential victims and witnesses
728
. This resulted in subsequent investigation 
in 22 cases.  
 
It must be noted, however, that numbers of investigations resulting from reports of 
immigration authorities vary. In the UK, although many possible suspects have been detected 
and were refused to enter the country, referral to the police and eventual investigations took 
place only in a relatively small number of cases. It is claimed that among the war crimes 
suspects living in Britain are Saddam Hussein’s senior official, a Congolese police chief and a 
member of the Criminal Investigations Department in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe. It is 
also known that while during the period 2005-2010, 500 applications have been turned down 
                                                 
726
 See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, pp. 11-12. 
727
 Such techniques may include interviewing the applicant about previous jobs during which suspicion may be 
raised if the asylum seeker was a member of the army or militant group at a time when that army/militant group 
was known for commission of serious international crimes, or if the person was a member of the government or 
held important posts in a regime known for grave abuses. 
728
 See p. 2 in: http://www.sico.ankl.dk/media/SICO_2009_-_Summary_in_English.pdf (last visited on 18 
January 2012). 
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due to fear that the applicant had been involved in the commission of war crimes, only 51 
names have been forwarded to the Metropolitan Police, and no prosecution took place
729
.  
 
The numbers give more way to optimism in the Netherlands, where immigration authorities 
refused to grant asylum due to possible involvement in serious international crimes in 
approximately 700 cases, and in 2009, 43 cases have been examined by the police and 
prosecution that had been referred to them by the immigration authorities, out of which 3 
were pending before courts, 2 were in the investigation phase and 38 in the preliminary 
investigation phase
730
. In Denmark, one third of the cases investigated by the Special 
International Crimes Office have been reported by the Danish Immigration Service
731
. 
 
It is important to realize that the number of prosecutions is not the only factor demonstrating 
the successfulness of war crimes units within immigration authorities. Their tasks are usually 
twofold: on the one hand, to ensure prosecutions and track down possible victims and 
witnesses, on the other hand, to be aware if a person suspected of having committed a serious 
international crime entered or is present in the country. This second factor is important in 
order to be able to take action: send the person back to the state of origin or extradite to a state 
which has an interest in prosecution, or eventually hand over to an international court should 
such a request be made.  
 
Special units set up in the investigation and prosecution authorities usually comprise of a 
couple of persons within the police and/or prosecution dealing exclusively with war crimes 
cases. In Denmark, the unit comprises of 17 persons (including both investigators and 
prosecutors) and is a part of the Danish Prosecution Service
732
; in Belgium, one senior 
prosecutor is supervising a team and five police officers are dealing only with serious 
international crimes; in the Netherlands, 30 investigators and four prosecutors are dealing 
                                                 
729
 See „Exclusive: Britain: A 'safe haven' for war criminals; More than 50 people wanted for murder and torture 
living here free from prosecution, campaigners say”, The Independent, 6 April 2010, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-britain-a-safe-haven-for-war-criminals-
1936707.html (last visited on 14 January 2012). 
730
 See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, pp. 14-15. 
731
 See http://www.sico.ankl.dk/page34.aspx (last visited on 18 January 2012). 
732
 SICO (Special International Crimes Office), since its establishment in 2002, has opened investigations in 237 
cases related to crimes that have taken place in around 30 countries; out of these, 172 cases have been concluded 
until 2009. See http://www.sico.ankl.dk/page34.aspx (last visited on 18 January 2012). The majority of the cases 
are related to the Middle East, followed by the former Yugoslavia. See 2009 Annual Report 2009 – Summary in 
English available at: www.sico.ankl.dk/media/SICO_2009_-_Summary_in_English.pdf (last visited on 18 
January 2012). 
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exclusively with international crimes
733
; in Germany, two prosecutors are assigned 
permanently and four prosecutors temporarily, and seven investigators are working on war 
crimes cases; in Sweden, the police has a 10-member unit and four prosecutors working on 
international crimes cases.
734
 Investigations into such crimes can often be lengthy, however, 
the Danish unit’s demonstrated aim is to be able to determine within 12 months whether there 
is sufficient evidence to prosecute or else investigation should be halted. In 2009, 22 cases 
have been decided and this goal was met in 16 cases
735
. 
 
Although one can rarely speak of a unit set up within courts, in most states a designated court 
has exclusive competence for international crimes cases and it is the same judge(s) that are 
carrying out the procedures. Such a system allows that a trained and experienced judge is 
dealing with such cases and also contributes to consistent judicial practice. 
 
The result of the overall work of specialized units is nevertheless striking: out of 24 
convictions on account of serious international crimes, 18 involved investigation and 
prosecution undertaken by specialized units.
736
 The International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH) and REDRESS, in their project to map the work of existing units and assess 
their usefulness have gone as far as declaring that “it will be difficult, if not impossible, to 
successfully prosecute a suspect of serious international crimes without special 
arrangements”737.  
 
Indeed, numbers show that the number of investigations, prosecutions and eventual 
convictions are much higher in states having a specialized unit and cases are concluded within 
much shorter time if units exist. In Finland, for instance, ad hoc resources were provided for 
an ongoing case, which resulted in that investigation and prosecution was concluded within 
three years, and the trial was concluded within 10 months. The case raised huge media 
attention. It was unique in its kind in Finland. Around 100 witnesses had been heard in the 
pre-trial phase, most of them abroad; 68 witnesses were heard by the court (out of whom only 
one lived in Finland). The court proceedings included court sessions in Kigali and Dar es 
                                                 
733
 Such a high number of persons assigned only to international crimes may be explained by the fact that the 
Netherlands is a specially affected state due to its favorable immigration policy and its determination to carry out 
effective war crimes procedures. 
734
 See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, pp. 17-18. 
735
 See http://www.sico.ankl.dk/media/SICO_2009_-_Summary_in_English.pdf (last visited on 18 January 
2012). 
736
 See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, p. 18. 
737
 Ibid, p. 21. 
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Salaam to hear witnesses, and a site visit in Nyakizu, Rwanda, where the crimes were 
committed. Finland's Minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, said in an interview that the Nordic 
country was both capable and ready to host the trial. "We have specialists and lawyers 
working in international fields and expertise in international criminal cases ... It's a global 
world, and we're not an isolated island,"
738
. In most countries these time-frames would be 
highly praised even for an average domestic case, let alone for a case involving an 
international crime. It goes therefore without question that the setting up of units dealing with 
serious international crimes requires relatively little effort and results in huge advantages. 
 
(iii) Recommendations for Hungary 
 
Although it is clear that Hungary is not and probably will not be facing an influx of serious 
international crimes suspects on its territory or a mass amount of international crimes cases, it 
should nevertheless not neglect its international obligations. Besides, cases concerning 
international crimes occasionally did show up and at these occasions the Hungarian system 
has mostly demonstrated an instable ability to deal with them. What mostly seems to be 
lacking in Hungary is the recognition of the problem and the will to make it do. Arguments 
relating to the absence of finances, small number of cases or the lack of national interest 
usually outdo any considerations about how the system could be improved without investing 
much money in it. 
 
Due to the relatively small number of ongoing or possible cases and the meager financial 
possibilities it is naturally not viable to set up units composed of several persons in each 
authority: immigration, police, prosecution and the courts. Still, several technical measures 
could be adopted which do not require the allocation of serious funds
739
.  
 
These are for instance: 
 
                                                 
738
 See Prosecutor v Francois Bazaramba (R 09/404), judgment of June 2011. See 
http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/wcpw_vol04issue12.html#rw1 
(last visited on 18 January 2012) and Press Release of the District Court of ITÄ-UUSIMAA of 11 June 2010 
available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Finland-decision.pdf (last visited on 18 January 2012). 
739
 See Réka Varga, Domestic procedures on serious international crimes: interaction between international and 
domestic jurisprudence and ways forward for domestic authorities, in: 9/1 Miskolc Journal of International Law 
(2012) 54-68, p. 67. ff. 
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(i) The setting up of units in each authority with designating personnel who have 
gathered knowledge and information to be able to deal with international crimes cases. 
Such personnel may not have to be assigned to such cases exclusively but would have 
exclusive competence for war crimes and other serious international cases. Within the 
immigration authority this could mean that in case of any suspicions about an 
applicant’s involvement in international crimes – which requires that all the personnel 
is informed to a basic extent about what could be a ‘suspicious case’ - his/her 
application could be run through the “war crimes unit”, who could, should the need 
arise, undertake additional interviews with the person. Within the police and 
prosecution, this would obviously mean that investigation would be carried out by the 
unit or under the supervision or with the assistance of such unit. 
 
(ii) Training could be provided by taking advantage of trainings, conferences, 
workshops organized by international organizations and NGOs,
740
 visiting other units 
to gather experience, seeking cooperation with academic institutions in Hungary and 
abroad and taking advantage of the experiences of Hungarians who had been working 
at international tribunals or courts. This also includes the encouragement of relevant 
personnel for temporary posting to international courts and tribunals. Worth to note, 
that similar units of several countries are organizing conferences and workshops to 
enable exchange of experience of their staff
741
.  
 
(iii) The adoption of adequate legislation to provide an adequate framework for such 
procedures, including taking into account the specificities of such trials, such as 
absence of the suspect (mainly in universal jurisdiction cases), the place of 
commission of the crimes being abroad, protection of victims and witnesses, etcetera. 
 
(iv) Develop cooperation lines where nonexistent and increase cooperation where 
already exists between immigration and investigation (police and prosecution) 
authorities in order to gain from each other’s information on suspects, victims and 
witnesses. Cooperation is also important among units of different countries, especially 
                                                 
740
 For instance the Interpol, the Institute for International Criminal Investigations or the Joint Rapid Response 
Team are regularly offering such training possibilities. 
741
 For example, the Nordic countries organized a conference early 2009, followed by two other events in the 
same year, seeking ways to further cooperate. See p.3 in: http://www.sico.ankl.dk/media/SICO_2009_-
_Summary_in_English.pdf (last visited on 18 January 2012). 
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bearing in mind that investigations and prosecutions are often carried out by several 
countries related to the same situation, such as crimes committed in Rwanda, 
Afghanistan, ex-Yugoslavia or Iraq. Sharing of information and cooperation among 
the units could substantially ease the work of the authorities
742
. It can even happen that 
two countries are investigating in the same incident which means they could benefit 
from each other’s witness testimonies, documents or other relevant information. Worth 
to note that the EU Network of Contact Points in respect of persons responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
743
 brings together experts from 
ministries of justice, police investigators and prosecutors to share information and 
expertise on procedures related to these international crimes. Hungary already has a 
contact point for this network. The network often organizes events and conferences 
and facilitates the cooperation among states for the sharing of experiences. 
 
(v) Finally, on a more general note, the adequate promulgation of ratified international 
treaties is a must-do and a basis of further steps. Notably, the promulgation of the ICC 
Rome Statute would be highly desirable.
744
 
 
As a conclusion, it would be simplicist to blame the individual prosecutors or judges for 
failing to adequately engage in questions concerning international law with which they had 
not met before. This problem requires a complex attitude from the state, and examples of 
many countries demonstrate that if there is a determination to invest a minimal effort in 
creating units and training personnel, states may be in a much better position when confronted 
with cases on international crimes.  
 
                                                 
742
 Taking Rwanda as an example, only in Europe around 10 countries have carried out investigations related to 
the genocide. See REDRESS/FIDH report on war crimes units, pp. 24-25. 
743
 The EU Network was created by decision 2002/494/JHA, of 13 June 2002, of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council and reaffirmed with Council Decision 2003/335/JHA. See http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/gen-
network.htm (last visited on 25 January 2012). In July 2011 the EU network established a permanent secretariat 
in the Hague. 
744
 The issue of the official translation of the Geneva Conventions also regularly comes up. While the Geneva 
Conventions had been promulgated by law nr. 32 of 1954, this did not contain the original text or the Hungarian 
translation. The Hungarian text came out in a specific form, „International treaties from the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs”, nrs. 2000/17, 2000/18, 2000/19 and 2000/20 for the four Geneva Conventions respectively, these had 
been issued in the Official Gazette nr. 112 of 2000. It has been often questioned whether this form of 
promulgating the text of the Geneva Conventions is appropriate and confirms with the principle of legality. 
Although the Hungarian text should have ideally been promulgated in the law of 1954, and the publication of the 
Hungarian text in a form that is practically not a law is far from an ideal solution, reference to non-availability of 
the text of the Geneva Conventions cannot be raised in the present author’s opinion, especially in light of the fact 
that this argument had not been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Korbely case either.  
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(iv) Role of the judiciary in exercising universal jurisdiction 
 
Universal jurisdiction is sought to be an enforcement mechanism whose final application and 
success will be decided in the courtroom. However accurate national legislation may be, its 
fate will finally be decided by the judges through how they apply it, how they harmonize it 
with basic legal principles, or whether they decide to put further restriction on its application 
in the name of the rule of law. In the end, the two factors that the judges will have to consider 
are international morality versus procedural convenience.
745
  
 
Being aware of the motives of universal jurisdiction in the case of war crimes is an important 
aspect while actually applying it. Therefore judges are not completely free as to the 
interpretation of universal jurisdiction, but are bound by an interpretation that is consistent 
with its aim and purpose. At the same time, judges are restricted in the application of 
universal jurisdiction by basic legal principles, procedural rules and the sovereignty of other 
states.
746
 Based on these latter considerations, application of universal jurisdiction has been 
blocked by many judges. 
 
With this experience in the background, it is still a question for the future how universal 
jurisdiction can be made effective in a way that is acceptable for the judges but is also 
fulfilling the role assigned to it. It seems that pursuing a strict and pragmatic approach where 
universal jurisdiction is absolute is not workable or acceptable in many cases, at the same 
time, the restrictions judges link to the application of universal jurisdiction often contravene 
its very essence.  
 
In addition, there are financial aspects influencing the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
Collecting evidence in a country far away and where the act may have happened years or 
decades ago is fairly expensive, and states whose judiciary system is dealing with a 
continuing lack of resources even for their ordinary judicial procedures will not rush to 
investigate and prosecute a case which will be inevitably very expensive and does not concern 
the state directly. Therefore the exercise of universal jurisdiction also depends on the will of 
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 Slaughter (2006), p. 169. 
746
 Regarding the relationship between universal jurisdiction and state sovereignty, see Graefrath (1990), pp. 72-
73. 
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the state and the expression of such will in devoting money, manpower and energy into such 
cases. Countries such as those in Central Europe have typically not taken up such tasks. 
 
(v) National case law on universal jurisdiction 
 
National case law on universal jurisdiction has substantially appeared only in the recent two 
decades and there is a tendency of an increasing number of cases. A non-exhaustive list 
follows below, highlighting some interesting aspects of the application of universal 
jurisdiction, or cases where the application of universal jurisdiction was controversial and 
provides a perfect demonstration of the non-legal considerations. 
  
Belgium, often mentioned as the pioneer in applying universal jurisdiction, has imposed 
restrictions on its application. Although Belgian case law is rich in this respect, here only a 
Supreme Court decision will be highlighted around the much-debated restrictions: 
 
“If '[e]ach High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and 
shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts', as articles 
49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four Conventions, respectively, provide, it requires some 
imagination to construe the provision as requiring that the parties only 'progressively 
realize' the obligation to prosecute war criminals. It may be argued that, because the 
establishment of an efficient prosecutorial system requires harnessing scarce public 
resources, the parties to the Conventions might not have intended to impose an obligation 
on every single State, rich or poor, to prosecute every single war criminal it finds in its 
territory. In spite of the plausibility of this argument, in the travaux préparatoires, no 
intent of 'progressive realization' appears.”747 
 
The Belgian Supreme Court therefore came to the conclusion that the Geneva Conventions’ 
intention was to oblige states to exercise universal jurisdiction in its full understanding 
immediately after the coming into force of the Conventions for them, still Belgian courts, 
                                                 
747 
Belgium, AAZ and Others v FT and Others, Cass. P.031310.F, Supreme Court of Justice (Cour de Cassation), 
decision of 14th January 2004, para 2. In the case, AAZ and others argued that the 2003 law on universal 
jurisdiction, which gave the power to deny prosecution based on universal jurisdiction to the Prosecutor, violated 
the standstill principle. The standstill principle, used mostly in human rights contexts, implies that legislation 
may not weaken protection compared to what it had already reached. Although the Court found that the standstill 
principle was not a general principle of law, in 2005 the Constitutional Court found that it should be a court, not 
the prosecutor, to decide on prosecution.  
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before and after this judgment, adopted certain restrictions around its application, that were 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 3. (ii). 
 
The United Kingdom is also among those states that have shown a willingness to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. A famous example was the recent attempt to arrest Doron Almog, 
retired Major General of the Israeli Defence Forces. The underlying law was the 1957 Geneva 
Conventions Act which provides for jurisdiction of courts of the United Kingdom over 
persons charged with war crimes irrespective of nationality and place of commission of the 
act.  
 
A law firm filed a report with the authorities charging Almog with war crimes allegedly 
committed in Rafah, specifically referring to allegations that he had ordered the destruction in 
2002 of more than 50 Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip. On the basis of the report, a 
London court issued an arrest warrant in September 2005 to be executed against Almog when 
landing with an El-Al flight in London. However, the information about the intention to arrest 
was leaked to the Israeli Embassy, whose officers tipped the General, and eventually Almog 
did not leave the El-Al flight but flew back to Tel Aviv
748
. For fear of clashes between the 
British police and Almog’s security personnel and El-Al security personnel, the British 
authorities did not choose to board the flight and execute the arrest there.749 Following these 
events, many IDF prominents cancelled their trips to the UK for fear of arrest. After the 
2008/2009 Israeli operations in Gaza, the IDF warned its high-level officers750 not to travel to 
states which have legislation in place allowing them to arrest foreign nationals, among them, 
the United Kingdom. 
 
The Eichmann case in Israel, as some scholars suggest, is not really a universal jurisdiction 
case: “(…) this was a case of distinctly nonuniversal jurisdiction: the Jewish state trying a 
man for the extermination of the Jews.”751 One could agree on the first look, but if we think 
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 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7251954.stm (last visited on 28 March 2012). 
749
 For a detailed summary of universal jurisdiction cases against Israeli officials see Csige Zoltán, Nemzeti 
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750
 See http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3658823,00.html (last visited on 29 November 2011). Such a 
warning has also been issued earlier, see  
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5BG%5DSkins%2F_default%2FNo+Skin&ContainerSrc=%5BG%5DContainers%2F_default%2FNo+Container 
(last visited on 29 November 2011). 
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deeper and determine that the Jewish state did not exist when the crime was committed, it is 
more difficult to say that the case was prosecuted based on ordinary jurisdiction, considering 
that a state can only exercise ordinary jurisdiction for acts that were committed against its 
citizens, and citizens obviously only exist when there is a state. So the only jurisdiction that 
comes at hand is universal jurisdiction, and the Israeli State had as much right and was as 
much obliged to try war criminals as were any other states.
752
 It is just that obviously Israel 
was more interested in the prosecution than any other State. 
 
One of the main issues that are discussed around the Eichmann case is the question of 
sovereignty. This could remind us of the customary discussion around the compatibility of 
universal jurisdiction with states’ sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction, however, the real 
question of sovereignty in Eichmann lies somewhere else. The usual issue with state 
sovereignty lies in that based on universal jurisdiction a non-involved state has jurisdiction to 
try someone else’s citizen. However, in Eichmann, the problem came from the fact that he 
was kidnapped from Argentina by the Israeli secret forces, and abduction of a State’s national 
by the forces of another State clearly infringes the former’s sovereignty – a fact also admitted 
by Israel.
753
  
 
Thus, universal jurisdiction does not mean that a state can exercise such jurisdiction using any 
means and it does not give an excuse for any action infringing other states’ sovereignty, it 
merely means that the domestic courts have a special kind of jurisdiction over such crimes. 
The moral rationale of universal jurisdiction is that the gravest crimes are the concern of 
humanity as a whole, not only that of the victims. This has been one of the criticisms of 
Telford Taylor, the American chief prosecutor at the second round of the Nuremberg trials 
against the Eichmann case.
754
 
 
In March 2009, the Association for the dignity of detainees, a Spanish NGO defending human 
rights, filed a complaint (“plainte”) against US officials, among them Douglas Faith, former 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In April 2009 the judge ordered a preliminary 
                                                 
752
 The Attorney General in the Eichmann case underlined: „The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant 
to the principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its 
enforcement, to try the appellant. That being the case, no importance attaches to the fact that the State of Israel 
did not exist when the offences were committed.” See Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 304 
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investigation for having allegedly organizing and establishing a method for the torture, cruel 
inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees under their control in Guantanamo detention 
facility. In June 2009, the Parliament approved a reduction of the universal jurisdiction 
exercised by Spain, as a result of diplomatic pressure exercised on it by, among others, Israel 
and China. This resulted in that universal jurisdiction can be exercised if the accused is in 
Spain or if the victims are Spanish nationals. However, this effort was not without any effect : 
since 2009, news were reporting that the Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor 
responsible for investigating on the interrogation methods of detainees exercised by the US 
government after the September 11 attacks
755
. 
 
Finland had a case against François Bazaramba, a Rwandan pastor, who allegedly planned 
and carried out the massacre of more than 5000 persons who were fleeing from the atrocities. 
Bazaramba lived in Finland since 2003. In June 2009 the prosecutor filed a case against him 
accusing him of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, based on 
universal jurisdiction. In June 2010 he was sentenced for life imprisonment
756
 for genocide 
and murder
757
. The court argued that it was obliged to try the case as it rejected a request for 
extradition by Rwanda, for fear of a lack of a fair trial
758
. The court thereby applied the aut 
dedere aut judicare principle, in that it could not extradite, therefore had to proceed. Although 
this case was based on genocide and not war crimes, the same logic applies as to the 
application of the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 
 
The French Court of Cassation found in the Javor case that the “search for and prosecute” 
provision has no direct effect, although it did not give an explanation, why
759
.  
 
Australian High Court Judge Brennan opined in the Polyukhovich case (The War Crimes Act 
case) – a remarkable reasoning that digests many of the relevant international and domestic 
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 See http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/24/special-prosecutor-probe-cia-interrogations/ (last visited on 
28 March 2012). For developments, see http://articles.courant.com/2011-06-30/news/hc-durham-terror-
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procedure.html (last visited on 28 March 2012). 
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 See http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=36&level1=15248&level2=&level3=&textid=39733 (last 
visited on 28 March 2012). 
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cases related to domestic prosecution of mainly World War Two criminals - that “[t]he 
universal jurisdiction to try war criminals is a jurisdiction to try those alleged to have 
committed war crimes as defined by international law (…) But jurisdiction under municipal 
law to try a municipal law offence which is similar to but not identical with an international 
crime is not recognized as a jurisdiction conferred or recognized by the law of nations. (…) 
However, when municipal law adopts the international law definition of a crime as the 
municipal law definition of the crime, the jurisdiction exercised in applying the municipal law 
is recognized as an appropriate means of exercising universal jurisdiction under international 
law. (…) International law distinguishes between crimes as defined by it and crimes as 
defined by municipal law and it makes a corresponding distinction between jurisdiction to try 
crimes as defined by international law and jurisdiction to try crimes as defined by municipal 
law.” 760  
 
Judge Brennan therefore makes a clear distinction between states exercising jurisdiction in the 
name of the international community and in the name of their own state and between carrying 
out a process for a violation of international law. No matter whether this is done based 
directly on international law or based on municipal law, if the procedure is related to crimes 
defined by international law, its rules on prosecution, elements of crimes, conditions of 
punishment have to be respected by the domestic judge. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
One of the weakest points of international law is its enforcement. As the ICRC regularly 
noted as a response to the argument that international humanitarian law was outdated, the 
problem is not with the rules of humanitarian law themselves, but with the will to comply 
with it and the will to enforce it
761
. With international law containing rules that oblige 
individuals and their violations raising criminal responsibility, the corresponding fields of 
international law have developed quite substantively. International criminal jurisdiction was 
established through the setting up of ad hoc international tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court, and now it is clear that violations of international crimes result in individual 
criminal responsibility. Provisions related to the obligation of states to punish such violations 
have also developed extensively and, despite the significant progress in international criminal 
jurisdiction, national courts shall remain the primary forum for such proceedings. It is such 
domestic proceedings that the present thesis seeks to examine. 
 
In light of the development of international law after the Second World War and the 
statements of states and international organizations, it seems there is a general commitment by 
the international community to repress war crimes. Although war crimes and crimes against 
humanity – although not yet named as such – had already previously been dealt with at the 
international level, and the Hagenbach-trial proved to be a success and well ahead of its time, 
attempts at setting up an international tribunal after the First World War failed. Building 
partially on previous experiences, several mechanisms were established after the Second 
World War to serve this goal.  
 
The mechanisms to repress war crimes operate on two levels: on the international and 
national, developed to work as complementary systems
762
. The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, the 
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establishment of the ad hoc tribunals and special and mixed courts and tribunals, as well as 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court have all supported this development.  
 
A part of this progress in international criminal law is the adoption of individual criminal 
responsibility with the result that criminal accountability can be directly based on 
international law. In parallel to this development the list of war crimes under international law 
has evolved, increased and became more precise, and this development is still in progress. 
Although numerous writings have dealt with the question of collective responsibility 
especially after the Second World War, the notion of collective responsibility is difficult to 
apply in the case of war crimes, and, due to the acceptance of individual criminal 
responsibility, the concept seems pointless. 
 
In addition, the enforcement of the rules of armed conflicts has become an even more cardinal 
question since reference to such rules in modern conflicts seems to serve a new military-
political purpose, with the result that states are bound to demonstrate that eventual violations 
are individual acts, thereby denying an underlying state policy.  
 
The Alien Tort Statute adopted in the United States is somewhat similar to the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction linked to war crimes in criminal cases. The Statute makes reparation claims for 
victims of serious international crimes available before US courts, irrespective of the place of 
the commission of the act or the nationality of the offender or the victim. Although these are 
civil law claims, they are often linked to war crimes due to the nature of the acts, and the 
procedures and arguments of the parties often set an interesting analogy with criminal 
proceedings related to war crimes. 
 
Although the concept of universal jurisdiction was adopted in 1949 for grave breaches, its 
application started only much later. The number of proceedings based on universal 
jurisdiction is still relatively few, although the number is emerging. Even though by today the 
concept is not new, discussions around its exact meaning and contents and ways of 
application are still ongoing. 
 
The international and national levels of accountability are therefore complementary elements, 
putting the primary responsibility to prosecute on states, and only in case of its failure or non-
availability do the international tribunals and courts step in. This sharing of responsibility is 
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articulated in the system of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, and the 
complementarity principle of the International Criminal Court. This system does make sense, 
considering that in most cases domestic courts are in the best position to proceed, taking into 
account the restricted resources of international tribunals. 
 
International law therefore has clearly set obligations relating to the repression of war crimes 
for more than fifty years. These obligations were at first quite general, but with the 
development of the law and the jurisprudence of international tribunals, they became more 
and more elaborate. Obligations now include specific restrictions on defences, certain 
requirements on national procedures or on basis of jurisdiction. These developments all point 
to a certain restriction of state sovereignty. From this point on, states are no longer completely 
free to decide on the criminalization of certain acts but are bound to criminalize them and 
proceed accordingly, acting not on their own behalf but on that of the international 
community.  
 
The Geneva Conventions require states to adopt effective penal sanctions and other measures 
for grave breaches and other violations of their rules. Therefore the ratification of the treaties 
and the adoption of ineffective implementation measures are not enough. The consequences 
of such reckless implementation become apparent during their actual application. Therefore 
the legislator is bound to remedy in advance the eventual problems that may arise during the 
application of international law before domestic courts. 
 
However, since these obligations are stemming from international law, states meet certain 
difficulties in applying them. These difficulties may arise from different factors. The nature of 
international lawmaking entails that international rules are less elaborate than domestic rules, 
and when applied, they have to fulfill the criteria of both the international law requirements 
and domestic legal guarantees. States used several ways to overcome these problems, 
depending on their own systems, and it can be stated that no uniform solution exists. 
 
Although international law determining the list of criminal acts, their elements and the 
conditions of their punishability inevitably constrains the – voluntarily renounced – 
sovereignty of states, states are free to decide on the modes of criminalization within the 
limitations set forth under international law. This is similar to human rights treaties, which 
now reach beyond the state-citizen relationship and regulate to a certain extent the citizen-
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citizen relationship as well, when it comes to the violation of basic human rights by another 
citizen and the obligation of the state to criminalize and punish such violations. 
 
One of the controversial international obligations that was thoroughly examined in the thesis 
is universal jurisdiction. As its application also ventures into political considerations, the 
practice of states is not free from politics. Both legal and political considerations have led to 
the adoption of restrictions to the application of universal jurisdiction. Certain questions, such 
as immunity of state officials while exercising universal jurisdiction by a state has not been 
cleared yet, although there are an emerging number of cases where states did not accept 
immunity in case of former heads of state or other officials, while they seem to uphold 
immunity for acting state officials. 
 
State sovereignty is one of the main arguments of those supporting universal jurisdiction only 
in case of an express authorization under international law. This question is raised mainly in 
connection with the application of universal jurisdiction for crimes committed in non-
international armed conflicts and is a typical example where uncertainty resulting from the 
formulation of the rule under international law is sought to be corrected by domestic 
jurisprudence. The application of universal jurisdiction would normally infringe the 
sovereignty of the state with ordinary jurisdiction, therefore it can be applied only in case of 
express authorization rendered by a treaty or customary international law – according to the 
prevailing view in scholarly literature. Although the rule has not entirely crystallized, 
customary law seems to support this view.  
 
The difficulties of application of international law in domestic systems are not new and not a 
specificity of international humanitarian law or repression of war crimes. The problems of 
legal transformation of international rules into domestic criminal law, however, might be even 
more delicate than in other fields, because complying with international obligations and at the 
same time fulfilling basic legal guarantees may be contradictory. Notwithstanding these 
complexities, it is still unacceptable that states repeatedly seem not to take notice of such 
circumstances and simply refer to the direct applicability of international law.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between international law and national law and its domestic 
application indicates that due to the primary status of international law in case of a collision 
with national legislation – even where it collides with the constitution –, these conflicts must 
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be resolved primarily on the level of legislation, otherwise the state’s responsibility for non-
compliance with international law shall emerge. This is also true in cases where we are facing 
self-executing international norms or in legal systems which accept direct applicability of 
international law in domestic systems. This argument is substantiated by examples where 
domestic courts cannot deal with problems which arise in consequence of a lack of such 
harmonization. Therefore states are bound to consider during the adoption of implementing 
legislation which rules can really be directly applicable and which cannot. 
 
Therefore the discussion on the previous chapters and pages concentrated on demonstrating 
that although direct application of international law by domestic courts may look easy in 
theory and may even work in some states without specific measures, in most cases it meets 
legal barriers and therefore demands a complex attitude. Therefore the question of direct 
applicability of international law by domestic courts has to be looked at from a practical point 
of view and ultimately the conclusion must be drawn that – in continental legal systems even 
more than in Anglo-Saxon systems – direct application only works if the inherent conflicts 
between international law and national legality guarantees are solved through implementing 
legislation. This does not mean, however, that judges are bound to rely solely on domestic 
laws and should not directly rely on international provisions. 
 
States therefore have to decide how they make international obligations workable within their 
own legal systems and boundaries. In order to do this, they have to take into account the 
differences in legal sources – international and national –, different legal cultures and legal 
traditions. There are several ways offered, but the end-result has to be an effective application 
of international law. Solutions where repression of war crimes will in the end not be available 
for one or another reason are not enough to arrive at. States therefore have to consider 
whether or not implementing legislation might infringe basic legal principles, whether or not 
legal security will exist in the outcome, whether or not their solution will be really smoothly 
workable and applied in the courtrooms. 
 
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court gave an important 
impulse to such harmonization. Namely, in the case of the ICC, there is a direct consequence 
attached to the non-ability of state proceedings, embodied by the eventual jurisdiction of the 
ICC. Since all states shall obviously try to prevent ICC jurisdiction in a case affecting them, 
most states, even non-state parties, have started a comprehensive implementation process. 
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This proved to be even more timely in Central European states, where criminal codes adopted 
during the communist era were in need of revision anyway. 
 
Although most of the scholarly writings concentrate on the ‘unwillingess’ and ‘inability’ 
criteria of the compementarity principle, it must be noted that the primary condition for ICC 
jurisdiction based on the principle of complementarity is the lack of investigations or 
prosecutions by the state. The criteria of unwillingness and inability listed in the Rome Statute 
being cumulative, and inaction not being a part of it, if states are not investigating or 
prosecuting for any reason whatsoever – be it lack of adequate implementing legislation or the 
non-adequate application of international law by the prosecutor or the judge – the ICC may 
have jurisdiction. Therefore the demonstration of mere ability or willingness of a state will not 
be sufficient to bar ICC jurisdiction. 
 
The determination of a state being unable or unwilling to proceed raises the question which 
considerations the Court will take into account during such examination and whether an 
international standard exists which could serve as a basis for such analysis. Since it seems that 
such a standard does not exist, the examination of the ICC will most probably be based on 
considerations spread between the frameworks set forth by the Rome Statute (elements of 
crimes, conditions of accountability and so on) and the due process requirements formulated 
under human rights law.  
 
Examining the relationship between the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute and 
universal jurisdiction, we may observe that the following order of jurisdictions seemed to 
appear: (i) war crimes procedures shall be primarily carried out by states having ordinary 
jurisdiction, as normally it is these states that are most interested in the procedure and possess 
the most advantageous conditions to follow through with the procedure (presence of the 
accused, witnesses, documents, etc); (ii) in case states with ordinary jurisdiction do not 
proceed for some reason, then universal jurisdiction shall be applied; (iii) in case no state 
proceeds, and other conditions are met, the ICC may take the case. From above, it is clear that 
although the rules of international law concerning war crimes may have been a source of 
uncertainty for the domestic legislator and the courts, the Rome Statute seemed to have 
clarified many questions and appears to have a more direct influence on domestic legislation. 
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As noted above, there is a fundamental tension resulting from the implementation of crimes 
determined by the logic of international law into the domestic legislation underpinned by 
criminal justice guarantees and this situation raises conceptual questions for the states, such as 
(i) whether international crimes should be regulated in the criminal code, if so, whether 
ordinary crimes can be applied or separate crimes should be adopted, and in the latter case, 
whether it is better to transfer the crimes word for word to national legislation or to re-
formulate them; (ii) whether to make a distinction between crimes committed in international 
and non-international armed conflicts; (iii) how states with continental legal system can apply 
the conditions of accountability determined on the basis of a mixed, or in most cases, Anglo-
Saxon legal tradition; (iv) how they can reconcile the special principles applicable to war 
crimes with their own legality principles. Most issues mentioned above may be dealt with on 
the level of national legislation. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and many 
states amended their legislation after proceeding in one or two relevant cases. 
 
Based on the considerations and questions raised above, the thesis reached the conclusion that 
although no uniform solution exist– bearing in mind the different legal cultures and traditions 
of states –, some common elements may be determined. For instance, it did not prove to be a 
good solution to apply ordinary crimes to war crimes. The reason being that war crimes bear 
specific elements and determination of violation or non-violation of humanitarian law is 
founded on so fundamentally different notions that ordinary crimes cannot represent such 
features.  
 
To give an example, while self-defence must be analysed under domestic law according to 
certain considerations, the concept bears a very different meaning in the case of war crimes. 
Similarly, the principle of proportionality in humanitarian law – a notion often decisive for the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action – is basically untranslatable into ordinary criminal 
law, still, its consideration may be the decisive element in the assessment of a given action. 
Proceeding on the basis of ordinary crimes yields further dangers. It is notably difficult to 
apply the non-applicability of statute of limitations or universal jurisdiction to war crimes 
while these are understood differently for ordinary crimes. 
 
Examining certain states’ legislation and practice we may arrive at the general conclusion that 
in most cases a direct reference to international law may not provide a full solution either. In 
practice, eventual conflicts or non-compliance with the legality principle caused the biggest 
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problems. The nullum crimen sine lege, especially the nullum crimen sine lege certa, and the 
nulla poena sine lege principles are difficult to apply in full in case of a direct reference. This 
is because international law typically does not attach sanctions to crimes and its elements are 
not as clear and well defined as domestic law usually requires. Moreover, the elements of 
crimes of the Rome Statute are enshrined in a document lacking obligatory power, the 
reference to which may also raise issues of legality.  
 
Reference to customary law may also raise the question of clarity and the well-defined 
formulation of crimes. Direct application of customary law may prove to be most demanding 
in states where no national law, not even the constitution declares the applicability of 
customary law in domestic law. 
 
When examining the influence that international tribunals and the ICC exert on domestic 
courts, it may be observed that although especially the procedural rules are based on 
completely different considerations for international bodies, they nevertheless do have an 
effect on domestic courts. In the case of substantive law, such effects may be detected in the 
determination of the elements of crimes, the determination of customary rules and the 
interpretation of the conditions of accountability; in the case of procedural rules, it would be 
the specific rules of international crimes that have an effect, such as the protection of victims 
and witnesses. It must also be mentioned that international courts also refer to domestic 
jurisprudence. 
 
The completion strategies of the ICTY and ICTR prompted both Tribunals to hand over cases 
to domestic courts. Although this had been more successful in case of the ICTY, in both cases 
such hand-overs – be it based on the “Rules of the Road program”, or based on Rule 11bis –  
resulted in a significant development of domestic systems dealing with international crimes 
cases. In the case of post-Yugoslav states, the setting-up of special courts or special 
departments within existing courts and the existence of international experts, as well as the 
adoption of new criminal codes and criminal procedure codes have considerably raised the 
level of national expertise and resulted in more and more autonomous and high-level 
proceedings. In the case of Rwanda, the potential of 11bis cases reaching Rwandese 
authorities resulted in the adoption of numerous pieces of legislation to satisfy fair trial 
requirements and ultimately to make 11bis referrals viable.      
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Obviously, the outcome and success of war crime trials also depends on prosecutors and 
judges. The present study repeatedly mentions the reluctance of prosecutors and judges in 
directly applying international law. That they are reluctant to apply a completely foreign body 
of law in a procedure where they have to comply with standards given within their own legal 
system is by far not to wonder. This is a phenomenon that always reminds us of the necessity 
of states to realize that if they want prosecutors and judges to work with international law 
with more comfort, they have to provide them with sufficient ammunition, such as training, 
availability of documents, experience gained from other countries, motivation to work with 
war crimes cases and so forth. Without the provision of such resources it cannot be expected 
that international law will successfully be applied in domestic courtrooms. Looking at the 
practice of more experienced states, the present thesis arrived at the conclusion that training 
and establishing a group of experts dealing with war crimes (and other international crimes) 
under the auspices of both investigative and immigration authorities as well as courts may in 
itself guarantee effective procedures compatible with international obligations. 
 
The topic of the present debate deserves further study in various fields. The emerging number 
of domestic procedures inevitably results in a growing number of cases in front of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The Court, it seems, happily dives into questions of 
evidence, facts and law, questions that should be decided by domestic courts. An analysis of 
the practice of the ECtHR on cases relating to international humanitarian law and the 
growing, and according to the views of the present author, questionable, activism of the 
ECtHR in elements of domestic cases that are not under its jurisdiction would definitely 
deserve attention. Furthermore, the ICC’s future jurisprudence on weighing the 
complementarity principle, more precisely the inactivity and the inability/unwillingness 
criteria will certainly shed light on the precise obligations of states to evade ICC jurisdiction. 
 
Another matter that deserves attention is the development in national practice around the 
acceptance of immunity of state officials in universal jurisdiction cases. This is an important 
aspect of universal jurisdiction, since immunity was the most often applied obstacle to 
proceedings.  
 
Issues as to the ‘legal imperialism’ applied by Western states directly or through the ICTY 
and ICTR in 11bis cases or the ICC in assessing the admissibility of a case under the 
complementarity principle also deserve further examination. The search for a healthy balance 
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between the need to fight impunity and respect for legal traditions of states and regions is 
inevitable to a functional system of international criminal justice, be it under international or 
national fora, and will certainly be an important question in the future. 
 
A similar issue that deserves further attention is the neo-colonialism argument often raised 
with respect to the application of universal jurisdiction. As is apparent from the AU-EU 
expert report on universal jurisdiction, African states feel that the application of universal 
jurisdiction by European states is primarily directed against African states, and envokes 
feelings of colonialism. While the list of universal jurisdiction cases does not support the 
argument of pinpointing African states, its application is doubtlessly a sensitive issue, 
especially when it concerns foreign heads of state or other senior state officials. Since the 
primary aim is to end impunity, the ideal solution would be if the territorial/nationality states 
could and would proceed. Therefore efforts should be strengthened to increasing the capacity 
of such states and the application of universal jurisdiction should only be a last resort. 
 
In sum, it must be noted that generally the activity of domestic courts is increasing with 
respect to prosecuting war crimes; however, it seems that the legislative and practical 
background – especially in Central European states – although already under development, 
still needs improvement. Scholarly literature has recently started to deal with this specific 
issue and a dialogue not only among academic circles, but also involving experts from the 
practice would be highly desirable. Examples of certain states demonstrate that once a general 
discussion has begun on the issue, it is always followed by an improvement in the awareness 
about the problem, legislation and general approach. The present thesis attempted to provide a 
contribution to this effort, with the hope that such discussions will also continue in Hungary. 
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Annex: Legislation related to the prosecution of war crimes in selected Central 
European countries
763
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 Specific references to articles are not indicated to avoid heavy footnoting. These references are available with 
the author on request. The table was prepared partially based on the research undertaken by the author for 
REDRESS/FIDH on universal jurisdiction. The REDRESS/FIDH report, including the findings of the research, 
are available at:  
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_States_of_the_
European_Union.pdf (last visited on 21 March 2012). 
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 Poland
764
 Hungary
765
 Czech Republic
766
 Slovenia
767
 Slovakia
768
 
Universal jurisdiction Yes (if Poland is obliged 
by international treaties 
to prosecute and if no 
decision on extradition 
has been made) 
Yes (if international treaty 
promulgated in law 
stipulates) 
(i) Yes, for certain war 
crimes 
(ii) for other war crimes yes, 
but only if the offender is 
apprehended on the territory 
of the Czech Republic and 
was not extradited 
Yes, if the person has been 
apprehended in Slovenia 
and is not extradited, for 
crimes for which 
international agreement 
establishes universal 
jurisdiction 
Yes for certain war 
crimes 
Discretion to launch 
proceedings of war 
crimes 
Prosecutor ex officio Prosecutor General Prosecutor Prosecutor / private 
prosecutor, but it can be 
overruled by a panel of 
investigating judges 
Prosecutor General 
Who decides on 
extradition? 
If extradition is 
requested, Voivodship 
Court decides. Minister 
of Justice may request 
another state to take over 
(if accused is foreigner) 
Extradition request is 
received and sent by the 
Minister of Justice or the 
Prosecutor General. 
Extradition request is 
decided by the Metropolitan 
Court. 
No information No information No information 
Is subsidiarity a 
requirement for 
universal jurisdiction 
cases? 
Yes, universal 
jurisdiction only 
applicable if no 
extradition was made 
No rules No information Yes, universal jurisdiction 
only applicable if no 
extradition was made 
No information 
Can own national be 
extradited for war 
crimes? 
Yes Yes No information No information No information 
Case law on universal 
jurisdiction? 
No No. Civil party prosecution 
was filed at the General 
Prosecutor's Office against 
the government of Israel for 
acts committed during the 
operation in Gaza in 
2008/2009, based on 
universal jurisdiction. 
Application rejected. 
No No No 
                                                 
764
 Answers are based on the following legislation: Criminal Code of 1997 as amended (substantial amendments 
weer adopted in 2009), Penal Procedure Code of 1997 as amended. 
765
 Answers are based on the following legislation: Criminal Code Nr. 100 of 2012, Criminal Procedure Code Nr. 
19 of 1998, The Basic Law of Hungary. 
766
 Answers are based on the following legislation: Criminal Code (Act No. 40/2009 of the Collection of Laws) 
as amended, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 141/1961 of the Collection of Laws) as amended, 
Constitution of the Czech Republic of December 16, 1992. 
767
 Answers are based on the following legislation: Criminal Code (Official Gazette No. 55/2008, corrected No. 
66/2008), Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 32/2007), Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia. 
768
 Code of Criminal Procedure, Criminal Code (Law no. 300/2005 coll.) as amended. 
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In absentia proceedings Presence of the accused 
at the first instance 
hearing is mandatory, 
unless otherwise 
provided by law. If the 
accused, notified of the 
date of the hearing, states 
that he will not 
participate, the court may 
continue the hearing 
without his presence, 
unless it finds the 
presence of the accused 
indispensable. 
The fact that the location of 
the defendant is unknown 
shall not be an obstacle of 
the proceedings. Absence of 
accused is not an obstacle to 
proceed with the 
investigation. In case the 
accused is abroad and there 
is no place for extradition 
the prosecutor may initiate 
that the trial is held in the 
absence of the accused. 
Yes No for universal jurisdiction 
cases. Yes for ordinary 
jurisdiction cases, if his 
defence counsel is present at 
the trial and if the defendant 
has already been heard. 
No information 
Statute of limitation 
applies for war crimes 
No No No No No 
Immunity applies for 
war crimes 
Diplomatic immunity. If 
immunity is granted by 
international law. 
As governed by 
international law, and 
immunity based on national 
law. 
Not clear, whether usual 
domestic law-based 
immunities also apply for 
war crimes. 
Yes, for MPs, members of 
the National Council, 
Constitutional Court judges, 
judges; and for persons 
based on international law 
(these are not excluded for 
war crimes!) 
Yes, immunities 
afforded by 
domestic law and 
international law 
Private 
prosecution/substitute 
prosecution 
Yes (injured person). The 
public prosecutor’s 
withdrawal of the charges 
does not deprive the 
subsidiary prosecutor of 
his right to press charges 
Yes, but ultimately 
prosecutor decides. 
No information Yes No information 
Domestic arrangements 
to investigate/prosecute 
serious international 
crimes 
No specific measures No specific measures No specific measures Special group established in 
1994 within the Criminal 
Police Directorate to 
investigate crimes 
committed after World War 
II 
No specific 
measures 
Legal basis for 
cooperation with ICC 
Yes (2004 amendment to 
the Penal Code).  The 
cooperation will be 
implemented by the court 
or prosecutor through the 
Minister of Justice 
Partially. ICC Rome Statute 
was not promulgated. 
However, ICC requests are 
handled similarly to general 
cooperation requests.  
No information No information No information 
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Case law on war crimes Yes. Case launched in 
2007 against soldiers for 
unlawful attacks against 
civilians in Afghanistan. 
All acquitted 
Yes. Cases concerning the 
1956 revolution. Latest: 
case against Béla Biszku, 
former Minister of Interior. 
No information Not on war crimes, but a 
case on crimes against 
humanity involving 
massacres committed after 
the Second World War, 
killing political opponents 
of the communist regime  
No 
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